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The Willem C. Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot is an 
international competition held annually in Vienna, Austria, since 1994. Drawing more 
than three hundred law schools from around the world, the goal of the Vis Arbitral Moot 
is to foster the study of international commercial law and arbitration for resolution of 
transnational business disputes through its application to a concrete problem, while 
training law leaders of tomorrow in methods of alternative dispute resolution. 
This year’s Moot involves a dispute arising out of a sales contract between two 
parties whose places of business are Contracting States to the United Nations Convention 
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods [CISG]. The contract signed between 
them provides that if an agreement cannot be reached, all disputes shall be settled by 
arbitration in Danubia, that has enacted the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration [Model Law] and is a signatory party to the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. As for the 
applicable arbitral rules, this edition of the Moot is to be conducted under the Centre for 
Arbitration and Mediation of the Chamber of Commerce Brazil-Canada (CAM-CCBC). 
Attracted by the features of this dispute resolution method, the business 
community has been demonstrating a growing interest in resolving international 
commercial disputes through arbitration. Therefore, participation in the Moot serves as 
one of the most pragmatic mechanisms for law students to delve into the crucial aspects 
of arbitration while having to represent clients in an international framework. In order to 
achieve this, students are first required to write memoranda for claimant and respondent, 
and then to orally present their arguments, which must be extensively backed by relevant 
literature, doctrine, and jurisprudence, before a panel of arbitrators. Hence, the written 
and forensic exercises compel the analysis and understanding of a multitude of 
contractual elements tied to a transaction related to the sale and purchase of goods under 
the CISG and other uniform international commercial laws, in the context of an arbitral 
forum governed by specific rules. 
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For the first time, NOVA Faculty of Law takes part in this globally-renowned 
competition. The team was assembled following last year’s curricular unit Moot Courts, 
which was taught in both Mestrado em Direito Forense e Arbitragem and Mestrado em 




In contemplation of the Vis Moot oral hearings that will take place in Vienna next 
April and which represent the culmination of the competition, the NOVA Faculty of Law 
team has been working on the Problem since October 2016. Since then, we have 
submitted a Request for Clarifications and two written memoranda, firstly on behalf of 
Claimant (December 2016), and then on behalf of Respondent (January 2017). Moreover, 
as of this moment, the team has competed in the São Paulo and Lisbon pre-moots, aimed 
at exercising and improving the team’s performance for the official oral hearings in 
Vienna. 
This year’s Problem encompasses four major issues (procedural and substantive). 
Although the pairs below worked extensively on each procedural and/or substantive 
argument, for the sake of this report and subsequent oral discussion, the team has decided 
to delegate the issues in the following manner: Catarina and Isabel focused on the 
procedural issues (Admissibility of the Claims and Security for Costs, respectively) while 
Mariana and António concentrated on the substantive issues of the dispute (Applicable 
Exchange Rate and Money Laundering Levy, respectively). 
 
Procedural Issues 
I. Admissibility of the Claims: Are CLAIMANT’s claims admissible or have they been 
untimely submitted?  
Pursuant to Section 21 of the Contract [Dispute Resolution Clause], the Parties 
agreed that [A]ll disputes arising out of or in connection with this Agreement shall be 
settled amicably and in good faith between the parties. If no agreement can be reached 
each party has the right to initiate arbitration proceedings within 60 days after the failure 
of the negotiation (…). The arbitration shall be conducted under the Rules of the Center 
Trabalho de Projecto 
Willem C. Vis International Commercial Arbitration Moot 
4 
 
for Arbitration and Mediation of the Chamber of Commerce Brazil-Canada (“CAM-
CCBC”) and in line with international arbitration practice (…).  
As the only relevant information regarding the origin of this clause is that it was 
the standard dispute resolution clause used between subsidiaries of Engineering 
International S.A., the Parties’ former parent company, the teams are invited to interpret 
the wording of the arbitration agreement, particularly the meaning of initiating arbitration 
proceedings by reference to the selected arbitration rules - namely the need for 
compliance with the requirements for valid commencement, set out in article 4 CAM-
CCBC Rules, entitled Commencement of the Arbitration. 
The commencement of arbitral proceedings comes with numerous legal 
consequences, the most relevant being the effect reflected on any applicable time limits. 
More precisely, the valid commencement of arbitration usually stops the running of 
eventual time limit provisions for referring a dispute to be resolved. If one fails to comply 
with the agreed limit, he or she may become unable to pursue its claim, since it would be 
rendered inadmissible as time barred, in light of the legal certainty commonly envisioned 
in the nature of those provisions. 
The main issue thus pertains to whether Claimant has complied with the 60-day 
time limit for commencing arbitration. For this purpose, and since time was of essence, it 
is a priori necessary to establish the exact date on which negotiations between the Parties 
failed and therefore the kick off of the time limit. According to Respondent, on 1 April 
2016, when the former stated to the latter that since it was “not possible to find an 
amicable solution” in the meeting held between the Parties on the previous day, Claimant 
had instructed its lawyer to take the necessary steps to initiate arbitration. However, at the 
same time, Claimant also declared that it remained open to negotiations should 
Respondent be willing to reconsider its position.  
Should this communication be deemed insufficient to acknowledge the failure of 
the negotiations, there is little ground to support the notion that the negotiations failed at 
another time, as the Problem is silent in regards to a possible posterior event in that sense. 
It is therefore reasonable to consider that the 1 April 2016 is the relevant starting 
point, which means that the 60th calendar day after the starting date would fall on the 31 
May 2016. Yet, curiously, this was also the day when Claimant submitted it Request for 
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Arbitration to the CAM-CCBC, albeit failing to comply with all its conditions of form as 
laid down in articles 4.1 and 4.2 of CAM-CCBC Rules. 
Seeing that the Request did not contain the required power of attorney signed by 
Wright Ltd [Claimant] and the Registration Fee was only partially paid, the Secretariat of 
CAM-CCBC first ordered CLAIMANT to amend those defects before sending the 
Request for Arbitration to RESPONDENT, not clarifying whether the arbitration had in 
fact commenced. The correct power of attorney [by Wright Ltd] was signed on the 5th of 
June and subsequently submitted on the 7th of June 2016, along with the proof of payment 
of the registration fee now in full – however, both already beyond the expiry of the 
contractual time limit. 
The question therefore arising is whether an incomplete Request is sufficient to 
stop the time limit from expiring. The CAM-CCBC Rules mandatorily requires both the 
power of attorney and payment of a registration fee; yet, alternatively, as the mentioned 
rules do not specifically determine the commencement date of proceedings as opposed to 
other sets of institutional arbitration rules, one can question if the Tribunal can remain 
satisfied with a clear demonstration of intention to initiate proceedings from the initiating 
party on the 31 May 2016, before the said expiry. 
Therefore, the date on which arbitration shall be deemed effectively or properly 
commenced for the purpose of setting aside the applicable time limit remains debatable. 
It is for teams to equate the retrospective effect of the later presented power of attorney 
or the very own nature and purpose of the obligation of payment of the registration fee, 
as well as, ultimately, the necessary balance between party autonomy and favor 
arbitrandi, both foundation stones of the preferred dispute resolution method. Finally, the 
manner through which the Arbitral Tribunal should articulate those somewhat apparently 
conflicting paradigms in the case at hand must also be considered. 
 
II. Security for Costs: Does the Tribunal have the power and, if so, should it order 
CLAIMANT to provide security for RESPONDENT’s costs? 
In case the arbitration is considered to have been timely initiated, the procedural 
issue to be addressed subsequently is the Request for Security for Costs filed by 
Respondent. In regards to this issue, two main questions may arise: whether the arbitral 
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tribunal has the power to grant Security for Costs and, should the tribunal find it has, 
whether the measure should be applied to the present case. 
Concerning the tribunal’s power to order Security for Costs, Claimant’s 
perspective may be that the tribunal should not have the power to grant Security for Costs 
since neither article 8 CAM-CCBC Rules nor article 17 Model Law expressly provide for 
such. Besides, the Rules seem to adopt an even-handed scheme according to which each 
party should equally bear the costs of the arbitration. However, international arbitration 
practice has almost unanimously adopted the opinion that a general provision on interim 
and conservatory measures (as foreseen in article 8.1 CAM-CCBC Rules) implicitly gives 
the tribunal the power to order Security for Costs. The same perspective applies to the 
Model Law (lex arbitri), as the UNCITRAL Working Group has made clear that article 
17.2(c) should include Security for Costs within its scope of application. 
Thus, should one consider that the tribunal has the power to order Security for 
Costs, the issue concerning the application of the measure in the case at hand is to be 
discussed. 
Respondent contends that Claimant’s submissions lack any factual or legal basis, 
in addition to Claimant’s non-compliant and misleading intent, and that its financial 
situation has unexpectedly deteriorated since the conclusion of the Development and 
Sales Agreement, hereinafter the DSA, to the point where Claimant may be facing an 
imminent insolvency situation. 
The first question that may arise from Respondent’s submission concerns the 
requirements to order the other party to provide for Security for Costs. Though Security 
for Costs is commonly accepted as an interim measure, it is not a traditional one since it 
aims to assure the compliance with an award on costs rather than an award on the merits 
of the dispute. Furthermore, the measure does not require any state court assistance to be 
enforced: generally, the lack of payment leads either to the stay of the proceedings or to 
the issuance of an award against the defaulting party.  Thus, the requirements to grant 
Security for Costs are not merely the traditional fumus boni iuris (the likelihood to 
succeed on the merits) and periculum in mora (the risk of irreparable harm). Rather, 
international arbitration practice has previously taken into account that to order Security 
for Costs the requesting party must be likely to be awarded costs in case it is successful 
on the merits and that the financial situation of the party against whom the measure is 
sought has been unexpectedly and exceptionally altered since the conclusion of the 
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contract due to a change of circumstances. Moreover, consideration is also given to both 
parties’ past and present behavior. 
In the case at hand, although there is no express provision neither on the Rules nor 
on the Terms of Reference regarding the costs allocation rule, which means that the 
tribunal has wide discretion on the matter, relevance ought to be given to the fact that the 
arbitrators are from jurisdictions where the costs follow the event principle is applicable 
and that both parties have requested the other party to bear the costs of the arbitration in 
case they are successful. 
Additionally, Respondent, who traditionally bears the burden of proof, should 
demonstrate that Claimant’s submissions are prima facie meritless. This might be a 
difficult requirement to fulfill since Claimant supports its position on the grounds that the 
parties have entered in a contract with a the risk-sharing structure. Therein, they had 
expressly included a clause which provided that the costs incurred by the transfer of the 
purchase price were to be borne by the buyer (Respondent). Regardless, in cases where 
both parties have a prima facie case, the tribunal may take into account other relevant 
factors to assess Respondent’s request. 
The main question deals with whether Claimant’s financial situation has 
unexpectedly or exceptionally deteriorated since the conclusion of the contract. On this 
regard, several aspects have to be considered. 
First, the fact that Claimant – before the conclusion of the DSA - had allegedly 
created the impression that it would be awarded 100 million dollars in an investment 
arbitration when, in reality, it was only awarded a fraction of such amount. On this point, 
relevance may be given to Respondent’s possible duty to be informed about Claimant’s 
realistic expectations, taking into account the international balance sheet which was 
publically available at the time. 
Second, not only Claimant has not yet complied with an award rendered against 
it, which is now being enforced in a state court, but also has sought third party funding 
for the current proceedings (and had already resorted to such mechanism in previous 
investment arbitrations). Though arbitral tribunals take seeking external funding into 
consideration when assessing an application for Security for Costs, this is generally not 
enough evidence that the party against whom the measure is sought is facing financial 
difficulties. 
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Third, whether Claimant is facing a strained liquidity situation. As far as this 
aspect is concerned, one should take into account that such strained liquidity situation 
may be associated not only with Claimant’s business model but also with Respondent’s 
alleged failure to comply with its obligations under the DSA. The exceptionality of 
Security for Costs is especially highlighted on this matter: authors and arbitral tribunals 
have been adopting the perspective that Security for Costs should not be granted if the 
applicant has somehow taken the risk of contracting with a company whose business 
model or financial situation was known or could have been known at the time they entered 
into a commercial relationship. Moreover, the fact that Respondent has allegedly not 
complied with its obligations under the DSA may be accepted as grounds for exclusion 
of any right of protection. 
 
Substantive Issues 
III. Applicable Exchange Rate: Is CLAIMANT entitled to the additional payments from 
RESPONDENT for the blades based on the exchange rate US$ 1 = EQD 1.79?  
This issue deals with how Section 4(1) of the DSA should be interpreted, taking 
into account article 8 CISG. The parties agreed that the contract is governed by the CISG 
and, for issues not dealt with by the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts are applicable [UNIDROIT Principles]. 
 The Parties disagree on the interpretation and scope of some of the terms, in 
particular that of the applicable exchange rate. After all, the exchange rate has a strong 
influence on which party is to be bear the currency risk, and constitutes a major concern 
in international transactions. In the case at hand, the exchange rate risk derives from the 
contract price being in US$, while the production costs were incurred in EQD 
[Equatorianian Denars] by Claimant.  
The difference of the exchange rate between these currencies at the time of 
contract formation and time of contract performance resulted in a price difference of US$ 
2,285,240, which is the basis of Claimant’s submission. The Price Formula, present in 
Section 4(1) of the DSA, reads: 
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Section 4 PURCHASE PRICE 
1. The purchase price is calculated on a cost-plus basis according to the following 
formula: 
 Production Costs per blade ≤ 9,500 US$: 9,975 US$ 
 Production Costs per blade: 9,500 – 10,500 US$: Costs + 475 US$ (5% of 9,500) 
 Production Costs per blade: 10,501 – 11,500 US$: Costs + 420 US$ (4% of 
10,500) 
 Production Costs per blade: 11,501 – 12,000 US$: Costs + 345 US$ (3% of 
11,500) 
 Production Costs per blade: 12,001 – 12,500 US$: Costs + 240 US$ (2% of 
12,000) 
 Production Costs per blade: 12,501 – 13,000 US$: Costs + 125 US$ (1% of 
12,500) 
 Production Costs per blade ≥ 13,125 US$: 13,125 US$ 
The minimum price per fan blade irrespective of production costs is US$ 9,975 
while the maximum price to be charged per fan blade is US$ 13,125. 
Should the production costs per fan blade exceed US$ 13,125 due to 
extraordinary unforeseeable circumstances and result in unbearable hardship for the 
Seller the Parties will enter into good faith negotiations to determine a price which is 
financially acceptable to both parties. 
 
 The exchange rate issue entails the application of articles 8 and 9 CISG. Article 8 
regards parties’ intentions and article 9 the practices and usages.  
 For various reasons, since the agreed upon contract, at first, did not contain a 
provision as to which exchange rate was to be applied - whether the one at the time the 
contract was concluded [US$ 1 = 2.0 EQD] or the one at the time the fan blades were 
produced [US$ 1 = 1.79 EQD] – this calls for the analysis of parties’ intention when 
negotiating and signing the DSA, pursuant to article 8 CISG. When negotiating the terms 
of this agreement, this matter was not discussed.  
 Claimant contends that only if the costs are converted at the rate at the time they 
are incurred it can be sure to recover its actual costs, which was one of the purposes of 
the price mechanism. Respondent, by contrast, relies on the Parties relationship and 
previous practices. In relation to their relationship and drafting history, Respondent 
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invokes a meeting in November 2009 convened by the then mother company of both 
Parties, Engineering International SA, where Respondent’s potential sale was discussed. 
In order to make it more attractive to potential buyers, Engineering International decided 
that Respondent was to be de-risked from all currency risks in existing contracts by 
agreeing on a fixed exchange rate or other hedging strategies. 
 A few months after the DSA was concluded, Respondent noticed it had to buy 
clamps specifically from Claimant. Thus, an addendum regulating that order and adding 
a provision regarding the applicable exchange rate was signed, which also calls for its 
interpretation. The main question, therefore, is whether this provision also applies to the 
sale of the fan-blades, or if it is contained and meant only for the sale of the clamps.  
Addendum of 26 October 2010 (handwritten)  
The Buyer may request the Seller to produce and deliver 2,000 clamps to attach 
the fan blades to the fan shaft.  
The Price for the clamps shall be on a cost coverage base and be paid in US$.  
Other terms as per main Agreement.  
The exchange rate for the agreement is fixed to US$ 1= EQD 2.01. 
Claimant contends that it does not extend, as such a delicate and decisive matter 
should have been properly addressed and cannot be implied from the exchange rate 
provision contained in the addendum, being opposed to Respondent’s submission that 
this provision clearly aimed at the whole agreement. Moreover, Respondent relies on the 
fact that the parties were, at that point, no longer subsidiaries of the same group of 
companies, and that therefore, an express clause regulating the applicable exchange rate 
was necessary.  
 Given the apparent ambiguity of that provision, the question regarding the 
application of contra proferentem rule may be raised, since it was the Respondent who 
suggested the addendum and respective wording.  
In conclusion, Claimant requests payment of the outstanding amount of US$ 
2,285,240.00 which corresponds to the remaining purchase price when applying the 
current exchange rate of US$ 1 = 1.79 EQD. 
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IV. Money Laundering Levy: Is CLAIMANT entitled to the additional payments from 
RESPONDENT for the fees deducted by the Equatoriana Central Bank? 
This issue deals with how Section 4(3) of the DSA must be interpreted, taking into 
account article 8 CISG once again. The Parties disagree on the nature, effect, and scope 
of some of the terms. However, Respondent advanced that, alternatively, an analogous 
application of article 35(2) is suitable, when considering that since the Seller is not 
obligated to know of all public law regulations in the country of the counterparty, the 
same should apply to the Buyer. The CISG is silent on this particular situation. 
Furthermore, given the facts of the present case, there is an inevitable discussion on 
whether it was Claimant who failed on its duty to inform or Respondent failed on its duty 
to be informed about the existence of the Levy, which brings to light articles 7, 54, and 
80 CISG. 
Regulation ML/2010C entered into force on 1 January 2010 as the Equatoriana 
government aimed at improving its bad reputation as a safe haven for money of dubious 
origins and was therefore implementing extensive legislation based on the UN-Model 
Provisions on Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, Preventive Measures and 
Proceeds of Crime. Regulation ML/2010C envisioned the creation of a Financial 
Investigation Unit, which under the auspices of the Equatoriana Central Bank, a 
government entity who transfers its profits to the Minister of Finance, deducted a 0.5% 
levy from every investigated transfer into Equatoriana of more than US$ 2 million. When 
Respondent transferred the amount as per Claimant’s invoice of 14 January 2014, a total 
of US$ 102,192.80 was deducted from that payment. 
Section 4(3) of the DSA reads: 
3. The BUYER will deposit the purchase price in full into the SELLER’s account 
at the Equatorianian National Bank, Ocean Promenade 3, Equatoriana, IBAN 1209 3456 
6798; SWIFT EQXPL6. The bank charges for the transfer of the amount are to be borne 
by the BUYER.  
[added emphasis] 
The question is whether the levy is envisioned in this provision, and if not, who 
must bear it. Therefore, in order to better understand how this Section may be interpreted, 
there will first be an analysis of the origin of the provision, which leads to whether 
Claimant or Respondent knew or ought to have known about the levy at the time of 
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contracting. Then, specific terms such as “deposit”, “bank charges”, and being liable for 
costs for the “transfer” of the amount are examined. Finally, Claimant alleges that 
Respondent ought to have performed adequate due diligence while, conversely, 
Respondent argues that Claimant ought to have informed it about the Regulation.  
Section 4 of the DSA, including the provision on bank charges, was taken from a 
previous agreement between the Parties, concluded in 2003. It seems that when the DSA 
was signed in 1 August 2010, the Parties had a very limited notion on the scope and 
finality of the bank charges provision, as the persons negotiating the DSA were not even 
aware of the actual effect of the Regulation.  
On one hand, while it is true that Claimant bore the Levy in contracts with third-
parties twice (May 2010 and December 2011), Claimant only did so due to the fact that 
those contracts did not contain a bank charges provision such as Section 4(3). Up until 
the date of payment, only Claimant’s financial department fully understood the 
Regulation. But on the other hand, the levy results from a very specific public law 
regulation and is present only in six countries worldwide, in particular not in 
Mediterraneo, Respondent’s place of business. It is uncontested that Respondent only 
became aware of Regulation ML/2010C when Claimant approached its bank on 12 
February 2015 and was informed that a deduction had been made from the payment of 
the fan-blades.  
According to Section 4(3) of the DSA, Respondent is obligated to i) deposit the 
full purchase price in Claimant’s bank account, and ii) bear bank charges for the transfer 
of the amount. Interpretation by the opposing Parties of the specific terminology 
necessarily leads in different directions. For instance, to begin with, Claimant states that 
Respondent must account for the deducted amount as the purchase price was not 
deposited in full, which is in clear breach of the wording of the provision. In response, 
Respondent raises the question of the moment of passing of risk in case of payment by 
transfer (but since the CISG does not deal with this issue specifically, and seeing that the 
Parties agreed that the UNIDROIT Principles could be applied subsidiarily, Article 
6.1.8(2) may be of relevance, and the fact that presented evidence points at how payment 
was confirmed to have been effected. Then, the issue of whether Respondent must only 
bear charges specifically by banks is put forward, since the Equatoriana Central Bank is 
not a “commercial bank” per se. Finally, the actual purpose of the levy is analyzed - is 
payment of the levy a necessary step to effect payment into Equatoriana, or something 
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more akin to a domestic tax aimed at investigating Claimant’s source of income, and not 
a charge for the “physical” transfer of the amount. 
Nevertheless, in Claimant’s view, the levy is either covered by Section 4(3), or 
falls within the costs associated with the payment of the purchase price which has to be 
borne by the buyer under article 54 CISG. Article 54 CISG states that [t]he buyer's 
obligation to pay the price includes taking such steps and complying with such formalities 
as may be required under the contract or any laws and regulations to enable payment to 
be made. The provision also provides that the buyer must bear the costs for these 
measures. 
In turn, Respondent advocates that an analogous application of article 35(2) CISG 
is appropriate. Article 35 CISG deals with conformity of goods, and states that the seller 
has delivered conforming goods if they comply with the public law provisions of the 
seller’s country while the public law provisions of the buyer’s country only become 
relevant in special cases or where the buyer has informed the seller about them. Therefore, 
by analogously applying the relevant principles to the payment obligation would mean 
that Respondent cannot be expected to know of all public law regulations in the seller’s 
place of business, and therefore would not bear the charges of the money laundering 
investigation levy. Whether such analogy is indeed adequate is crucial to understand the 
obligations of the Parties regarding compliance with unknown public law provisions in 
the counterparty’s place of business. Thus, in turn, this leads to an alternative, but 
nonetheless fundamental question: was it Claimant who failed on its duty to inform in 
view of dealing in good faith and duty to cooperate, or was it Respondent who failed to 
be diligent and inform itself about the levy? 
In conclusion, Claimant may request remedy in the form of specific performance 
under article 62 CISG in view of the maxim pacta sunt servanda, while Respondent may 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
THE PARTIES  
Claimant, Wright Ltd., is a highly specialized manufacturer of fan-blades for jet engines. 
Respondent, SantosD KG, is a medium sized manufacturer of jet engines. Both companies used 
to be subsidiaries of Engineering International, SA [Req. Arb., p.3, ¶¶1&2] and had, in 2003 
and 2005, cooperated in the development of the fan-blades TRF 155-II and TRF 163-I, 
respectively. Following negotiations since 2007, Claimant was sold to Skymover in July 2010, 
while Respondent, after being put up for sale in October 2009, was sold to SpeedRun in August 
2010 [PO2, p.54, ¶1&2]. Skymover was then renamed Wright Holding PLC, and owns 88% of 
Claimant’s shares [idem]. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT AND SALES AGREEMENT 
On January 2010, Respondent received notice that Earhart SP, a worldwide aircraft 
manufacturer, was seeking quotes for the engine for a new signature jet [Answer Req. Arb., p.24, 
¶5]. Respondent contacted Claimant to discuss the possibility of jointly developing a state-of-the-
art model of fan-blades – the TRF 192-I, based on Claimant’s TRF 192 model – to be included 
into Respondent’s high-spec jet engine to meet Earhart SP’s standards [Req. Arb., p.4, ¶¶3&4]. 
On 1 May 2010, Respondent insisted on fixing a maximum price so it could make a binding offer 
to Earhart SP [Cl. Ex. C1, p.8]. Respondent feared it would miss its business opportunity with 
Earhart since the latter was negotiating with other suppliers and wanted to sign a contract in 
September 2010 with a fixed price [Answer Req. Arb., p.24, ¶7]. As the final production costs 
were not yet determinable, Parties agreed on a flexible price structure [Req. Arb., p.4, ¶5]. 
On 1 August 2010, the Development and Sales Agreement (hereinafter the “Contract”) was 
concluded. In the first year of contracting, Respondent was bound to purchase 2,000 fan-blades 
[Cl. Ex. C2, p.10]. Respondent also expressed its firm intention to purchase further units in 
subsequent years [idem]. The final price would be paid in US$ and calculated on a cost + profit 
basis [idem] with risk-sharing elements [Cl. Ex. C1, p.8] in accordance with the pre-agreed price 
structure, ranging from US$ 9,975 to US$ 13,125 per unit. The purchase price would be 
transferred to Claimant’s bank account and the bank charges would be borne by Respondent [Cl. 
Ex. C2, p.10]. No exchange rate was fixed [Cl. Ex. C2, p.9&10]. 
 
THE ADDENDUM 
On 26 October 2010, following Respondent’s proposition, an addendum was added to the 
Contract regarding the purchase of 2,000 clamps [Req. Arb. p.4&5, ¶8]. Respondent initially 
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intended to buy the clamps from another producer, but they were inadequate [idem]. The 
inclusion of the purchase of the clamps into the main Contract was due to mere convenience and 
the fan-blades and the clamps were to be delivered together [PO2, p.57, ¶16]. Conversely to the 
main Contract, the addendum provided for a fixed exchange rate at US$ 1= EQD 2.01 [Cl. Ex. 
C2, p.11]. All other terms of the addendum were as per main Agreement [Cl. Ex. C2, p.11]. 
On 9 January 2015, Ms Beinhorn, Claimant’s COO, asked Mr Lee – from Claimant’s accounting 
department – to finalize the two separate invoices for the fan-blades and the clamps [Cl. Ex. C4, 
p.13]. Mr Lee firstly prepared the invoice for the clamps as the purchase order and a note that the 
fixed exchange rate of US$ 1 = EQD 2.01 was applicable to them had been left on top of Ms 
Kwang’s binder – who was the original responsible for the financial side of the Contract [idem]. 
However, Mr Lee, who was not familiar with the project, its agreed terms, and was under 
considerable time pressure, wrongly applied the fixed exchange rate to the invoice concerning the fan-
blades [idem]. 
On 14 January 2015, Claimant delivered the goods in conformity with the contract as confirmed 
by Respondent's inspection [Cl. Ex. C3, p.12], attaching the respective invoices [Req. Arb. p.5, 
¶9]. The following day, Respondent transferred to Claimant’s bank account US$ 20,438,560 for 
the fan-blades and US$ 183,343.28 for the clamps [Cl. Ex. C3, p.12]. Claimant immediately 
reported on the accounting department’s error and sent the correct invoice for the blades 
applying the current exchange rate of US$ 1 = EQD 1.79, thus requesting additional payment to 
meet the US$ 22,723,800 full purchase price [Cl. Ex. C5, p.14], but received no response. 
On 29 January 2015, only US$ 20,336,367.20 was credited to Claimant’s account due to a money 
laundering investigation [Req. Arb. p.5, ¶13]. As explained by the Equatoriana Central Bank, 
since the transfer exceeded US$ 2 million, a 0.5% levy was subtracted under Section 12 of 
Regulation ML/2010C [Cl. Ex. C8, p.17].  
 
THE BREACH OF CONTRACT  
On 9 February 2015, Claimant once again contacted Respondent demanding the outstanding 
payment [Cl. Ex. C6, p.15] to which the latter replied denying any additional payment [Cl. Ex. C7, 
p.16], alleging that the Parties agreed that the fixed exchange rate present in the addendum was to 
be applied to the whole Contract [Cl. Ex. C7, p.16]. Respondent also refused to pay the levy 
arguing that it was not bound to bear bank charges based on public law regulations in 
Equatoriana under the Contract [Answer Req. Arb., p.26, ¶18]. 
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On 1 April 2016, following the 31 March 2016 meeting where Respondent insisted on making no 
further payment and reported its unwillingness to purchase another 2,000 blades [PO2, p.58, 
¶23], Claimant informed Respondent that it would take the necessary steps to initiate arbitration 
proceedings [Res. Ex. R3, p.29]. 
On 31 May 2016, Claimant presented its Request for Arbitration [Req. Arb., pp.3-7], attaching 
a Power of Attorney on Wright Holding PLC’s behalf and partially paying the Registration Fee 
[PA1, p.18; CAM-CCBC LtoC., p.19, ¶¶2i&2ii].  
On 7 June 2016, Mr Fasttrack sent the requested Power of Attorney signed by Wright Ltd as 
well as the remainder of the fee [Fasttrack to CAM-CCBC2, pp.20&21]. 
On 24 June 2016, Respondent presented its Answer to Request for Arbitration [Answer Req. 
Arb., pp.23-26].  
On September 2016, Respondent requested the Tribunal to order Claimant to provide security 





APPLICABLE PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
According to the arbitration agreement, [t]he arbitration shall be conducted under the Rules of the (…) 
Chamber of Commerce Brazil-Canada (“CAM-CCBC”) and in line with international arbitration practice [Cl. 
Ex. C2, p.11, Section 21: Dispute Resolution]. Additionally, [t]he seat of arbitration shall be 
Vindobona, Danubia. Hence, the lex arbitri is the Danubian Arbitration Law – which is an adoption 
of UNCITRAL Model Law with the 2006 amendments [PO2, p.60, ¶37]. The latter consists of a 
subsidiary instrument, applicable whenever there is no express provision foreseen on the Rules 
and a hiatus needs to be remedied. The Parties also agreed that the Agreement is governed by the UN 
Convention of the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”). [F]or issues not dealt with by the CISG the 
UNIDROIT Principles are applicable [Cl. Ex. C2, p.10, Section 20: Choice of Law]. Pursuant to the 
agreement concluded between the Parties, the abovementioned statutes shall govern the arbitral 









SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
On behalf of our Client, Wright Ltd., hereinafter Claimant, following the applicable law, we 
respectfully make the following submissions and request this Tribunal to find that: 
 
I. Claimant’s claims are admissible as they have been submitted in a timely and regularly manner. 
Claimant has committedly attempted to resolve the dispute amicably; not succeeding, initiated 
arbitration. Claimant’s compliance with articles 4.1 and 4.2 CAM-CCBC Rules shall be deemed 
sufficient to consider the Request for Arbitration submitted on 31 May 2016, within the 60-day 
time limit agreed (A). Should the Tribunal remain uncertain concerning the commencement date 
of proceedings, the decision shall be taken in favour arbitrandi (B). 
 
II. The Tribunal shall not order Claimant to provide security for Respondent’s costs as it does not 
have the power to do so (A). Should the Tribunal find it is empowered to order security for 
costs, it still shall not order it as Respondent’s request is groundless (B). Even if the Tribunal 
considers the requirements fulfilled, the amount requested shall be reasonably reduced regarding 
the measure’s exceptional nature (C). 
 
III. Claimant is entitled to full payment of the purchase price according to articles 53, 54, 61 and 62 
CISG. Parties did not agree on a fixed exchange rate applicable to the fan-blades but only to the 
addendum for the clamps (A) and expressly provided that Respondent shall bear the transfer 
costs (B). The latter, by not complying with its buyer’s contractual and legal obligations, has 
incurred in a breach of contract (C) and shall therefore be ordered to pay the still outstanding 
purchase price in the amounts of US$ 2,285,240.00 for the fan-blades – calculated according to 
the exchange rate at the time of Claimant’s performance – and US$ 102,192.80 for the 0.5% levy 
deducted by the Central Bank. Having Claimant duly fulfilled its own contractual obligations, it is 










I.   CLAIMANT'S CLAIMS ARE ADMISSIBLE AS THEY HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED IN A TIMELY 
AND REGULAR MANNER 
1. Respondent argues that Claimant’s claim has to be rejected as not admissible as the arbitral 
proceedings were initiated too late [Answer Req. Arb. p.25, ¶¶11-13]. Nonetheless, 
Claimant’s claims have been timely and regularly submitted. 
2. According to the arbitration agreement, ‘All disputes arising out of or in connection with this 
Agreement shall be settled amicably and in good faith between the parties. If no agreement can be reached each 
party has the right to initiate the arbitral proceedings within 60 days after the failure of the negotiation’ [Cl. 
Ex. C2, p.11].  
3. Claimant attempted to resolve the present dispute amicably and in good faith by making 
several offers combining a reduction in the sales prices for the 2,000 fan-blades with a firm 
commitment to promote further business [Req. Arb. p.6, ¶17]. To such a degree, Claimant 
performed the agreed mandatory pre-condition to start arbitral proceedings. Since the Parties 
failed to reach a compromise on 1 April 2016 [Res. Ex. R 3, p.29], Claimant’s right to initiate 
arbitration was constitued, and so it filed its Request for Arbitration on 31 May 2016 [Req. 
Arb., p.3]. Only had Claimant failed to comply with the binding amicable dispute resolution 
clause could the Tribunal render its claims inadmissible [Medissimo v. Logica; Travaini quoting 
Dissaux, p.1290]. Therefore, Claimant’s claims are admissible and the arbitral proceedings 
were initiated in time. 
4. Differently to other institutional rules, there is no explicit mention in the CAM-CCBC Rules 
regarding the date the arbitral proceedings are deemed to have commenced [cf. art. 4.2 ICC 
Rules; art. 7.1 VIAC Rules; art. 3.2 SRIA; art. 4 SCC Rules]. Nevertheless, taking into 
account the wording of article 4.1 CAM-CCBC Rules – the party desiring to commence an 
arbitration will notify the CAM-CCBC (…) – the date of commencement of the proceedings is 
the date the Request is filed. 
5. Hence, the CAM-CCBC Rules follow the common practice of well-established arbitral 
institutions to commence the arbitration on the date the Request is submitted [i.e. art. 4.1 
ICC Rules]. Additionally, Respondent also recognizes the date Claimant submitted the 
Request for Arbitration as 31 May 2016 [Answer Req.Arb., p.25, ¶12&13], which represents 
the moment the arbitral proceedings commenced. Therefore, the arbitral proceedings were 
initiated in time since the Request was filed on 31 May 2016, within the 60-day time limit 
contractually agreed upon. 
 
 




A. Claimant’s Compliance With Articles 4.1 And 4.2 CAM-CCBC Rules Shall Be Deemed 
Sufficient To Consider The Request Submitted On 31 May 2016 
6. Respondent argues that Claimant neither paid the Registration Fee in full nor submitted a 
Power of Attorney for the arbitration, unlawfully concluding the arbitral proceedings were 
only commenced on 7 June 2016, after the signed Power of Attorney was provided and the 
fee had been fully paid [Answer to Req.Arb., p.25, ¶12].  
7. When submitting its Request for Arbitration, Claimant presented a Power of Attorney on 
behalf of its parent company Wright Holding PLC [PA1, p.18] and attached the bank 
confirmation for the payment of the registration fee in the amount of R$ 400.00 instead of 
R$ 4,000.00 [CAM-CCBC LtoC., p.19, ¶2].  
8. Notwithstanding, the Tribunal shall consider the proceedings initiated on 31 May 2016 since 
i) the submission of the Request does not depend upon the payment of the registration fee, 
ii) the latter granting of the Power of Attorney by Wright Ltd ratifies the action already 
undertaken by Mr Fasttrack, and iii) Claimant has demonstrated its clear intention in 
commencing the arbitral proceedings. Finally, iv) the timing of the Request for Arbitration 
submission is in line with the understanding of the President of CAM-CCBC.   
 
i) The submission of the Request does not depend upon the payment of the 
registration fee  
9. As is the case in other arbitration rules, CAM-CCBC Rules do not require full payment of 
registration fee in order to consider that the arbitration has been submitted. 
10. On the matter of the Request for Arbitration, CAM-CCBC Rules are similar to ICC Rules. 
Both contain separate provisions concerning the submission of the Request for Arbitration 
and the payment of registration fees [art. 4.3&4.4 ICC Rules and art. 4.1&4.2 CAM-CCBC 
Rules].  
11. In what concerns ICC Rules, commentators have discussed the aim of such provisions in 
ICC Rules and have concluded that the submission of the Request does not depend on the 
payment of the fee [Schwartz & Derains, p.54]. The same approach was adopted by a tribunal 
in an ICC arbitration where the non-payment of the filing fee was not considered as grounds 
for inadmissibility of the request [ICC Case No. 6784]. This conclusion also follows from the 
systematic interpretation of ICC Rules as, according to article 4.4, in case of lack of payment, 
the Secretariat may fix a time limit for the requesting party to comply. Only after the non-
compliance with that obligation is the file closed [art. 4.4 ICC Rules], which means that, even 
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if the fee is not paid at the time of submission, the initial request can still be successfully 
admitted.  
12.  Accordingly, articles 4.1 and 4.2 CAM-CCBC Rules also seem to have been deliberately 
drafted separately so that it was clear that the payment of the registration fee is not a 
condition for the submission of the Request for Arbitration itself [e.g. Or. CAM-CCBC, p.19, 
¶3].  
13. Thus, considering the similarity between ICC and CAM-CCBC Rules, as well as the fact that 
ICC Rules are the world’s leading international arbitration institution with less of a national 
character thus seen as international practice, the same conclusion applies to CAM-CCBC 
Rules. 
14. On the other hand, the CAM-CCBC Rules do not establish any consequences for the non-
payment of the registration fee - as art.12.10 is only applicable to fees and expenses that are 
to be borne by both parties [Timm, p.195] - when comparing to other institutional rules as 
art.12.10 is only applicable to fees and expenses that are to be borne by both parties [cf. art. 
4.4 ICC Rules; art. 10.4 VIAC Rules; art. 3(2) SCC Rules; art. 1(vi) LCIA Rules; art. 1.2 
Schedule I BIAC Rules]. Indeed, differently from the Rules, other leading arbitration centres 
specifically provide that the payment of the mentioned fee is a precondition to successfully 
submit the request for arbitration. For instance, article 1 LCIA Rules determines that such 
request has to contain or be accompanied by confirmation that the registration fee prescribed in the 
Schedule of Costs has been or is being paid to the LCIA [art. 1(vi), LCIA Rules]. Without that 
payment, the arbitration will be treated as not having been commenced [Scherer & Richman, p.56]. 
The same applies to article 3 SIAC Rules which even adopts the wording payment of the 
requisite filing fee [art. 3.1(k) SIAC Rules]. 
15. Thus, the commencement of the arbitration under the CAM-CCBC Rules does not depend 
upon that payment.  
16. To conclude, it is unquestionable the compliance with article 4.1 and not 4.2 CAM-CCBC 
Rules, stops the running of the contractual time limit applicable to the claim 
[Straube/Finkelstein/Filho, p.66]. Hence, the Request is deemed validly submitted on 31 May 
2016 irrespective of the payment in full of the registration fee. 
ii) The posterior granting of the Power of Attorney by Wright Ltd ratifies the 
action already undertaken by Mr Fasttrack 
17. Both the Law of Danubia and Equatoriana regarding agency consist of verbatim adoptions 
of the relevant rules in the 2010 UNIDROIT Principles [PO2, p.58, ¶24]. In light of this, 
UNIDROIT Principles state that an act practiced by an agent without authority is as 
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effective as if it had initially been carried out by the principal [art. 2.2.9.(1) UNIDROIT 
Principles, p.90]. Although acting without authority, an agent may bind the principal whenever 
the principal ratifies the agent’s act [UNIDROIT Principles, p.83]. 
18. When filing the Request for Arbitration, Mr Fasttrack lacked the authority to represent 
Claimant as the attached Power of Attorney did not refer to Wright Ltd. However, Mr 
Fasttrack then promptly presented a written Power of Attorney on Claimant’s behalf (the 
principal) which expressly provided that “the grant of this Power of Attorney shall thereby approve any 
actions already undertaken by the lawyer” [PA2, p.21], hence officially, expressly and 
retrospectively ratifying his previous unauthorized act [Schmitthoff, p.147; DeMott, p.6; 
Koenigsblatt v. Sweet]. Such practice is in line with the widely recognized uniform principles [cf. 
UNIDROIT Principles, p.91, ¶2] and also with the 1983 Convention on Agency in the 
International Sale of Goods upon which the UNIDROIT treatment on agency is based [art. 
15 Geneva Convention; Bennett, p.771]. 
19. Consequently, despite the Power of Attorney on behalf of Wright Ltd not being attached to 
the Request for Arbitration on the day it was actually submitted, it was ratified by Mr 
Fasttrack within the given time limit [CAM-CCBC LtoC. p.19, ¶3]. Thus, the arbitral 
proceedings shall still be considered commenced on 31 May 2016, the date the act was 
materially practiced by the attorney.   
 
iii) Claimant has demonstrated a clear intention to commence these arbitral 
proceedings 
20. Irrespective of the fulfilment of the abovementioned requirements, Claimant has shown a 
clear intention in initiating arbitral proceedings when filing the Request for Arbitration on 
the 31 May 2016 [Wilske & Gack, p.324 quoting Holtzmann & Neuhaus, p.620]. 
21. As held by the English Commercial Court [Nea Agrex SA; The Smaro; The Baltic Universal], 
arbitral proceedings shall be considered initiated in time regardless of the fulfilment of 
formal requirements if the applicant’s intention is clear. Although those court decisions refer 
to the appointment of arbitrators, their conclusions shall still apply to the case at hand since 
they are grounded on the inherent flexibility of arbitral proceedings rather than the strict 
application of law when the party desiring to commence the arbitration has materially taken 
the necessary steps to do so. 
22. The Power of Attorney signed by Wright Holding PLC was distinctly aimed at the current 
proceedings as it dates of 2 April 2016 [PO2, p.60, ¶38], precisely a day after Claimant 
contacted Respondent to inform that the necessary steps will be taken in order to commence the 
arbitral proceedings [Res. Ex. R3, p.29]. Also, Mr Fasttrack’s letter to the CAM-CCBC 
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evidences that he was indeed representing Claimant and not its parent company [Fasttrack to 
CAM-CCBC1, p.2]. 
23. Likewise, Claimant’s failure to initially pay the full Registration Fee was merely due to a 
mistake in Mr Fasttrack’s secretariat, and not due to a refusal or intent to not comply with 
such payment. The fact that Claimant partially paid the Registration Fee sufficiently 
demonstrates its serious commitment in commencing the arbitration, serving the fee’s typical 
purpose of discouraging manifestly inappropriate requests [Terashima & Gagliardi, p.67]. 
24. Finally and most importantly, Respondent’s right to present its defense was by no means 
harmed with the amendment of the Request. In fact, at the time the request was amended 
Respondent had not yet been notified to present its answer to the request for arbitration. 
Thus, when Respondent was made aware of such request, all the documents had already 
been correctly presented.  
 
iv) The submission of the Request is in line with the understanding of CAM-
CCBC 
25. Claimant’s understanding regarding the payment of the Registration Fee and the attachment 
of the Power of Attorney conforms with CAM-CCBC’s perception.  
26. As stated in the Orders of the President of CAM-CCBC of 1 June 2016 and 26 July 2016, 
the posterior presentation of the Power of Attorney and the payment of the remainder of 
the fee are considered mere supplementations to the originally submitted Request [CAM-
CCBC LtoC., p.19; Or. CAM-CCBC, p.40, respectively]. Also, Claimant’s Request was 
deemed to have been submitted on 31 May 2016 and not, as Respondent argues, on 7 June 
2016 – the date it was ratified [CAM-CCBC LtoArb., p.32]. Observing the directions of the 
President of CAM-CCBC, and in line with international practice, the Request shall be 
deemed to have been validly filed on the date on which the initial version was received [cf. 
art. 3.5 SRIA; 6.4 DIS Rules]. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE TRIBUNAL SHALL NOT DISREGARD CLAIMANT’S 
CLAIMS SINCE THE ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS INITIATED IN TIME 
 
B. Regardless Of The Arguments Presented Above, The Tribunal Shall Decide In Favour 
Arbitrandi 
27. In accordance with international practice, the Tribunal shall decide in favour arbitrandi 
[Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.]. By entering into an arbitration 
agreement, the Parties have shown their willingness to settle the dispute through arbitration 
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rather than any other separate and potentially inconsistent proceedings [Born, p.1320]. Thus, as 
stated in a judgement set out by the Singapore Court of Appeal, where the parties have evinced a 
clear intention to settle any dispute by arbitration, the court should give effect to such intention, even if certain 
aspects of the agreement may be ambiguous, inconsistent, incomplete or lacking in certain particulars so long 
as the arbitration can be carried out without prejudice to the rights of either party (…) [Insigma v. Alstom]. 
28. In the case at hand, besides the Parties’ unambiguous intention in submitting the dispute to 
arbitration – in line with their dispute resolution common practice [PO2, p.57, ¶21], it is also 
clear that these proceedings can be carried out without any harm to the rights of any party: 
both were given the right to participate in the arbitration in equal terms and without any 
benefit to one party in prejudice of the other. 
29. In conclusion, any doubts that the Tribunal may still have concerning the timeliness of these 
proceedings, shall be resolved in favour of arbitration.    
 
II. THE TRIBUNAL SHALL NOT ORDER CLAIMANT TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR 
RESPONDENT’S COSTS 
 
A. The Tribunal Does Not Have The Power To Order Security For Costs 
30. Respondent filed an application for security for costs [Req. SfC, pp.45&46]. However, the 
Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to decide on the matter as (i) the Parties did not agree 
nor envision security for costs when drafting the arbitration agreement, and (ii) during the 
arbitral proceedings, the expenses concerning the Tribunal are equally borne by both Parties, 
according to the Rules.  
 
i) The Parties did not agree nor envision the application of such measure 
31. The arbitration agreement has a contractual nature whereby each party consents for the 
arbitration to take place [Lew/Mistelis/Kroll, p.99]. One of the main features of arbitration 
is precisely the maximization of the parties’ autonomy, seen as the cornerstone of arbitration 
[Born, pp.84&1133].  
32. When drafting arbitration agreements, parties have the opportunity to negotiate the rules 
applicable to the arbitration, allowing them to tailor and control the procedure according to 
their specific wishes and needs [X Panama v Une personne physique, Notes on Organizing 
Arbitral Proceedings, p.2 ¶¶6&7; Lew/Mistelis/Kroll, p.3]. Due focus on this clause is of 
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33. In the present case, neither the arbitration agreement nor the Rules chosen by the Parties 
address security for costs [Cl. Ex. C2, p.6, Section 21]. Thus, neither Party foresaw, at the 
time of contracting, the granting of such measure. Hence, the absence of an express 
agreement regarding security for costs excludes the Tribunal’s power to order so. This view 
is supported by a Swiss Tribunal, which held that only an explicit agreement of the parties (…) 
would permit the Arbitral Tribunal to order the payment of a security deposit [Not Indicated v. Not 
Indicated]. 
34. In fact, international commercial contracts do not usually address security for costs as the 
parties see little benefit in making concessions in exchange for what seems a relatively minor procedural 
detail [Rubins, p.5 quoting Hoellering, p.31, X Panama v Une personne physique]. Their silence is 
evidence of their lack of intention to request the arbitrator to order security [Rubins, p.29].  
35. If even a generic reference to a certain legal basis that provides for security for costs is not 
enough to determine the parties’ will [Not Indicated v. Not Indicated], neither is a general 
mention to a certain set of rules which do not specifically mention security for costs. Thus, 
the mere allusion to provisional measures foreseen in article 8 CAM-CCBC Rules is not a 
valid legal basis for Respondent to request security for costs. 
36. Should the Tribunal find that article 8 CAM-CCBC Rules extends to security for costs, it still 
cannot be ordered, since the Parties did not foresee nor envision the Tribunal’s generic 
power to order provisional measures when drafting the arbitration agreement, let alone the 
application of the specific measure.  
37. In 2010, the year the Contract was concluded, the 1998 CAM-CCBC Rules were still in 
force. Article 8 was only added when the 2012 CAM-CCBC Rules were implemented. 
Hence, even though Claimant is aware of the fact that the Rules applicable to commence the 
arbitral proceedings are those in effect at the time of receipt of the Request for Arbitration 
[art. 15.3 CAM-CCBC Rules], the Tribunal has to consider the Parties’ intention regarding 
the scope of the arbitral agreement at the time of consolidation of the Contract, since it must 
be interpreted as any other contract [Lew/Mistelis/Kroll, p.150, ¶¶7.59&7.60].  
38. Indeed, the conjugation of articles 8 and 15.3 of the present Rules cannot determine the 
Parties’ intention at the time of contracting – such must be understood to comprise only the 
version of the rules as known to them upon agreement [Schlosser, p.473, ¶631].  
39. In conclusion, if no reference at all was made in the agreement or included in the set of 
Rules the Parties have agreed on, the Tribunal cannot order security for costs as it lacks 
jurisdiction to do so.  
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ii) According to the Rules, during the proceedings the expenses concerning the 
Tribunal are equally borne by both Parties 
40. Considering the provisions in the Rules, the expenses incurred during the proceedings 
concerning the arbitral tribunal are to be equally borne by both Parties [art. 12 CAM-CCBC 
Rules; CAM-CCBC Table of Expenses]. Consequently, the mandatory advanced payment 
provisions by both parties of administrative and arbitrator’s fees in equal shares [arts. 12.6 & 
12.7 CAM CCBC-Rules, respectively] shall be interpreted to exclude the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction to order the measure as requested. Granting security for costs is therefore 
contrary to the notorious balanced scheme of the Rules. 
41. The English Court of Appeal’s Lord Justice Kerr came to a comparable conclusion, 
reporting that the payment of security for costs is clearly inconsistent with the even-handed scheme 
that [1975 ICC] rules envisage in this regard [Bank v. Helliniki]. Lord Kerr also found that (…) the 
express provision for a prepayment of part of the costs of the arbitration by way of security (…) militate[s] 
against any intention, in the scheme of rules, concerning the provision of security in relation to any party’s own 
legal costs (…) [idem].  
42. Furthermore, a tribunal settled that the ICC Rules do not provide for security for costs. However, Art. 
9 of the [1988] ICC Rules stated that in principle, Claimant and Defendant pay the advance costs fixed by 
the ICC Court of Arbitration in equal shares, therefore the Defendant has to pay half of the advance on costs 
[ICC Case No. 7047].  
43. Both ICC and CAM-CCBC Rules adopt similar and equitable approaches as to parties’ 
obligations during the course of arbitral proceedings. In light of this, and envisioning the 
mentioned ICC Rules, Lord Kerr concluded that [a]n order for security for costs against the 
defendants would have the effect of compelling them to make a double deposit (…)[Bank v. Helliniki]. 
Likewise, in the event security for costs is ordered, Claimant would be unreasonably 
burdened to make a double advanced payment for the same costs. Thus, the admissibility of 
Respondent’s request shall be logically ruled out. 
 
 
B. Even If The Tribunal Finds It Is Empowered To Order Security For Costs, It Shall 
Not Grant It As Respondent’s Request Is Groundless  
44. Should the Tribunal decide on its authority to order security for costs, such measure shall 
still not be granted since the requirements to do so are not fulfilled. 
45. Security for costs is an extraordinary measure that may only be granted in exceptional 
circumstances for which Respondent bears the burden of proof [Waincymer, pp.653-654]. 
 
 
Memorandum for CLAIMANT                                                                                             NOVA FACULTY OF LAW 
 
 13 
Engaging in arbitral proceedings is ultimately considered a general commercial risk when 
parties have placed themselves in the business and trade market [Yesilirmak, p.215, ¶5.83; 
Blessing, p.284, ¶886]. Therefore, in line with international arbitration practice, security for 
costs is only granted under special circumstances [Commerce v. El Salvador; EuroGas and 
Belmont Resources v. Slovak Republic; XY International v. Société Z; Ho, p.334; Sandrock, p.17] and 
on a case by case basis [Kee, p.5]. Tribunals typically consider the applicant’s prospects of 
success, the financial situation of the party against whom security is requested, the extent of 
third party funding and the possibility of enforcement of the final award [e.g. X. S.A.R.L. 
Lebanon v Y. AG; Born, p.2496]. 
46. Respondent attempts to ground its request for security for costs in unmotivated 
assumptions, rushing to conclude that the Tribunal has no option other than to reject 
Claimant’s claims and render a cost award in Respondent’s favour. Respondent further 
argues that Claimant will very likely not comply with such [Req. SfC, p.46, ¶2], also accusing 
Claimant of concealing its financial situation as a business practice [Req. SfC, p.46, ¶4]. 
47. However, i) a prima facie examination of the merits of the dispute does not evidence 
Claimant’s claims lack any factual or legal grounds and ii) both the outcome of the arbitration 
and the cost allocation rule remain unknown. Additionally, iii) Claimant did not conceal its 
financial situation and iv) Respondent’s breach of contract contributed to Claimant’s 
strained liquidity. Therefore, as Respondent fails to prove any exceptional circumstance, the 
Tribunal shall not order Claimant to provide security for costs. 
 
i) A prima facie examination of the merits of the dispute does not evidence 
Claimant’s claims lack any factual or legal grounds  
48. In its Request for Security for Costs Respondent suggests that Claimant’s claims lack any factual 
and legal basis [Req. Sfc, p.46, ¶2]. Claimant’s claims are otherwise unquestionably quantified, 
based on a breach that goes to the heart of the Contract [Martowski, p.6] and supported by 
sufficient evidence – namely Respondent’s refusal to fulfill its obligations under the Contract 
[e.g. Cl. Exs. C2, pp.9-11; C3, p.12; C4, p.13; C5, p.14; C6, p.15].  
49. When addressing a request for security for costs, the Tribunal must analyse whether the 
applicant has established a prima facie case on the merits of one or more of its claims [NAI Case No. 
1694].  
50. Respondent requests protection for a hypothetical right based on its very own understanding 
of total demerit of Claimant’s claims. Yet, such application requires the Tribunal to pre-judge 
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the case. This is unbecoming unless the Tribunal can clearly demonstrate a high degree of 
probability of success or failure [cf. Porzelack KG v. Porzelack UK Ltd.].  
51. In the case at hand, the preliminary assessment of Claimant’s claims evidences its bona fide 
and seriousness, culminating in the denial of the measure. The abovementioned elements 
have to be carefully considered by the Tribunal, which is not able, at this moment, to 
provide detailed findings on factual issues nor prepared to thoroughly judge the merits of the 
dispute in order to hold that security for costs is to be granted. In such event, pre-judgement 
could jeopardize Claimant’s further ability to present the case [cf. Maffezini v. Spain]. 
ii) Both the outcome of the arbitration and the ultimately applicable cost 
allocation rule remain unknown 
52. Respondent’s doubts concerning Claimant’s financial situation are also based on the fact 
Claimant has sought and failed to obtain outside funding for these proceedings [Req. SfC, 
p.46, ¶3], simply relying on a non-solid source [Res. Ex. R6, p.47]. However, the fact that 
Claimant did not obtain third party funding does not indicate its unlikelihood to win the 
dispute since a funder rejecting a case does not mean that the case lacks merit [Sahani I, ¶3].  
53. Security for costs is only a viable remedy when the losing party is at last condemned to bear 
the other party’s costs and expenses [Rubins, p.369; Redfern & O’Leary, p.403; Miles & 
Speller, p.32; Živković, ¶4]. In the case at matter, there is no certainty concerning the 
outcome of the proceedings. Thus, Claimant’s unlikelihood to win the dispute is far from 
undisputed.  
54. Taking into account that the Tribunal has considerable discretion on determining the 
allocation of costs and that parties’ conduct throughout the course of the proceedings may be 
considered [art. 10.4.1 CAM-CCBC Rules], this is not the proper moment for the Tribunal to 
decide on Claimant’s ability or inability to provide for eventual arbitration costs. 
55. It should be noted that, at this stage, it remains unknown whether the Tribunal will rule in 
Respondent’s favour and, if so, whether the final award on costs will determine Respondent’s 
right to reimbursement of its incurred costs. In what regards cost allocation, the Terms of 
Reference provide that the tribunal shall establish the responsibility related to the payment of the 
costs, not specifying how the responsibility is to be finally allocated [ToR, p.43, ¶12.3].  
56. Even though procedural and arbitration laws in Danubia, Equatoriana and Mediterraneo are 
based on the ‘costs follow the event principle’, this is strictly applied in court proceedings. In 
arbitration, however, in the absence of parties’ specific agreement limiting such discretion, the 
Tribunal may deviate from the principle and allocate the costs differently [PO2, p.58, ¶26].  
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57. In conclusion, Respondent cannot argue that there is a risk of non-recovery of its incurred 
costs [Req. SfC, p.46, ¶2] since there is no strictly pre-defined rule on cost allocation [PO2, 
p.58, ¶26]. 
 
iii) Claimant’s financial situation is stable 
58. Respondent argues Claimant will very likely not comply with an eventually unfavourable 
award, grounding such claim on the allegation that Claimant has in the past failed to comply 
with an award rendered against it, as well as on the fact that Claimant failed to obtain external 
funding for these proceedings [Req. SfC, p.46, ¶2&3]. However, such allegations, as well as 
the conclusions drawn from them, are not true. Moreover, Respondent failed to file any 
concrete and reliable evidence on Claimant’s inability or unwillingness to comply with an 
eventual adverse award. 
59. To begin with, is noteworthy that Claimant’s financial situation has not changed substantially 
or unexpectedly since the conclusion of the Contract [Cl. Ex. C9, p.50]. Considering the 
Parties’ previous co-operations, Respondent could not have been unaware of Claimant’s 
temporary strain in liquidity due to the development of the new fan-blade [Cl. Ex. C6, p.15]. 
According to Ms Jaschin’s witness statement - Claimant’s CFO – [f]or companies of the size of 
Wright Ltd the development of a new fan-blade is normally associated with a considerable financial effort 
largely depleting the freely available financial means. Once the sale of the newly developed fan-blades starts 
liquid means are built up again [Cl. Ex. C9, p.50]. Thus, the mentioned strain in liquidity was 
expected considering Claimant’s business model and, for this reason, shall not justify 
Respondent’s request [Berger, p.10].  
60. Also, Claimant stresses it has a sound financial situation and is not involved in any 
insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings [in contrast to X. S.A.R.L., Lebanon v Y. AG] and there 
are no attempts to do so [PO2, p.60, ¶31]. Hence, no urgency or threatening harm can be 
forecasted to support this application [Pessey, p.22, ¶2.1]. 
61. In any event, and as commentators have concluded, not even the fact that a party is suffering 
financial difficulties or is the subject of bankruptcy proceedings is (...) sufficient, in itself, to form the basis of a 
request for security [Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, p.688, ¶1256].  
62. According to its last balance sheet, Claimant possesses physical assets in higher value than 
the amount Respondent is requesting as security [PO2, p.59, ¶28], thus proving its financial 
capacity to support an eventual adverse award - in contrast to Oilex A.G. MM Mitsui & Co, 
where the plaintiff was ordered security for costs because it seemed to have no assets and be 
out of business. 
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63. In what concerns Claimant’s non-compliance with the arbitral award rendered in the CAM-
CCBC proceedings against one of its suppliers, represents a rather unique situation. Claimant 
is simply expecting the outcome of the enforcement proceedings related with such award 
and has claimed a set-off [PO2, p.59, ¶30] since the award creditor owes an even larger 
amount to Claimant’s parent company [Answer to Req. SfC, p.49]. Thus, Claimant’s conduct 
in such proceedings is directly related with its organizational context and cannot be 
considered as its common practice. On the contrary, Claimant has time and again 
demonstrated a compliance demeanour. Firstly, it has not defaulted on any of its obligations 
under the Rules, having paid both the registration fee and the advance on costs [Fasttrack to 
CAM-CCBC2, p.20; PO2, p.60, ¶32]. Secondly, Claimant has also performed its obligations 
under the Contract, having developed and delivered both the fan-blades and the clamps in 
good order [Req. Arb. p.5, ¶9; Cl. Ex. C3, p.12]. Finally, Claimant is not involved in any other 
enforcement or arbitral proceedings [PO2, p.60, ¶33]. 
64. Furthermore, there would be a considerable reduced risk of non-enforcement of an award 
on costs since both Equatoriana and Mediterraneo are parties to the NY Convention [PO2, 
p.60, ¶35; Gu, p.192]. In situations such as these, arbitrators are rightly particularly reluctant 
in ordering security for costs [Yesilirmak, p.218, ¶85] because there is no actual need to grant 
the measure when the requested party’s assets can assure the payment of the arbitration 
costs, being any final award effectively enforceable under the NY Convention. As stated by 
commentators [t]he lack of enforcement outside the forum of jurisdiction which was the concern at the root 
of cautio judicatum solvi has largely been mitigated by the (...) New York Convention [Gu, p.191]. 
65. Lastly, Respondent doubts Claimant’s financial stability since it sought outside funding for 
these proceedings. However, procuring external funding of legal costs should not usually be proof that 
circumstances have materially changed in a way that is commercially unforeseeable [Task Force Report, 
p.17, ¶C.2(a)]. Moreover, Claimant was able to commence the arbitration without any third 
party support [PO2, p.59, ¶29] and it has not, as abovementioned, defaulted on any of its 
obligations, reiterating its sound financial situation [Darwazeh & Leleu, p.144, ¶3.2(b)(i)]. 
66. In addition, Claimant highlights that the fact that it has previously resorted to third party 
funding in investment arbitrations – where, as it is general knowledge, third party funding is 
frequently used [Brekoulakis, p.1] – or sought it in the instant proceedings should not be 
construed as indicating any financial instability. In the present case, Claimant’s search for 
funding was not due to an unusual or unexpected strained liquidity but rather related to its 
business model. There are many reasons for which a parties seek litigation funding as to 
maintain cash-flow and offset the risk of an uncertain arbitration outcome [idem] or to even out the litigation 
 
 
Memorandum for CLAIMANT                                                                                             NOVA FACULTY OF LAW 
 
 17 
line item on balance sheets since funders can offer a fixed payment system for managing litigation 
costs [Sahani II, p.396]. Indeed, Claimant’s decision to search for outside funding represents 
a legitimate business one, justified, amongst other things, by its business practice and, in 
particular, its cyclical and temporary strained liquidity. 
67. Finally, Claimant’s financial statements evidence its permanent capacity to raise liquid funds 
throughout the years from both its parent company and financing institutions [PO2, p.59, 
¶28]. Party’s ability to get credit from external sources is also an important factor to be taken 
into account as it evidences its borrowing power [e.g. Kufaan Publishing Ltd v. Al Warrack 
Bookshop Ltd; Gu, p.190; Karrer & Desax, p.346]. 
68. For all given reasons, Claimant’s financial situation is nothing but stable. Hence, 
Respondent’s arguments shall be disregarded, and Claimant shall not be ordered to provide 
security for costs. 
 
iv) Claimant did not conceal its financial situation nor carried out a misleading 
conduct 
69. Respondent further argues that Claimant concealed its financial situation by not revealing the 
outcome of previous arbitrations or the fact it tried to obtain third party funding for these 
proceedings. On this regard, Respondent invokes – without any substantiation – an alleged 
transparency trend in international arbitration based on a single non-applicable legal source. 
Lastly, Respondent tries to justify it was only able to file its Request for Security for Costs 
after the conclusion of the Terms of Reference due to Claimant’s conduct.  
70. However, Respondent fails to prove not only Claimant’s duty of disclosure, but also its 
inability to acknowledge those facts before the conclusion of the Terms of Reference, being 
its mere allegations insufficient for the Tribunal to order security for costs.  
 
a) Transparency in international arbitration 
71. Firstly, the circumstances under which a duty to reveal external funding in arbitral 
proceedings may be sustained are not present in the instant case. Upfront disclosure is 
associated with the integrity of the arbitral system and aims at gauging any potential conflicts 
of interest between the arbitrators and the funder as exemplified by the IBA Guidelines on 
Conflicts of Interest [Darwazeh & Leleu, p.135, ¶3.1; Blavi, ¶¶5-7; Maniruzzaman, ¶4]. These 
grounds for disclosure do not relate in any way to Respondent’s argument; on the contrary, 
it appears that Respondent is invoking disclosure for personal interest rather than in view of 
the arbitration’s legitimacy. 
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72. Respondent advocates that, according to an alleged general trend to transparency in 
arbitration, arbitral awards should be made available to the general public and, specifically, 
Claimant should have disclosed the outcome of previous arbitrations [Req. SfC, p.46, ¶4]. 
However, this notion disregards one of the main features of international arbitration – 
confidentiality – whereby a party commits itself to the good faith resolution of specified disputes with 
another party in a single, centralized, commercially-sensible forum [Born, p.2818]. Courts and 
commentators have recognized that the obligation of confidentiality encompasses the award 
and may only be breached if it is reasonably necessary [Dolling-Baker v. Merrett; Ali Shipping 
Corp v. Shipyard Trogir; Myanma Yaung v. Win Win; Rubino-Sammartano, pp.800&804]. In fact, 
the Rules applicable to the current arbitral proceedings expressly provide for confidentiality 
[art. 14 CAM-CCBC Rules]. 
73. Conversely, UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency evidence not a general but a limited 
transparency trend in arbitration, restricted to the settlement of Treaty-based investor-State disputes to 
take account of the public interest involved in [Johnson & Bernasconi-Osterwalder, p.3; Reports of the 
United Nations Commission; Biwater Gauff Ltd v. United Republic of Tanzania]. Art. 1(1) Rules on 
Transparency provides for its applicability to investor-State arbitration initiated under the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules pursuant to a treaty providing for the protection of investments or investors 
(“treaty”) concluded on or after 1st April 2014 unless the Parties to the treaty have agreed otherwise. 
74. However, should such reasoning be deemed as insufficient since the proceedings which 
opposed Claimant to the government of Xanadu are only referred to as an investment 
dispute and not treaty-based or initiated under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, the 
Tribunal must note that those proceedings took place prior to the entering into force of the 
Rules on Transparency, as the final award was rendered in 7 June 2010 [PO2, p.61, ¶39(d)]. 
In any case, when and where such rules do apply or in investment arbitration generally, 
transparency is limited and specifically motivated by inherent public policy interests of the 
involved state such as the government’s conduct and the budgetary implications of the 
arbitration outcome [OECD, p.2, ¶1; Teiltelbaum, p.55]. None of these reasons or the 
requirements set for the application of the rules can be found in the any of the proceedings.  
75. Besides, the underlying argument in favour of transparency in arbitration is the concern of 
fairness and quality of arbitrators, proceedings and awards and contribute to the development and evolution of 
arbitration [Villaggi, p.20, ¶5], monitoring of arbitrators decision-making process [Rogers, 
pp.1310, 1328]. Respondent raises no similar justifications when referring to its alleged 
transparency expectation [Req. SfC, p.46, ¶4]. Instead, Respondent is motivated by its very 
own contractual commercial risk. 
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76. Lastly, a disclosure of the previous arbitral awards would possibly require the consent of the 
disputing parties [Ali Shipping Corp v. Shipyard Trogir] or the allowance of the arbitral 
institution involved [Redfern & Hunter, Chapter 2, ¶2.179]. Thus, as widely accepted in 
institutionalized arbitration, the disclosure of the outcome of the previously mentioned 
disputes would not unilaterally depend upon Claimant [e.g. art. 14.1.1 CAM CCBC-Rules; 
art. 27(4) AAA Rules; art. 30.3 LCIA Rules; art. 8.2 MCA Rules]. 
 
b) Availability of the information concerning Claimant’s financial situation 
77. Claimant’s financial statement published in April 2010 – before the conclusion of the 
Contract [PO2, p.54, ¶1] – reflected its expectations concerning the outcome of the previous 
arbitrations [PO2, p.59, ¶28, Cl. Ex. C9, p.50, ¶3], quite accurately so: the award in the first 
arbitration was approximately the amount anticipated and, in the second, Claimant was also 
awarded the exact expected amount, as evidenced in the 2013 balance sheet [PO2, p.58, ¶28]. 
Apart from that, Claimant did not carry out a misleading conduct by creating the impression 
that an award of around US$ 100 million would be rendered in the first arbitration with the 
government of Xanadu [PO2, p.60, ¶34]. Such fact would nonetheless always be irrelevant 
for the decision on the application for security for costs since Claimant’s current financial 
stability does not depend – and it never did – on such award.  
78. Therefore, no exceptional change of circumstances occurred since the conclusion of the 
Contract to support the application for security for costs [cf. ICC Case No. 7047]. As 
discussed, Claimant has not given misleading information about its assets [Rubins, p.32] nor 
started bad faith manoeuvres in order to avoid a rendered award on costs such as, for 
instance, deliberately organizing its own insolvency divesting itself from its assets [Ho, p.337] 
or transferring its domicile to escape enforcement [Berger, p.12]. 
 
c) Timeliness of Respondent’s Request for Security for Costs 
79. Respondent has failed to timely file an application for security for costs. The need for such 
application should have been considered by Respondent before filing its Answer to the 
Request for Arbitration and agreeing on the Terms of Reference. As has been demonstrated 
above, Respondent had, at the time of before filing its Answer to the Request for Arbitration, 
access to the information it used to ground its application of security for costs. 
80. Indeed, irrespective of the disclosure of the outcome of the arbitration with the government 
of Xanadu, the award had impact in Claimant’s shares [Res. Ex. R6, p.47], fact that 
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81. Accordingly, the lateness of the application for security for costs shall be taken into account 
by the Tribunal [Keary Developments v. Tarmac Constructions] since Respondent had previously 
had the opportunity to file such request. Respondent’s behaviour may thus be interpreted as 
an attempt to stifle the claim [Gu, p.195]. 
82. Notwithstanding, the Terms of Reference is considered a core document in arbitration, defining 
and setting forth the subject-matter and the rules of the proceedings 
[Straube/Finkelstein/Filho, p.98]. After its conclusion, both parties and arbitrators are 
bound to its scope and limits [Art. 4.21 CAM-CCBC Rules; Straube/Finkelstein/Filho, 
p.111]. Accordingly, security for costs shall not be ordered as it falls outside of the scope of 
the Terms of Reference, which only mention that costs and expenses concerning the 
proceedings are to be dealt with in the final award [ToR, p.43, ¶12.3]. Hence, the Tribunal 
shall disregard Respondent’s request. 
 
v) Respondent’s breach of contract contributed to Claimant’s strained liquidity 
83. Respondent contributed to extend Claimant’s temporary strain in liquidity considering that it 
has refused to comply with the Contract and pay the outstanding amount of US$ 
2,387,432.80 [Answer to Req. SfC, p.49]. In international arbitration practice, respondent’s 
behaviour is taken into account by the arbitral tribunal. This raises the fact that respondent 
may not be entitled to protection if it is found, even partially, responsible for claimant’s 
financial situation [Farrer v. Lacy, Hartland & Co., Born, p.2496; Rubins, p.376]. Respondent’s 
refusal to comply with its contractual obligations shall weight in the Tribunal’s decision as 
Claimant’s liquidity is also owed to the very conduct of the respondent that has given rise to the 
arbitration [Redfern & Hunter, ¶5.35]. Had Respondent not refused to pay the due price, 
Claimant would not have, at the moment, a strained liquidity, nor initiated these proceedings 
and consequently none of the parties would have incurred in arbitration costs. Therefore, 
security for costs shall not be ordered since it would be particularly unfair to punish the Claimant 
for a lack of resources allegedly imputable to the respondent [Rubins, p.362]. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE TRIBUNAL SHALL NOT ORDER CLAIMANT TO 
PROVIDE SECURITY FOR COSTS AS RESPONDENT FAILED TO PROVE 
ANY EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE   
 
84. Several authors have agreed that Respondent must demonstrate that claimant will be unable to pay, 
not a probability of the same or show that there is a real risk that the claimant will not comply with any 
costs award made against it [Gu, p.189; Redfern & O’Leary, p.411].  
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85. Respondent has, however, failed to prove Claimant’s inability to pay and to present concrete 
facts or other exceptional circumstance of unwillingness to comply with an eventual 
unfavourable award. Altogether, the facts demonstrate that there is no reasonably established 
fumus boni iuris, urgency, imminent danger nor risk of irreparable harm supporting the request 
[Berger, pp.9-10; Redfern & O’Leary, p.410]. Therefore, such application shall be 
disregarded.   
 
C. Even If The Tribunal Considers The Requirements By Any Means Fulfilled, The 
Amount Requested Shall Be Reasonably Reduced Regarding The Exceptional Nature Of 
The Measure 
86. Should the Tribunal find the application for security for costs grounded, Respondent fails to 
assure that the estimated amount actually corresponds to what it could reasonably expect to 
incur in throughout this arbitration.  
87. Respondent requests the Tribunal to order Claimant ‘to provide security for the costs Respondent is 
likely to incur in this arbitration, including the costs which Respondent has to pay to the Tribunal as well as 
its legal costs for the services of Mr Langweiler and expenses likely to be incurred for the oral hearing for 
witnesses and experts’, overall estimated to a minimum of US$ 200,000 [Req. SfC, p.46, ¶1].  
88. The order of security for costs requires a Claimant to post a security equivalent to the respondent’s 
likely costs [Kirtley & Wietrzykowski, p.21].  
89. The fact that Respondent does not enclose any documentary evidence supporting that the 
expected cost should be deemed as a relevant factor in order to reasonably reduce the 
amount requested, especially in what concerns costs related with attorney’s fees. In fact, the 
costs due to the arbitral tribunal are the only ones that can be objectively predictable and 
impartially accounted for both parties. As far as attorneys’ fees, party representation costs may 
vary widely for of a number of reasons, including the vastly different conditions under which lawyers work 
around the world [Karrer & Desax, p.339], namely parties’ legal backgrounds or domestic 
usages. That being said, the applicant’s own procedural strategy shall not be secured under 
an exceptional measure whose main feature is reasonableness. In the case at hand, it is not 
possible to ascertain whether the merely estimated amount of $200,000 includes an 
unproportioned contingency fee – which is not commonly accepted in global practice 
[Wolfram, pp.526-527; Kritzer, pp.258 & 2590] – for Mr Langweiler.  
90. The Tribunal is not bound to the request and is free to decide that some of the costs claimed should 
not be reimbursed or that the sums requested (e.g. lawyer’s fees) should be reduced due to reasonable 
concerns [Verbist/Schäfer/Imhoos, p.221; CIARB, p.13, ¶2(a); Martowski, p.7]. 
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91. In conclusion, since the requested amount is not properly supported by evidence it shall be 
reasonably and proportionally reduced [cf. Hart Investments Ltd v. Larchpark Ltd]. 
 
III. CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO FULL PAYMENT OF THE PURCHASE PRICE IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLES 53, 54, 61 AND 62 CISG 
 
92. Claimant is entitled to full payment of the purchase price for the fan-blades, including the 
levy deducted by the Central Bank as contractually agreed and provided for in the CISG and 
UNIDROIT Principles.  
93. The case beforehand mainly relates to the interpretation of the Contract according to the 
Parties’ will. Therefore, since the Parties (A) did not agree on the application of a fixed 
exchange rate for the fan-blades and (B) expressly provided that Respondent shall bear the 
transfer costs, (C) the latter, by not complying with its obligations as the buyer, has breached 
the contract and (D) shall be ordered by this Tribunal to pay the still outstanding purchase 
price of US$ 2,387,432.80 pursuant to articles 53, 54, 61 and 62 CISG. 
 
A. The Parties Did Not Agree On A Fixed Exchange Rate For The Whole Contract 
94. Respondent claims that the Parties agreed on a fixed exchange rate regarding the whole 
Contract, applicable to both the fan-blades and clamps, hence alleging that no payment is 
due [Ans. SoC., p.25, ¶¶15-17]. However, when drafting the addendum to the main 
Agreement, the Parties intended to fix an exchange rate only to the additional purchase of 
the clamps. Furthermore, Respondent could not have been unaware of Claimant’s intent 
when negotiating both the main Contract and the addendum. Therefore, the Tribunal shall 
disregard Respondent’s arguments as they do not accompany the (i) Parties’ previous 
conduct, negotiations and practices. Moreover, (ii) the conduct of the Parties when drafting 
and negotiating the Contract itself leads to the understanding that the DSA and the 
addendum are two separate contracts with their own rules.  
i) In their previous co-operations, the Parties did not fix an exchange rate 
95. Claimant’s main corporate object is the highly-specialized manufacture of fan-blades for jet 
engines [Req. Arb. p.3, ¶1]. Thus, Respondent could not have been unaware of the fact that 
its request for clamps fell outside Claimant’s usual modus operandi, not to mention that all 
previous contracts concluded between the Parties naturally dealt only with fan-blades. 
96. Previous to the case at hand, these previous contracts were celebrated and performed while 
the Parties were still both subsidiaries of Engineering International SA [Req. Arb. p.3, ¶2]. 
The first contract, signed in March 2003, regarded the TRF 155-II fan-blade, whereas the 
 
 
Memorandum for CLAIMANT                                                                                             NOVA FACULTY OF LAW 
 
 23 
TRF 163-I fan-blade contract was signed on 3 January 2005 [PO2, pp.54&55, ¶5]. In both 
cases, exchange rates were only brought up in Claimant’s invoices [idem].  
97. Therefore, even though it is uncontested that certain parts of the DSA – such as the price 
calculation mechanism – were formulated according to the basic principles agreed for the 
joint development and some of the contractual provisions were contained in the two 
previous contracts, no express provision regarding the exchange rate was ever included [Cl. 
Ex. C1, p.8, ¶5; Cl. Ex. C2, p.10; Answer Req.Arb., p.24, ¶8].  
98. Yet, Respondent claims that the applicable exchange rate has always been the one at the time 
of contracting [Ans. Req.Arb., p.24, ¶8]. This is simply not true. At the time of performance 
for both contracts, Engineering International decided to adopt whichever exchange rate was 
most profitable for Respondent [PO2, pp.54&55, ¶5], a method viewed by Engineering 
International SA as an important tool in their tax optimization strategy [PO2, p.55, ¶5]. This is 
clearly not the same as setting a fixed exchange rate: for the TRF 155-II contract, the 
circumstances favoured the use of the exchange rate at the time of contracting; while for the 
TRF 163-I, the exchange rates at the time of contracting and of performance were identical 
[PO2, p.54, ¶5] – and so, for mere convenience or due to its triviality, the exchange rate was 
set in the same way as the TRF 155-II contract. Thus, it cannot be concluded that the 
previous contractual practice between the Parties operated on a fixed exchange rate basis.  
99. In addition, when the 2010 Contract was concluded, the Parties were no longer subsidiaries 
under the same group of companies [PO2, p.54, ¶1] so, there was no reason why there ought 
to be a one-sided preference for Respondent’s profitability or risk taking. 
100. Finally, there is no fixed usage regarding the application of exchange rates in the aircraft 
industry [PO2, p.56, ¶13]. Respondent cannot argue that not adding an express provision 
regarding the fixed exchange rate was due to a mere oversight [Answer Req.Arb., p.25, ¶10]. 
 
ii) The Contract and the addendum are separate agreements 
101. Pursuant to article 8(1) CISG, the Parties’ subjective intent when drafting the main Contract 
and the addendum must be drawn from where the other party (…) could not have been unaware of 
what that intent was [cf. Office furniture case]. Commentators have agreed that article 8 CISG 
foresees that all extrinsic evidence, including the Parties’ declarations and actions, may be 
considered to establish and interpret the terms of a contract, which means that provisions in 
writing are but one of the many circumstances to be considered [CISG Advisory Council 
Opinion No. 3, ¶2.2; Honnold, p.117, ¶105; Case involving machine for repair of bricks].  
102. Thus, considering the Parties’ behaviour, Respondent knew or could not have been unaware 
of Claimant’s intention to agree on a fixed exchange rate for the clamps only, whether 
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through the establishment of different price calculation methods and distinct subject matters, 
or the fact that the addendum was written in much less detailed terms, as opposed to the 
Contract, which was carefully negotiated [Req. Arb. pp.4-7, ¶¶3, 6, 21; Cl. Ex. C1, p.8]. 
103. Should the Tribunal find the Parties’ subjective intent when drafting the addendum 
insufficient, it shall adopt the objective approach under article 8(2) CISG. Any reasonable 
person of the same kind, in the same business field and given the specific circumstances at 
stake, would realize that Claimant’s conduct could not have been understood otherwise 
[Crudex Chemicals Oy v. Landmark Chemicals S.A; Honnold, p.257].  
104. Considering the criteria for article 8(3), Respondent cannot advance its point of view by 
contradicting its own conduct. In fact, when negotiating Section 4 of the Contract, the 
exchange rate was, as usual, left unmentioned. Therefore, the addendum cannot determine 
the Respondent’s intent when signing the main Contract, as a contradictory conduct by a 
party bars that party from relying on a different meaning of its former conduct – prohibition 
of venire contra factum proprium [cf. Conveyor band case; Furniture leather case].  
105. Furthermore, article 9(1) CISG, which addresses industry practices and prior dealings between the 
parties, states that parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and any practices 
which they have established between themselves [cf. Magnesium case; Memory module case].  
106. Finally, the standard contra proferentem principle – foreseen by both article 4.6 UNIDROIT 
Principles and article 8(2) CISG – shall be considered by the Tribunal. In case a contract is 
deemed ambiguous, its interpretation ought to go against the party who drafted the contract 
[cf. Automobile case]. As found, not only Section 4 of the Contract regarding the Purchase 
Price – in which an eventual fixed exchange rate was logically to be included – but also the 
addendum regarding the purchase of the clamps was drafted by Respondent [PO2, p.55, ¶6; 
Res. Ex. R2, p.28]. Consequently, in the absence of concurring intent, the Tribunal shall not 
favour Respondent’s now alleged intention. 
107. Nevertheless, as discussed in detail below, the different price calculation for each good, the 
pre-arranged two separate invoices, the sufficiently clear terminology and conduct adopted 
by both Parties, not only demonstrate that they unequivocally intended to conclude the 
addendum as a separate contract, but also that the fixed exchange rate was to be limited to 
the purchase of the clamps. 
 
a) The agreements have substantially different purposes and objects 
108. The Contract serves as the basis for the development of a state-of-the-art fan-blade while the 
addendum was concluded solely for the purchase of clamps. Indeed, the purchase of the 
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clamps was so distinct from the Contract that Respondent even sought another producer 
[Req. Arb. p.5, ¶8].  
109. The Contract signed by the Parties in 2010 remains unchanged by the addendum as its terms 
and conditions were not modified nor subjected to its provisions. As a matter of fact, the 
main Agreement actually framed all terms to the addendum, considering that the latter 
establishes other terms as per the main Agreement [Cl. Ex. C2, p.11]. In a similar fashion, the 
fact that the clause fixing an exchange rate for the clamps is set forth independently after the 
quoted statement again proves such intention to separate the agreements.  
110. Thus, if at the time of the conclusion Contract Respondent did not mention anything similar 
to an exchange rate, let alone a fixed one, it is not in the scope of the new contract, i.e. the 
addendum, that Respondent would come to unilaterally and ambiguously define a crucial 
element that had never been dealt with. 
 
b) Different price calculation for the fan-blades and for the clamps 
111. As opposed to what was agreed to on the main Contract, where the price was determined on 
a “cost + profit basis”, the price calculation for the clamps was otherwise determined on a 
cost basis [Cl. Ex. C2, pp.10&11; Cl. Ex. C5, p.14; Res. Ex. R2, p.28].  
112. The Parties concluded the Contract as having as the sole subject the purchase of fan-blades. 
Had the Parties intended to merge the addendum with the main Contract, they would have 
simply referred to the price calculation provision of the latter. Instead, they applied a 
different price calculation method to the clamps which is, in fact, not as favourable for 
Claimant as the method used to calculate the price for the fan-blades. Such business option 
is due to the fact that the purchase of the clamps represents a matter of lower significance in 
strict comparison with the fan-blades [Req. Arb. p.7, ¶22].  
113. Besides, Mr Lee was asked to prepare two separate invoices for each of the goods [Cl. Ex. 
C4, p.13] which also demonstrates Claimant’s indubitable intention to apply two different 
price calculation methods and ultimately, different exchange rates, to each contract.  
 
c) The Parties’ intention to restrict the use of US$ 1 = EQD 2.01 to the 
addendum is clear 
114. The fixed exchange rate of US$ 1 = EQD 2.01 for the purchase of the clamps, as drafted by 
Respondent and envisioned in the addendum, was indeed accepted by Claimant. However, 
the email exchange between Claimant and Respondent clearly evidences the Parties’ 
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115. Firstly, the subject of the 22 October 2010 email sent by Respondent to Claimant, Re: Clamps 
[Res. Ex. R2, p.28], illustrates the scope of what was specifically being discussed between the 
Parties. Even Respondent’s CEO, Mr Paul Romario, considered that the easiest way to regulate 
the purchase of the clamps is to sign an addendum to the main Contract [idem].  
116. Also, the different letter case adopted for the word ‘agreement’ on the addendum signals that 
the Parties intended to agree on a fixed exchange rate only for the clamps: whereas in the 
reference to the main Contract, ‘agreement’ is written with a capital letter – other terms as per 
the main Agreement –, in the clause providing for a fix exchange rate, the same word is written 
in lowercase – The exchange rate for the agreement is fixed to (…) [idem].  
117. The same intention can be apprehended in the email sent by Claimant on 24 May 2010 [Res. 
Ex. R4, p.30], answering Respondent’s proposal for the addendum. Claimant’s intention to 
limit the addendum’s scope, as well as the application of the fixed exchange rate, is very 
perceivable: I think your suggestion to link the agreement, in regards to the clamps to the 
contract in regards to the TRF 192-I fan blades is a sensible one [idem].  
118. The fact that Claimant replied that it also agree[d] to the fixed exchange rate indicates that such 
clause had no connection to the main Contract. In reality, Claimant agreed on a fixed 
exchange rate for the clamps in view of good business, as had happened in previous 
contracts with third parties regarding other matters [PO2, p.56, ¶9].  
119. Furthermore, the fact that Mr Mario Lee – who was not familiarized with the specific terms 
negotiated for both agreements when replacing Mr Kwang, the employee actually 
responsible for the financial side of the Contract – was given specific instructions on how to 
finalize the two separate invoices evidences Claimant’s managerial understanding that the 
Contract and the addendum had different scope and purpose [Cl. Ex. C4, p.13]. 
iii) The exchange rate applicable to the Contract is the one at the time of 
Claimant’s performance  
120. The applicable exchange rate for the purchase of the fan-blades is the exchange rate at the 
time of Claimant’s performance: US$ 1 = EQD 1.79 [Cl. Ex. C4, p.13]. The production cost 
per fan-blade amounts to EQD 19,586.00, which multiplied by the current exchange rate at 
the time of performance, results in a final cost of US$ 10,941.90 per blade [Cl. Ex. C5, p.14].  
121. The Contract was concluded without a clause regarding the exchange rate. Had Respondent 
intended a fixed exchange rate for the entire Contract, the inclusion of such an important 
clause would have to be explicit, both in the written contract and during negotiations – all 
the more because it went against the Parties’ previous reliance on using floating exchange 
rates. The same approach was adopted by a German Court that held that [i]f the parties 
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anticipate currency fluctuations they may account for it by means of a special clause in the contract. [Germany 
27 January 1981]. Such clause would then be indisputable evidence of Respondent’s alleged 
intention under article 8 CISG. Instead of such a clause, the parties have an essentially more comfortable 
and practical way to avoid the effects of currency fluctuations. Instead of using the currency of the place of 
payment or the place of delivery, they can agree to use the currency of a third country [idem].  
122. Respondent insisted on pricing in US$ [Req. Arb. p.4, ¶5], thereby choosing a currency of a 
third country instead of a fixed exchange rate as the risk mitigation mechanism to limit 
currency exchange fluctuations [UNIDROIT Secretariat, p.7, ¶17]. Thus, contrarily to what it 
is now arguing, Respondent foresaw or ought to have foreseen the possibility of currency 
devaluations. Had the Parties agreed on a fixed exchange rate, as claimed by Respondent, 
there would have been no concern over the fixation of the price in US$.  
123. Hence, the lack of provision in the Contract regarding an exchange rate clause entails the 
application of article 54 CISG and article 6.1.9 (1)(b) UNIDROIT Principles. For all intents 
and purposes, the parties have included an effectivo clause – a clause that stipulates that payment 
must be made in the expressed currency [Osuna-González, pp.320-322]. In regard to the exchange 
rate the UNIDROIT Principles provide that it shall be the prevailing rate of exchange at the place for 
payment when payment is due [idem].  
124. In the present case, payment was due on 15 January 2015 [Cl. Ex. C5, p.14]. As the current 
exchange rate at the time of delivery was identical to that at the time of production [idem], the 
rate US$ 1 = EQD 1.79 is the one applicable to the fan-blades.  
125. In conclusion, the Parties intended to apply a fixed exchange rate only to the addendum. 
Respondent has no ground to claim that the invoices Claimant sent were the lawful ones. 
Claimant is thus entitled to the outstanding amount of US$ 2,285,240.00 which corresponds 
to the remaining purchase price when applying the current exchange rate referred. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE PARTIES INTENDED TO APPLY A FIXED 
EXCHANGE RATE ONLY TO THE ADDENDUM DUE TO THE 
ADDITIONAL PURCHASE OF THE CLAMPS  
 
B. Respondent Shall Bear The Transfer Costs Deducted By The Central Bank  
126. There is no question over the fact that Respondent must pay the levy deducted. Regulation 
ML/2010C entered into force in January 2010, prior to the conclusion of the Contract – 
which not only expressly determines that Respondent ought to bear the deducted transfer 
costs (i), but also provides the applicable law under which it is specifically governed that the 
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buyer shall comply with its obligation to take all necessary steps to ensure full payment goes 
through (ii).  
 
i) The Contract expressly determines Respondent’s obligation to bear the bank 
charges incurred with the transfer of the purchase price 
127. In the case at hand, Section 4 of the Contract states that the bank charges for the transfer of the 
amount are to be borne by the BUYER [Cl. Ex. C2, p.10, Section 4.3]. Once more, Article 8 
CISG sets out to determine the Parties’ intent when drafting the contract, firstly according to 
a subjective test and, if insufficient, to an objective analysis [CISG Digest, pp.55&56, ¶¶6&11; 
Farnsworth, pp.98&99, ¶¶2.3&2.4].  
128. First off, Section 4, including the provision on bank charges, was taken from the agreement 
between the Parties regarding the TRF 155-II of March 2003 [PO2, p.55, ¶6]. The fact that 
the Parties used the same provision after more than a decade assured Claimant that any 
change of circumstances in Equatorianian law would not limit its entitlement to and reliance 
on full payment. In other words, the very broadness of the term bank charges can only be 
aimed at including any bank charge, whether ordinary or extraordinary, contrarily to 
Respondent’s allegations [Answer Req. Arb., p.26, ¶¶18&19]. The inclusion of such clause 
serves to prevent that any potentially changeable situation, such as the emergence of new 
laws or regulations, would cause unnecessary burden on the seller and discharge the buyer 
from its obligation to bear the bank costs. Hence, this was the model of conduct socially accepted by 
the parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract [Electro-erosion machine case]. 
129. It is uncontested that this business practice differs from Claimant’s dealings with third 
parties in the two instances Respondent mentioned [Ans. Req. p.26, ¶19; PO2, pp.55-56, 
¶¶8&9]. In the contracts concluded with JetPropulse (May 2010) or JumboFly (December 
2011), Claimant did not request the payment of bank charges simply due to the fact that 
those did not contain any specific provisions regarding bank charges [idem]. Therefore, 
Claimant’s previous conduct shall not be considered as its usual practice since such approach 
was reasonably justified by Claimant’s legitimate desire to preserve long-standing 
relationships with both clients [PO2, pp.55-56, ¶¶8&9].  
130. Rather, in the present case, the Parties concluded a contract whereby they both agreed on 
explicitly establishing that Respondent should bear the bank charges. Had the Parties wished 
to include exemptions to the provision regarding bank charges, they would have taken 
concrete steps to do so at the time of contracting or face possible consequences.  
131. Indeed, when Claimant noticed the mistaken invoice and subsequent short payment, it 
immediately informed Respondent while simultaneously calling upon itself to bear all the 
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additional costs incurred with the following transfer [Cl. Ex. C5, p.14]. A reasonable person of the 
same kind and in the same circumstances could only have logically and objectively concluded 
that the intention of both Parties was that Respondent was the one to bear any bank charge 
that could eventually be charged at the time of payment [CISG Digest, p.56, ¶11].  
132. Therefore, Respondent is obligated to pay the levy deducted in the amount of US$ 
102,192.80 under the Contract. 
ii) Both CISG and UNIDROIT Principles state that the buyer shall take the 
necessary steps to comply with its obligation to pay the price 
133. The fundamental contracting principle according to which each party has to bear the costs of 
its obligations is reflected throughout the CISG and UNIDROIT Principles [CISG Digest, 
p.45, ¶29; Machines, devices and replacement parts case]. Accordingly, while Claimant handled most 
of the risk of development and production and potentially incurring in expenses due to the 
preparation for the delivery [Req. Arb. pp. 4, 7, ¶¶5, 21; Honnold, p. 351], Respondent’s 
obligation did not deplete at effecting payment, yet also including making the proper 
arrangements for payment and bearing all consequent costs associated to such [Cl. Ex. C2, 
p.10, Section 4.3; Osuna-González, p.303].  
134. In fact, article 54 CISG states that the buyer’s obligations to pay the contract price extends 
beyond the abstraction of owing money – such obligation includes taking whatever steps and 
costs that are necessary to ensure that payment is actually made, whether legal or contractual 
[Gabriel, p.273; ICC Award 00.00.1992].  
135. Also in line is article 6.1.11 UNIDROIT Principles, when considering which party shall bear 
costs, it is usually the same party that has to pay them. In this case, Respondent is the party 
that has to bear the costs for the bank charge and pay for them seeing that there is no 
express provision that burdens a specific party with the payment otherwise; thus, the buyer 
must bear the costs of the bank charges [UNIDROIT Principles, p.197]. 
136. Respondent’s unwillingness to bear the levy charged under Regulation ML/2010C consists 
of failure to pursue its buyer’s obligation of enabling or performing the required steps to pay 
the full price under article 54 CISG, regardless of the fact that no comparable rule exists in any 
country known to Respondent [Answer Req.Arb., p.26, ¶18; PO2, p.55, ¶8] – as there was an 
explicit commitment by the Parties to achieve the result stated in the contract, in addition to 
the fact that it was within the buyer’s control to know of and pay the levy [Osuna-González, 
p.304; CISG Digest Art. 54, ¶5].  
137. In other words, Respondent cannot claim that it is excused from such payment as the buyer 
must make his best reasonable effort to pursue compliance with the legal requirements full heartedly, with a 
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view to actually obtaining the desired result [Osuna-González, p.305; art. 5.1.4(2) UNIDROIT 
Principles; DiMatteo, ¶IV 1].  
138. Respondent ought to have known of Regulation ML/2010C for various reasons. As an 
experienced party in international business transactions, Respondent was expected to 
perform due diligence regarding the situation in Equatoriana, especially considering that it 
was the first contract since their dissociation from Engineering International.  
139. First, Regulation ML/2010C entered into force on 1 January 2010, eight months before the 
Contract was signed, making it a clearly foreseeable provision to take into account at the 
time of contracting [PO2, p.55, ¶7]. Second, the foreign and Mediterranean press did report 
that the Equatorianian government was adopting measures to tackle money laundering on 
January 2010, which makes it all the more reasonable to keep an eye on Equatorianian 
government policies [idem]. Finally, the Equatorianian political scenario has changed 
considerably since 2010, leading to dramatic changes not only to the exchange rate, but also 
regarding internal and external economic policy, which should trigger crucial up-to-minute 
analysis [PO2, p.56, ¶12]. Therefore, Respondent did not even attempt to fulfil the 
requirements under article 54 CISG since the breach was clearly foreseeable and avoidable.  
140. The case at hand can be compared to Russia 17 October 1995 Arbitration proceeding. In that case, 
the tribunal held that simply requesting the bank to transfer the amount payable under the 
contract (which was similarly lacking) was insufficient to fulfil the requirement of article 54 
CISG. The same conclusion can be applied to the present case. Respondent merely 
requested the bank to transfer the sum after receiving the invoices, therefore not displaying 
any particular concern with the information that had been internationally conveyed regarding 
the adoption of measures against possible money laundering in Equatoriana [PO2, p.55, ¶7].  
141. Any failure to comply with obligations under the contract shall be deemed a contractual non-
performance [Arbitral Award 30.11.2006]. Thus, non-compliance with formalities required 
for the buyer to effect payment pursuant to article 54 is also considered breach of contract, 
since these formalities are part of the principal obligation to effect payment; therefore, if a buyer fails to 
comply with any of these enabling steps he would be in breach of his contractual obligation to pay will entitle 
the seller to exercise the remedial rights [Osuna-González, p.304; Gabriel, p.273; Lookofsky, ¶239]. 
142. Thus, Respondent did not follow the necessary steps to enable full payment to be made as 
bearing the levy is subsumed in the buyer’s obligation to pay the price due to Claimant.   
 
CONCLUSION: RESPONDENT MUST DUTIFULLY BEAR THE BANK 
CHARGES DEDUCTED UNDER REGULATION ML/2010C AS AGREED 
BY THE PARTIES 
 
 




C. Respondent Failed To Perform Its Contractual And Legal Obligations 
143. Respondent failed to perform its obligations as the buyer under the Contract and the CISG. 
Once a contract is concluded, the parties are subject to the contract’s binding effect and 
should perform their obligations accordingly [Silk shirts case]. Firstly, Respondent failed to 
pay the full purchase price for the 2,000 fan-blades in the amount of US$ 22,723,800 
calculated in accordance with the exchange rate at the time of Claimant’s performance [Req. 
Arb., p.5, ¶¶10-12; Cl. Ex. C5, p.14]. And secondly, Respondent did not bear the bank 
charge for the transfer in the amount of US$ 102,192.80 [Req. Arb., p.5, ¶15]. Therefore, 
considering that, according to articles 53 and 54 CISG, payment of the price is the buyer’s 
foremost obligation in international sales contracts, Respondent incurred in a breach of 
contract, which under the Convention (...) comprises any non-fulfilment of contractual obligations 
established not only in the contract (...), but also in the Convention, established practices and usages (art. 9) 
[Chengwei II, ¶d)].  
 
144. According to the Contract, the price is due upon delivery of the fan blades [Cl. Ex. C2, p.10, Section 
4, ¶4.2]. Following the delivery of the fan blades in good order on 14 January 2015 [Req. Arb. 
p.5, ¶9; Cl. Ex. C3, p.12], the correct invoices were sent to Respondent on 15 January 2015 
[Cl. Ex. 5, p.14] – being this the date payment in full was due.  
145. Despite Claimant’s attempts to amicably compel Respondent to perform [Cl. Ex. C5, p.14; 
Cl. Ex. C6, p.15], only US$ 20,336,367.20 was credited to Claimant’s bank account [Cl. Ex. 
C6, p.15]. Therefore, Respondent did not fully pay the price in time. Such failure entitles 
Claimant to require the specific performance of Respondent’s obligation, being Claimant’s 
primary concern the performance of the Contract, embodied in article 62 CISG [Knapp, 
p.452, ¶1.3] and corroborated by Claimant’s demeanour.   
 
D. Claimant Is Entitled To Require Full Performance Of The Contract Pursuant To 
Articles 61.1(A) And 62 CISG 
146. Subject to article 61 CISG, the natural remedy in case of non-payment of the due price is 
specific performance, expression of the maxim pacta sunt servanda [Chengwei I, ¶4.1].  
147. As provided for in article 62 CISG, the seller is entitled to the due purchase price by the 
buyer under the contract. In fact, Claimant simply requests Respondent to comply with its 
very own buyer’s obligations under the Contract: the payment in full of the purchase price 
for the fan-blades. It is not requesting the constitution of any other right, but simply a 
pursuance of its initial one under the Contract [Chengwei I, ¶4.1; Knapp, p.452, ¶2.2].   
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148. Claimant, thus, requires the specific performance of Respondent’s obligation to pay the full 
purchase price. As demonstrated below, i) Claimant has fully performed its own contractual 
obligations. Therefore, ii) specific performance is a viable remedy both under the CISG and 
UNIDROIT Principles [arts. 61 CISG and 7.2.1 UNIDROIT Principles, respectively] since: 
iii) it is factually possible and iv) the fixation of an additional time for Respondent’s 
compliance is not inconsistent with such remedy. Therefore, Claimant shall be awarded such 
remedy as it has proven its claims are grounded [cf. Russian Int’l Arb. Court CCI].  
i) Claimant has fully performed its own contractual obligations 
149. Claimant produced the 2,000 fan blades and 2,000 clamps and delivered both in a timely and 
regularly manner to Respondent [Req. Arb. p.5, ¶9], having the latter confirmed that the 
goods were in conformity with the required specifications in the Contract [Cl. Ex. C3, p.12]. 
Therefore, by complying with its own contractual obligations, Claimant is entitled to request 
full performance of Respondent’s consideration.  
ii) Specific performance is the viable and natural remedy under both the CISG and 
UNIDROIT Principles 
150. Article 61.1(a) CISG adopts a single consolidated set of remedial provisions for breach of 
contract by the buyer. In the case at hand, the buyer, namely the Respondent, failed to 
perform its obligation to pay the price under the contract, which enables Claimant, the seller, 
to exercise the rights provided in articles 62 to 65 CISG.  
151. Claimant resorted to the remedy provisioned in article 62 [Req. Arb., p.6, ¶20] which 
enshrines its right, as the seller, to require specific performance [cf. COMPROMEX case; 
Russian Trib. Int’t Comm. Arb.Award 13.01.2006; Cour de Justice de Genève 20.01.2006]. Article 
7.2.1 UNIDROIT Principles also recognizes the generally accepted principle that payment of money 
which is due under a contractual obligation can always be demanded and, if the demand is not met, enforced 
by legal action (...) irrespective of the currency in which payment is due.  
152. Claimant’s right to require payment of the price of the goods could only be excluded had 
Respondent not accepted such delivery, which it did as previously mentioned. Only in that 
event could Claimant be expected to resell the fan-blades and the clamps, notwithstanding 
the fact that those were specifically produced under the Contract with the single purpose to 
be used in the manufacturing of Respondent’s jet engine [Req. Arb., p.4, ¶3; Cl. Ex. C2, p.9; 
Answer Req. Arb., p.24, ¶¶5-6].  
153. Even more, the remedy cannot be exceptionally excluded in the instant case. Specific 
performance of non-monetary obligations can occasionally be ruled out when unlawful or 
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factually impossible; (...) would cause the debtor unreasonable effort or expense; (...) consists in the the 
provision of services or work of a personal character or depends upon a personal relationship; or the aggrieved 
party may reasonably obtain performance from another source [c.f. art. 9:102 PECL, often resorted to for 
guidance in interpreting and supplementing art. 46 CISG; Vanto, ¶¶(d)&(e)]. Not only is Claimant 
requesting specific performance of a monetary obligation rather than a non-monetary one, 
but none of the previous criteria is met in the case at matter.  
154. First, Claimant is lawfully demanding the due purchase price under the Contract. Second, 
impossibilium nulla est obligatio cannot be applied since the obligation is fungible and 
consequently factually possible. Third, specific performance will not cause Respondent 
unreasonable effort or expense since the due purchase price is in any case covered by the 
price range agreed upon by the parties [Req. Arb., p.4, ¶6] and, furthermore, Claimant has 
offered to bear the costs which may result from that additional transfer [Cl. Ex. C5, p.14]. 
Fourth, full performance in this case does not consist in services or work of a personal character or 
depends upon a personal relationship [c.f. art. 9:102 PECL].  
155. And last but not least, Claimant may not reasonably obtain performance from another source 
considering that, as abovementioned, not only were both the fan-blades and the clamps 
specifically produced in view of Respondent’s business with Earhart, but Claimant no longer 
possesses the goods since they are now in Respondent’s possession. 
iii) Claimant’s conduct is not inconsistent with specific performance 
156. After the correction of the invoice, Claimant requested payment to be made [Cl. Ex. C5, 
p.14]. However, Respondent did not fulfil its obligation, as Claimant did not receive the 
outstanding payment of the full purchase price [Cl. Ex. C6, p.15]. Thereafter, Claimant fixed 
an additional period of time – Nachfrist –, according to article 63 CISG.  
157. Such remedy is not inconsistent with the request for specific performance under article 62 
CISG [Knapp, p.453] since Respondent did not pay and promptly declared it will not do so 
[Cl. Ex. C7, p.16]. As it is recognized by commentators, after a breach of obligations by the other 
party, the aggrieved party's principal concern is often that the breaching party perform the contract as he 
originally promised [Chengwei II, ¶2].  
158. Article 63 CISG requires the length of the period of time to be defined, since it is not sufficient 
that the seller expresses his wish to receive payment as soon as possible without delay or uses other similar 
terms [Sévon, ¶225]. Accordingly, Claimant requested payment to be made until 4 March [Cl. 
Ex. C6, p.15]. The additional period of a month shall be considered, in the business world, 
reasonable for the fulfilment of an already delayed obligation since the very beginning – 15 
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January [Cl. Ex C5, p.14].  Besides, Claimant offered to exceptionally bear all the costs 
resultant from the second transfer [idem]. 
159. Despite of the above, Respondent not only did not fulfil his obligation to pay the full 
purchase price, which included the sum pertaining to the levy, but also gave notice he would 
not do so during the period of grace granted by Claimant nor after it [Cl. Ex. C7, p.16]. The 
fact that Respondent has denied the existence of the abovementioned obligations alone is 
sufficient to grant specific performance since it proves its unwillingness to fulfil such.  
160. Thereafter, Claimant’s request for specific performance is in accordance with article 7.1.5 (2) 
UNIDROIT Principles and also does not infringes article 63 (2) CISG, which states that the 
seller may not, during that period, resort to any remedy for breach of contract, since Claimant has received 
notice from the buyer that he will not perform within the period so fixed.  
161. Consequently, Claimant did not resort to any other remedy inconsistent with performance as 
it did not, for instance, declare avoidance whilst waiting for performance to take place. 
Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that after the non-payment notice by Respondent, Claimant 
could, in fact, declare avoidance under article 64(1)(b) CISG if the buyer does not pay the price 
within the additional period fixed by the seller [Sévon, p.228].  
162. Considering all of the above, Claimant is entitled to and requires specific performance 
pursuant to article 62 CISG. Moreover, pursuant to article 63(2) CISG the seller, in granting an 
additional period of time, is not deprived of the right to claim damages for delay in performance [CISG 
Digest Art.63, p.304, ¶9]. 
163. Notwithstanding that specific performance is the most accurate method of achieving the 
compensation aim of contractual remedies, giving the aggrieved party the precise 
performance that should have taken place, if the Tribunal considers that the remedy cannot 
be granted, Claimant shall naturally be awarded damages for the breach of contract, namely 
under the provision of “sum equal to the loss” [art. 74 CISG], in the amount difference between 




CONCLUSION: CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO THE ADDITIONAL 
PAYMENTS IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ 2,387,432.80: US$ 2,285,240.00 
FOR THE FAN-BLADES AND US$ 102,192.80 FOR THE DEDUCTED 
LEVY, ALL ADDED BY THE CORRESPONDING INTEREST AS FORESEEN 
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REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
 
Counsel for Claimant respectively requests the Tribunal to find that: 
 
 Claimant’s claims are admissible and have been timely and regularly submitted;  
 It does not have jurisdiction to order Claimant to post security for costs; 
 Should the Tribunal consider itself empowered to order security for costs, the request is 
groundless and consequently is to be denied; 
 Respondent incurred into a breach of Contract, being Claimant entitled to the outstanding 
purchase price for the fan-blades of US$ 2,285,240.00 and the bank charge in the amount of 
US$ 102,192.80, all added by the correspondent interest. 
 Respondent shall bear all the costs incurred in these arbitral proceedings, including costs due 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
       
      THE PARTIES: Claimant, Wright Ltd., is a specialized manufacturer of fan-blades for jet engines; 
Respondent, SantosD KG, is a manufacturer of jet engines. During the period both were subsidiaries 
of Engineering International, the Parties cooperated in other joint developments for fan-blades 
[Answer Req. Arb., p.24, ¶7]. Shortly after being put up for sale, in November 2009 it was decided 
Respondent should be de-risked in order to make it more attractive to potential buyers, for instance, 
via the agreement of fixed exchange rates [Res. Ex. R1, p.27] not only in ongoing relations but also 
newly concluded contracts [Answer Req. Arb., p.24, ¶9]. On the other hand, as a result of the 
confidential negotiations between Engineering International and Skymover – which finally bought 
Claimant on 27 July 2010 – the signature of the Development and Sales Agreement had to be 
postponed to 1 August 2010, instead of the former original date [PO2, p.54, ¶1]. Subsequently, 
Respondent was sold to SpeedRun on 3 August 2010 [idem].  
 
      NEGOTIATION AND CONCLUSION OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND SALES AGREEMENT 
     In January 2010, Respondent received notice from Earhart SP, an aircraft manufacturer, seeking 
quotes for a new jet engine, particularly focusing on its low fuel consumption and noise reduction 
[Answer Req. Arb., p.24, ¶5]. In Spring 2010, Respondent contacted Claimant to discuss the 
possibility of jointly developing the state-of-the-art TRF 192-I fan-blade, to be included into 
Respondent’s high-spec jet engine to meet Earhart SP’s standards. At the time, both Parties were 
subsidiaries of Engineering International [idem, ¶¶6&7]. On 1 May 2010, when agreeing on the basic 
principles for their cooperation, Respondent made clear that, in order to contract with Earhart in 
September 2010 – and thus guarantee business for both Parties – it needed a fixed figure; as the final 
production costs for the fan-blade were not yet determined, the Parties agreed on a price range as the 
basis for Respondent’s internal calculation of its offer to Earhart [idem].  
     On 1 August 2010, the Development and Sales Agreement was concluded. In the first year of 
contracting, Respondent was bound to purchase 2,000 fan-blades [Cl. Ex. C2, p.10]. The final price 
would be paid in US$ and calculated on a cost + profit basis [idem] with risk-sharing elements [Cl. Ex. 
C1, p.8]. As a comparable model had already been used in their two earlier cooperations, the Parties 
copied the price mechanism. At the time of those cooperations, there had been no need for the Parties 
to explicitly regulate the exchange rate as they belonged to the same group of companies. Yet, in the 
end, the exchange rate at the time of contracting had been used for the conversion of the cost 
elements for both [Answer Req. Arb., p.24, ¶8]. It was clear for Respondent that this should also be 
the basis for the present cooperation considering Respondent’s de-risking context [idem, ¶9; Res. Ex. 
R5, p.31]. However, since the Parties used previous contracts and adopted very similar conducts as 
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in the past, the inclusion of an express provision regarding a fixed exchange rate was overlooked 
[Answer Req. Arb., p.25, ¶10]. On 26 October 2010, the Parties agreed to add an addendum to the 
Contract regarding the purchase of 2,000 clamps [Req. Arb. p.4&5, ¶8]. Given that they no longer 
belonged to the same group of companies and to avoid any discussions on the applicable exchange 
rate, Respondent suggested to explicitly regulate the rate governing the whole Contract in the 
addendum, to which Claimant did not raise any objections [Answer Req. Arb., p.25, ¶10; Res. Ex. R2, 
p.28; Res. Ex. R4, p.30].  
 
     PERFORMANCE OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND SALES AGREEMENT  
     On 14 January 2015, Claimant delivered the goods in conformity with the Contract [Cl. Ex. C3, 
p.12], attaching the respective invoices [Req. Arb. p.5, ¶9]. The following day, after examining the 
received goods, Respondent transferred to Claimant’s bank account US$ 20,438,560.00 for the fan-
blades and US$ 183,343.28 for the clamps [Cl. Ex. C3, p.12], fully performing its payment obligations 
under the Contract [Answer Req. Arb., p.25, ¶¶15-19]. After receiving payment confirmation from 
Respondent, Claimant sent a second invoice for the fan-blades wrongly applying a floating exchange 
rate and requesting additional payment of US$ 2,285,240.00 [Cl. Ex. C5, p.14; Cl. Ex. C7, p.16]. On 
29 January 2015, only US$ 20,336,367.20 was credited to Claimant’s bank account due to unknown 
reasons for Respondent [idem]. As then explained by the Central Bank, since the transfer exceeded 
US$ 2 million, a 0.5% levy had been subtracted under Regulation ML/2010C [Cl. Ex. C8, p.17], a 
specific public law regulation in Equatoriana regarding money laundering investigations [Answer Req. 
Arb., p.26, ¶¶18&19] with no correspondence in Mediterraneo [PO2, p. 55, ¶8]. On 9 February 2015, 
Claimant once again contacted Respondent demanding further payment [Cl. Ex. C6, p.15]. The latter 
replied that no such was due under the Contract as the invoice correctly reflected the Parties’ 
agreement on a fixed exchange rate for the whole Contract [Cl. Ex. C7, p.16], also stating it was not 
bound to bear the levy as it was not an ordinary charge [Answer Req. Arb., p.26, ¶¶18&19]. 
 
     THE ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS: On 1 April 2016, as Claimant informed Respondent it would take 
the steps to initiate arbitral proceedings [Res. Ex. R3, p.29], the 60-day limit started running [Answer 
Req. Arb., p.25, ¶13].  On 31 May 2016, the deadline for initiating arbitration [idem], Claimant 
presented an incomplete Request for Arbitration [Req. Arb., pp.3-7], neither attaching a power of 
attorney for these proceedings nor paying the registration fee in full [CAM-CCBC LtoCl., p.19, 
¶¶2i&2ii]. On 7 June 2016, Mr Fasttrack presented the correct signed power of attorney by Wright 
Ltd and payment confirmation of the fee remainder [Fasttrack to CAM-CCBC2, pp.20&21]. On 
September 2016, Respondent requested security for costs [Req. SfC, pp.45&46]. 
 
APPLICABLE PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
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     According to the arbitration agreement, [t]he arbitration shall be conducted under the Rules of the (…) 
Chamber of Commerce Brazil-Canada (“CAM-CCBC”) and in line with international arbitration practice [Cl. Ex. 
C2, p.11]. Additionally, [t]he seat of arbitration shall be Vindobona, Danubia. Hence, the lex arbitri is 
Danubian Arbitration Law – which is an adoption of UNCITRAL Model Law [PO2, p.60, ¶37]. The 
Parties also agreed that the Agreement is governed by the UN Convention of the International Sale of Goods 
(“CISG”). [F]or issues not dealt with by the CISG the UNIDROIT Principles are applicable [Cl. Ex. C2, p.10]. 
Pursuant to the agreement between the Parties, the abovementioned statutes shall govern the arbitral 
proceedings and the merits of the present dispute. 
 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
     On behalf of our Client, SantosD KG, hereinafter Respondent, following the applicable law, we 
respectfully make the following submissions and request this Tribunal to find that: 
I. Claimant’s claims are inadmissible since the arbitration was not regularly initiated within the 60-day 
limit agreed by the Parties (A), irrespective of CAM-CCBC’s President acceptance of the Request for 
Arbitration (B). Furthermore, the said limit cannot and shall not be deemed extended under the Rules 
as it consists of a contractual provision accordant to the Parties’ will (C). 
 
 
II. The Tribunal is empowered to and shall order Claimant to provide security for Respondent’s costs 
as the elements contained in the arbitration agreement provide for such an application (A) and the 
facts of the case demonstrate an exceptional circumstance grounding the request (B).  
 
III. Claimant is not entitled to additional payment since the Parties intended and agreed on a fixed 
exchange rate for the whole Contract (A) and Respondent is not under the obligation to bear the 
levy as it is an extraordinary bank charge (B). Therefore, no further payment of any kind is due since 
Respondent duly concluded the Contract and performed its obligations under the CISG (C). 
Furthermore, Respondent reasonably relied on Claimant throughout the negotiation and 




      In Claimant’s submission there are several misreferences as to the Parties in dispute as well as to 
relevant facts and events of the case [MfC, pp. i, ii, 1-3&6, etc.] which could substantially impact the 
argumentative logic hereinafter adopted. Notwithstanding, relying on the initially submitted Request 
for Arbitration and Answer to Request for Security for Costs, parallel to the global context of the 
case Claimant presents, those shall be disregarded in order to address the issues at matter, being for 
all purposes Wright Ltd, Claimant in dispute and, SantosD KG, Respondent. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. CLAIMANT’S CLAIMS ARE INADMISSIBLE AS NOT HAVING BEEN TIMELY SUBMITTED 
1. Claimant’s claims are inadmissible since the arbitration was not properly initiated within the 60-
day limit agreed by the Parties (A), irrespective of the CAM-CCBC’s President acceptance of the 
Request for Arbitration (B). Furthermore, the said limit shall not be deemed extended under the 
Rules as it consists of a contractual provision accordant to the Parties’ will (C). 
A. Claimant did not initiate arbitration within the 60-day limit agreed by the Parties 
2. Pursuant to Section 21 of the Contract, the arbitral proceedings had to be initiated – meaning 
properly commenced – within 60 days after the failure of the negotiation [Cl. Ex. C2, p.11]. When 
agreeing to this 60-day limit, the Parties were clearly and unambiguously [cf. Montecalvo v. ACE] 
contracting an absolute time-bar clause to refer the disputes pursuant to the underlying contract 
to arbitration [cf. Wholecrop v. Wolds Produce; Tweeddale & Tweeddale, p.480]. Additionally, when 
consenting on the arbitration to be conducted under the Rules of (...) CAM-CCBC [Cl. Ex. C2, p.11], 
the Parties were agreeing on the conditions as to the form of the request for arbitration that must 
be enforced by the arbitrators by reference to institutional arbitration rules 
[Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, p.657].  
3. However, the Request for Arbitration that Claimant submitted on the 31st of May 2016 did not 
comply with the specific mandatory requirements concerning the commencement of the 
proceedings provided for in article 4 CAM-CCBC Rules. The proceedings were only commenced 
on the 7th of June 2016 [Fasttrack to CAM-CCBC2, p.20] when the required valid signed power 
of attorney by Wright Ltd was provided and the requisite registration fee paid in full (i), thereby 
the date when all requisites were fulfilled – as CAM-CCBC itself found the deficiencies of an 
importance preventing from notifying Respondent of the said Request. Similarly, the Kuala 
LRCA Rules establish that the date of receipt (...) of the request complete with all the accompanying 
documentation and (...) registration fee shall be (...) the date on which the arbitration has commenced 
for all purposes [cf. art. 2(2) KLRCA Rules]. In addition, Respondent cannot be deemed liable for 
Claimant’s untimely commencement of arbitral proceedings (ii). 
4. By the 7th June the time limit for initiating arbitration had already expired. According to article 
1.12(1) UNIDROIT Principles, the agreed 60-day contractual provision must be counted in 
calendar days. Thus, and as Claimant duly observes [MfC, p.12, ¶¶27&28], considering that the 
negotiations failed on the 1st of April 2016, the submission deadline was indeed the 31st of May. 
5. Only a complete and thereby validly submitted request for arbitration could stop the running of time 
limits applicable to the claim [Terashima & Gagliardi, p.66]. Therefore, a claimant amending its 
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request after the deadline is running the risk of having an arbitral award declaring that the claim is barred 
[idem] considering that the arbitration was not validly commenced before the expiry of the time limit 
[Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, p.520]. Hence, the non-compliance with the requirements for initiating 
arbitration within the abovementioned agreed time limit shall render Claimant’s claims 
inadmissible as time-barred [cf. Nanjing v. Orchard; Born, p.942]. 
i) All procedural requirements were only complied with on the 7th June 2016  
a) The power of attorney by Wright Holding PLC presented on the 31st of May 2016 
did not provide for Claimant’s adequate representation nor give Mr Fasttrack 
proper authority to commence the proceedings on its behalf 
6. Pursuant to article 4.1 CAM-CCBC Rules, [t]he party desiring to commence an arbitration will 
notify the CAM/CCBC, (...) enclosing (...) a power of attorney for any lawyers providing for adequate 
representation. From this wording, one concludes that the party initiating proceedings must 
enclose all the requested documents [Terashima & Gagliardi, p.65]. Yet, Claimant argues that the 
power of attorney did (...) provide for adequate representation as Wright Holding PLC is Claimant’s 
parent company and the one who had originally approached Mr Fasttrack to prepare the claim 
[MfC, p.13 ¶30].  
7. However, since Mr Fasttrack is representing Claimant and not its parent company in these 
proceedings [Fasttrack to CAM-CCBC2, p.20], which are for all matters and purposes 
independent legal entities, the power of attorney presented first [PA1, p.18] did not provide for 
Claimant’s representation as was therefore invalid. Hence, since the Request for Arbitration was 
solely signed by Mr Fasttrack [Req. Arb., p.7] and not accompanied by a power of attorney on 
Claimant’s behalf, the Request shall be considered an unsigned Request whose legal certainty 
cannot be ensured [Wilske & Gack, p.323]. 
8. The Tribunal shall thus consider there was neither unequivocal nor implied indication from the 
initiating party to commence proceedings upon the filing of the Request [Wilske & Gack, 
pp.323&324; Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, p.656; contrarily, vide ICC Case No. 6228 where 
claimant’s signature implied the party’s intention]. As Mr Fasttrack did not represent Claimant in 
the negotiations preceding the arbitration nor in any previous proceedings Respondent is aware 
of [PO2, p.58, ¶25], the attorney could not be deemed to be Claimant’s adequate nor apparent 
representative on the 31st of May 2016. Even though Mr Fasttrack referred to Wright Ltd as its 
client in his first letter to CAM-CCBC [Fasttrack to CAM-CCBC1, p.2], there was not, at the 
time, proper documentation to attest such claim.  
9. Besides, Wright Holding PLC had not been directly involved in the negotiations, drafting or 
conclusion of the Contract [PO2, p.57, ¶22]. Its involvement in the dispute merely concerned the 
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obtainment of a general policy decision on customer complaints concerning the levy and not the 
initiation of the arbitration or the preparation of the claims [PO2, pp.57&58, ¶22]. 
10. Furthermore, Claimant’s 1st of April 2016 e-mail is not an evident manifestation of its intention 
to initiate arbitration on the 31st of May 2016 [MfC, p.12, ¶27], as it did not refer any specific 
dates for such event nor provide any information that could indicate to Respondent – or even 
the Tribunal – that Mr Fasttrack was Claimant’s nominated attorney [Res. Ex. R3, p.29]. For these 
reasons, there was neither a clear demonstration that Claimant intended to start this arbitration 
[Wilske & Gack, p.324] nor that it had, for that end, had named Mr Fasttrack as representative.  
11. Moreover, the presentation of the second power of attorney, on the 7th June 2016 [PA2, p.21], 
does not cover the blunder of not presenting a proper power of attorney in the first place.  
12. Respondent does not contest the fact that Mr Fasttrack was given retrospective power to present 
the Request on the 31st of May 2016 [idem]. However, the procedural formal requirement for 
commencing an arbitration – which has to be both dissociated from the attorney’s material act 
and analysed in the singular context of institutionalized arbitration – was only carried out on the 
7th of June 2016, after the time limit had already expired and therefore being incompatible with 
the agreement of the Parties. Indeed, the arbitral center is an intermediary between the Parties for 
the purposes of commencing proceedings and has its own procedural rules and specific formal 
requirements [Born, pp.63-67; Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, p.514]. The liberty to ratify is not an absolute 
unrestricted right, instead subject to restrictions [Bowstead/Reynolds/Watts, pp.65-66], namely 
the terms relied and agreed upon by the Parties. Giving ratification full effect in this case clearly 
denies those terms as it consequently extends the 60-day limit beyond the legal certainty the 
Parties intended to assure.  
13. In conclusion, the Tribunal shall deem the proceedings to have initiated on the date Mr Fasttrack 
was given the authority to make any submission on Claimant’s behalf – the 7th of June 2016. 
b) The partial payment of the registration fee is insufficient for the effective 
commencement of the arbitration 
14. Claimant argues that all requisites for initiating proceedings were met and all required documents 
provided on 31 May 2016 [MfC, pp.12&13, Section 2.2 & ¶29]. However, it does not mention that 
at that time Claimant did not pay the registration fee in full. 
15. Article 4.2 CAM-CCBC Rules dictates that, coupled with the notice for the commencement of 
proceedings, the party must [Terashima & Gagliardi, p.67] – attach proof of payment of the Registration 
Fee in accordance with article 12.5 of the Rules. This article, in turn, provides that [a]t the time of 
presentation of the notice for commencement of arbitration, the claimant must pay (...) the Registration 
Fee, in the amount stated in the Table of Expenses.  
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16. The payment of the fee must be effected in full – R$ 4,000.00 – even before the presentation of 
the mentioned notice as the payment receipt shall accompany the request [4.2 CAM-CCBC Rules; 
Timm, p.192]. Thereby, such payment is a precondition for the effective commencement of the 
arbitration as it has to be already demonstrated along with the Request. For that reason, the 
proceedings were only initiated on the 7th of June 2016 when Claimant suitably paid the Center 
the price for the service of processing the case, having CAM-CCBC made service of the Request 
dependent on the compliance of all formalities [Fasttrack CAM-CCBC2, p.20; Timm, p.192; cf. 
art. 5.2 ACICA Rules the arbitration shall be deemed to commence on the date on which the Notice of 
Arbitration or the registration fee is received by ACICA, whichever is the later]. 
ii) Respondent did not prevent Claimant from complying with the set out 
requirements in a timely manner 
17. Respondent is not prevented from relying on Claimant’s inefficiency to properly initiate 
arbitration. In fact, Respondent did not impede Claimant to comply with the demanded 
requirements [Answer Req. Arb., p.25, ¶14] as neither depends on Respondent’s cooperation. To 
the contrary, they are all under Claimant’s sphere of control, so the time-bar clause shall be 
enforced. 
18. Regardless, seeing that Claimant was the one who declared the negotiations to have failed, and 
now is claiming undue payment [Res. Ex. R3, p.29], it was burdened to take the necessary steps 
to duly commence the arbitration – as it well recognizes two months prior to the expiration of 
the time-limit [idem]. Thus, Respondent is not accountable for Claimant’s failure to properly do 
so. 
CONCLUSION: PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED ON 7 
JUNE 2016 AFTER THE TIME LIMIT HAD ALREADY 
EXPIRED  
B. CAM-CCBC’s President can only prima facie verify the arbitration agreement  
19. Claimant seems to interpret the communication for the amendment of the Request for 
Arbitration of CAM-CCBC’s President [Or. CAM-CCBC, p.19] as the acceptance of its timeliness 
[MfC, p.14, ¶¶31&32]. This is in disregard, however, of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle, one of 
the fundamental principles of arbitration [Born, Chapter 7; Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, 
pp.213,395-401; Rubino-Sammartano, p.584; Cauillez]. Such principle is foreseen in the Rules [art. 
4.5 CAM-CCBC Rules; Straube, p.12], in the applicable law to the arbitration [art. 16.1 DAL] and 
is now firmly established in most modern arbitration laws [Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, p.332, ¶14-17]. In 
accordance to the principle, arbitrators are empowered to ultimately examine the effectiveness of 
the arbitration agreement [Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, p.213, ¶416].  
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20. Consequently, the Tribunal is the single entity enabled to finally and definitely decide on the 
admissibility of these proceedings and is not bound to a preliminary administrative assessment 
[Wald/Borja/Vieira, p.81]. Even though the Rules authorize the President of the CAM-CCBC to 
examine the existence, validity or effectiveness of the arbitration agreement whenever requested 
or when respondent raises any objections [Straube, p.12; Wald/Borja/Vieira, p.81] without 
the production of evidence – which was not the case at the time of the amendment request – 
such eventual prima facie verification will always be confirmed or modified once the tribunal is 
constituted [art. 4.5 CAM-CCBC Rules]. The fact that the Request for Arbitration was not thrown 
out by CAM-CCBC’s President shall not be portrayed as Claimant suggests [MfC, p.14, ¶31] as, in 
practise, the President (...) will, (...), decide that the arbitration shall continue and any complex aspects related to 
the dispute (...) end up readdressed and effectively decided by the arbitral tribunal as already occurs in ICC [cf. 
art. 6(3) ICC Rules; Wald/Borja/Vieira, p.84]. 
21. Therefore, the acceptance by the arbitral institution of the Request for Arbitration without the 
fulfilment of all the needed requirements does not, by any means, indicate that the proceedings 
were initiated on the 31st of May 2016. Conversely, it is for this Tribunal to finally decide whether 
or not the proceedings were timely initiated.    
C. The time limit extension provision is of a procedural nature and is not accordant with 
the consolidated contractual intent of the Parties  
22. Claimant argues that even if the Tribunal finds the proceedings not timely initiated, its claims are 
still admissible as the Rules provide for the extension of time periods, invoking article 2.6(a) – 
which instead refers to representation – and unrelated case law to support such argument [MfC, 
pp.14&15, ¶¶33&34]. According to Claimant’s conception, the request for amendment implied 
the extension of the 60-day limit, until 10 June 2016 [MfC, p.14, ¶33]. 
23. Assuming Claimant intended to rely on article 2.6(i) CAM-CCBC Rules as the one providing for 
time periods, it still is confusing procedural and contractual time periods. It is not only calling 
upon the wrong provision, but also on article 6.6 of the Rules to count towards the agreed 60-
day limit [MfC, p.13, ¶28] – whose nature differs from the procedural time periods the Rules 
foresee [art. 6 CAM-CCBC Rules].  
24. The 60-day limit is of contractual nature since it is included in an arbitration agreement. Being a 
creature of contract [Born, p.1317], it records the consent of the parties to submit to arbitration [Redfern 
& Hunter, ¶2.01]. Therefore, the limit included in the agreement to arbitrate, as an exercise of 
party autonomy, shall only be modified according to the parties’ will and not at the discretion of 
either the arbitral institution or tribunal. Contrarily, the time periods forecast in the Rules are of 
procedural nature and can be extended [arts. 2.6(i) & 6.4 CAM-CCBC Rules]. 
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25. Claimant further alleges that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal has been established and for that 
reason the admissibility of the claims is an irrelevant issue [MfC, pp.14&15, ¶34], ignoring 
however that jurisdiction and admissibility are somewhat distinct concepts [Paulsson, p.601]. The fact 
that neither Party challenged in principle the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to address this dispute 
[PO1, p.52, ¶3(i)] does not mean Claimant’s claims are admissible as it is the Tribunal – when 
exercising its jurisdiction – that shall finally determine on such (in)admissibility in order to after 
all consider the merits of the dispute  [Paulsson, p.617].  
26. Both Parties agreed that if no amicable solution could be found each had the right to initiate 
arbitration within 60 days after the failure of the negotiations [Cl. Ex. C2, p.11]. As the claims were only 
appropriately submitted after the 60-day limit, Claimant can no longer submit its claims to 
arbitration [Redfern & Hunter, ¶2.202; Rubino-Sammartano, p.248; Tweeddale, p.239; Romano v. 
Rinaldi where the court held that neither the arbitration agreement was effective nor could the 
parties refer the dispute to courts]. 
27. Claimant’s vision that, irrespective of the effectiveness of the arbitration agreement for this 
dispute, the Tribunal shall extend the time limit, contradicts the contractual nature of this 
arbitration. The Rules may only be applied to a timely referred dispute. Claimant cannot argue an 
extension of the time limit based on an alleged power of the institution even before it is involved 
at all. It would be rather illogical to exercise a power which arises from the Parties’ agreement 
when the same agreement determines that such power can no longer be constituted for the 
present dispute. 
28. Additionally, even if the Tribunal could actually consider an extension, its decision would have to 
be fully justified and formalized via a procedural order and only when facing force majeure or other 
unforeseen circumstances [Verçosa, p.126; Harbour v. Agency]. In the present case, the 60-day limit 
is both reasonably long – not violating public policy – and familiar to Claimant as is was not only 
originally agreed by the Parties but also the standard dispute resolution clause in all contracts 
between subsidiaries of Engineering International [PO2, p.57, ¶21]. Any extension would always 
be unfair to Respondent which is not – and could not have been – accountable for Claimant’s 
untimely submission [vide Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, pp.510&511, concerning the fairly high considerations to 
meet for such an extension to be granted, for instance respondent’s responsibility].  
29. [A]s a general rule, arbitrators will ensure that deadlines stipulated by the parties are complied with, and the courts 
will not set aside or refuse to enforce the award for having done so [Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, p.658]. 
The Tribunal shall, above all, honour the Parties’ agreement to arbitrate: the foundation stone of 
almost every arbitration [Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, p.99, ¶6-1; Redfern & Hunter, ¶2.01] and expression 
of their intentions [Born, p.1343]. Thus, since arbitrators derive their power from such agreement, 
they should consider not the preferences of the parties in the heat of battle, but their more abstracted utility 
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calculations before [Style, p.3], as well as their emerging legitimate expectations, namely the strictly 
fixed time period in which a claim could be brought forward [vide Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, p.507 
regarding legal certainty provided by time limits]. Otherwise be running the risk of rendering a non-
enforceable arbitral award under the Model Law and the NY Convention, whose articles 36 and 
V, respectively, provide for the refusal of enforcement of arbitral awards following proceedings 
contrary to the effective agreement of the parties as to procedure.  
 
CONCLUSION: CLAIMANT’S CLAIMS ARE 
INADMISSIBLE AS NOT HAVING BEEN TIMELY 
SUBMITTED AND SHALL THEREFORE BE 
DISREGARDED 
II. THE TRIBUNAL IS EMPOWERED TO AND SHALL ORDER CLAIMANT TO PROVIDE SECURITY 
FOR COSTS 
30. Claimant shares Respondent’s perspective as to the Tribunal’s power to order security for costs, 
which correctly notes its jurisdiction although based on different standards. The arbitral power 
to order interim measures seems now uncontested [vide Filho & Lacreta, p.143; Kee, p.280; 
Craig/Park/Paulsson, p.467]. Indeed, the elements contained in the arbitration agreement 
provide for security for costs (A). However, Claimant’s arguments as to the non-fulfilment of the 
requirements to grant the measure shall be deemed unacceptable and consequently be disregarded 
since Respondent’s request is grounded (B).  
31. Therefore, Claimant shall be ordered to secure in advance the costs Respondent has to pay to the 
Tribunal, as well as the legal costs for the services of Mr Langweiler and also the likely expenses 
incurred for the oral hearing for witnesses and experts [Req. SfC, p.46, ¶1], in the estimated 
minimum amount of US$ 200,000.00, probably higher [idem]. 
A. The elements contained in the arbitration agreement provide for security for costs   
32. As previously mentioned, the arbitration agreement, being a reflection of party autonomy, is the 
primary source of the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction [Born, pp.75,2453; Rubino-Sammartano, 
p.56; Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, p.11, ¶11]. 
33. When agreeing that [t]he arbitration shall be conducted under the Rules of the (...) Chamber of Commerce 
Brazil-Canada the Parties thereby incorporated CAM-CCBC Rules as those applicable to the 
proceedings [Born, p.1388; Haddad & Coelho, p.32; Cl. Ex. C2, p.11, Section 21: Dispute 
Resolution]. Additionally, by selecting Vindobona, Danubia as the seat of arbitration [idem], the 
Parties also subscribed that the lex arbitri would be Danubian Arbitration Law. Finally, the Parties 
consented on the arbitration to be conducted in line with international arbitration practice [idem]. As 
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hereafter demonstrated, all these elements are the genesis of the parties’ ability to request security 
[Rubins, p.315; Redfern & O’Leary, p.401; Skoufalos, p.3] which provide for such a provisional 
measure to be within the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.  
34. Thereby, it is clear that the current proceedings shall be conducted under the abovementioned 
statutes and not ICSID Convention nor any other arbitration laws or institutional rules that 
Claimant refers [MfC, p.4, Section 1.1], neglecting the specific context of the cited article “Security 
for costs in ICSID Arbitration” [Uchkunova & Temnikov, ¶1].  
i) Article 8 of the Rules comprises security for costs as an available measure 
35. Despite some of its distinctive features, security for costs is commonly accepted as a provisional 
measure [Gu, p.167; Born, p.2495; Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, p.594; Berger, p.9].  
36. Article 8.1 CAM-CCBC Rules – and not 10.4.1 [MfC, p.5, ¶3] – provides that the Tribunal has 
the power to grant injunctive or anticipatory measures, unless otherwise agreed by the parties.  
37. The mentioned provision can be compared to other institutional rules, such as ICC former article 
23 – now 28 – drafted in order to bridge the problematic security for costs gap in the previous regime [Gu, 
p.181] and broadly enough to include applications for that measure [Schwartz & Derains, p.298; 
Blessing, p.31; Miles & Speller, p.33]. Although there is no express mention as to security for 
costs in the mentioned rules, the current international approach tends to conclude tribunals can 
grant such orders under their general power to grant interim relief [Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, p.600, ¶23-53; RSM 
Production v. Saint Lucia]. Thus, the absence of an express agreement to the contrary is commonly 
interpreted in international arbitration as a tacit consent to order measures as security for costs 
[Born, pp.2434-2454; cf. Swiss entity v, Dutch entity; ICC Case No. 12542; ICC Case No. 10032; XY 
International v. Société Z; Parties Not Indicated Award]. Consequently, an arbitral tribunal is 
empowered to issue security unless there is evidence that parties did not intend to bestow that 
power [Holtzmann & Neuhaus, p.550]. 
38. Notwithstanding, even if the Tribunal considers security for costs not included in the scope of 
article 8 CAM-CCBC Rules, it shall still find it is empowered to order it as a determination of 
procedure under article 7.8 which foresees [t]he Arbitral Tribunal will adopt the necessary and convenient 
measures for the appropriate conduct of the proceedings (...) in order to preserve their integrity [Goeler, p.336, 
quoting Craig/Park/Paulsson, p.467]. Respondent’s application is both necessary and convenient 
in this case [vide B(ii)].  
39. Altogether, in light of the spirit of the Rules in the matters that relate to their own powers [Escobar & Leite, 
p.212 on article 13.1 CAM-CCBC Rules], arbitrators are supposed to address security for costs as a 
provisional measure, envisioning arbitral plenitude towards courts. 
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ii) Consistently, Danubian Arbitration Law also foresees such measure 
40. The lex arbitri is a verbatim adoption of the Model Law [PO1, p.53, ¶5(4)] which foresees that the 
tribunal may order a party to provide a means of preserving assets out of which a subsequent award may be 
satisfied [art. 17(2)(c) Model Law]. Despite the fact that there is no express reference to security 
for costs, the UNCITRAL Working Group has clarified that such may be included within the 
scope of article 17(2)(c) [vide UNCITRAL Working Group, p.10, ¶48; Kee, p.275].  
41. The 2006 amendments to the Model Law confirmed the arbitral tribunal’s broad authority to grant 
provisional measures and clarified the existing substance of the Model Law rather than expanding previously-
limited powers [Born, p.2449], being security for costs available under the general provision to issue 
interim protection [Redfern & Hunter, ¶5.37; Guaracachi  v. Bolivia]. 
CONCLUSION: THE TRIBUNAL HAS THE INHERENT 
POWER TO ORDER SECURITY FOR COSTS  
B. Respondent’s request for security for costs is grounded and shall be granted 
42. Conversely to Claimant’s argument, Respondent’s request is duly substantiated and shall therefore 
be granted. The Tribunal should exercise its power on the present case since Respondent's case 
is properly supported by evidence (i), indeed representing exceptional circumstances for security 
for costs (ii). Moreover, by granting the measure, the Tribunal will not be prejudging the merits 
of the dispute in any way (iii).  
 
i) The article of the Carioca Business News is an admissible evidence   
43. Claimant argues the news article [Res. Ex. R6, p.47] is an inadmissible evidence since it is based 
on out-of-court declarations generally not allowed under the hearsay rule [MfC, p.8, ¶18]. However, 
such objection is rather uncommon in international arbitration [O’Malley, p.240, ¶8.25]. 
44. Respondent does not contest the general non-acceptance of the rule in domestic court 
proceedings [Burnett & Weiss, p.107] – as Claimant well demonstrated when trying to support 
its argument on state court decisions based on non-applicable national law provisions [e.g. Brooks 
v. Miller; Planned Parenthood v. Strange; Larez v. City of Los Angeles].  
45. It should be noted, however, that not only is there no formal bar to the admission of hearsay evidence 
[Burnett & Weiss, p.107; Mehren & Salomon, p.293] but also that such sort of evidence is 
generally accepted in arbitration either by state courts or arbitral tribunals [Petroleum v. Refining; 
Warborough v. S. Robinson & Sons; Steamship v. Thai Transportation; ICC Case No. 12124].  
46. Each party is entitled to produce the documents to prove their case on their evidentiary initiatives 
[Pereira & Levin, p.137]. In the instant case, Respondent presented one press article and did not 
exclusively rely on it to demonstrate the necessity of the measure [MfC, pp.8&9, ¶¶17&20]. 
Notwithstanding, the Tribunal has broad discretion to determine what evidence it should hear [Mehren & 
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Salomon, p.285], deem useful, necessary and appropriate, according to the applicable statutes and 
international practice [vide art. 7.4.1 Rules; art. 19(2) DAL; art. 9.1 IBA Rules].  
47. The news article provides circumstantial evidence and credible testimony of Claimant’s 
impecuniosity and previous non-compliance behaviour and aims to underline the current risk of 
its unwillingness or inability to comply with an adverse award [Needham, pp.122-125].  
48. Identical conclusions can also be drawn from the analysis of Claimant’s financial statements [PO2, 
pp.58&59, ¶28] and other relevant facts: Claimant’s unsuccessful search for funding; the use of 
the US$ 3,000,000.00 parent company loan for commence this arbitral proceedings; the 
enforcement proceedings initiated by its supplier; the objection to the declared set-off or 
Claimant’s past misleading and concealment behaviour [PO2, pp.59&60, ¶¶29,30&34]. Thus, 
Claimant cannot argue the inadmissibility of the article on the ground it jeopardizes the fairness 
and equality of the proceedings, namely because its author cannot be cross-examined [MfC, p.8, 
¶18], since all facts therein reported are either uncontested by Claimant or demonstrated by of 
other evidentiary elements.   
49. In conclusion, the Tribunal shall freely assess the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of the 
article [art. 19(2) DAL; Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, p.698] and deem it admissible. 
ii) The facts demonstrate the request is grounded and made in good faith 
50. Claimant argues that an application for security for costs should follow an alleged fixed group of 
criteria [MfC, p.6, ¶7]. This criteria is particularly based on investment arbitration case law which 
is actually similar to Respondent’s case [RSM Production v. Saint Lucia]. Furthermore, Claimant 
alleges the measure should only be granted in very exceptional cases [MfC, p.4, ¶2].  
51. However, contrarily to Claimant’s understanding, there is not an internationally recognized “legal test” 
for granting security for costs [Gu, p.186]. Instead, there are several different criteria that can be applied 
[Colbran, p.233; Delany, p.130; Rubins, pp.369-376; e.g. Parkinson v. Triplan; Hart v. Larchpark; 
ICC Case No. 12542]. Institutions, scholars and tribunals have developed widely accepted 
guidelines when assessing such applications [Goeler, p.336; Task Force Report, p.13, ¶B]. For 
instance, while article 8 CAM-CCBC Rules is silent on any specific conditions, UNCITRAL 
Model Law provides some guidance for granting general interim relief, although not for security 
for costs in particular. 
52. Hence, following international arbitration practice – which the Parties incorporated into to their 
agreement – not bound to the completion of concrete dispositions and since the grounds of the 
measure are entirely within the Tribunal’s discretion [art. 8.1 CAM-CCBC Rules; Rubins, p.320], 
this discretion shall be exercised considering the particularities of the case [Martowski, p.6; Keary 
v. Tarmac] and balancing both parties’ interests [Goeler, p.336; Gu, p.186; ICC Case No. 10032]. 
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Thus, it is not accurate to say that the power to order security shall be used rarely [MfC, p.4, ¶2]. 
Such restrictive approaches are based on singular legal backgrounds of particularly structured 
institutions such as the ICC [Born, p.2460; Rubins, p.340; Schwartz, p.54] and cannot be 
interpreted as a general international trend. In the contrary, its historic reluctance is presently 
being overridden as it was mostly associated with past doubts about arbitrator’s power to 
provisional measures comparing to courts [Rubins, p.341; Born, p.2461; Lew I, pp.23-30]. 
53. As an available remedy, the measure shall only be granted when the circumstances of the case 
justify it. Thus, Respondent does not contest such cannot be abused [MfC, p.4, ¶2].  
54. Nonetheless, Respondent further points out relevant facts which prove there are grounds to order 
security for costs, thus such will not constitute a misuse of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.  
a) Claimant’s claims lack any factual and legal basis so the Tribunal will 
ultimately render an award on costs in Respondent’s favour 
55. Claimant states Respondent’s case concerning its chances to win this dispute are not clear-cut [MfC, 
p.8, ¶16]. However, Claimant failed, all in all, to prove any facts to support its statement, not 
honouring the principle it invokes: who alleges must prove [MfC, p.6, ¶8]. Respondent has fully 
performed its obligations under the Contract and therefore Claimant’s claims for additional 
payment are non-meritorious and shall consequently be disregarded.  
56. Claimant is attempting to take advantage of the exchange rate fluctuation between the conclusion 
of the Contract and its performance [PO2, p.56, ¶12] – which swayed its way – arguing that the 
rate included in the addendum was only applicable to the purchase of the clamps and not the fan-
blades [Req. Arb. p.5, ¶¶8&12; MfC, p.16, ¶37]. Hence, the prima facie analysis of Claimant’s claims 
evidences they lack bona fide, an essential element when evaluating the prospects of success on an 
application for security [Rubins, p.370; art. 2 CIArb Guideline]. Therefore, Claimant’s claims are 
not only inadmissible but also unjustified. 
57. Since Claimant’s claims have no factual or legal basis, an award on the merits will most likely be 
rendered in Respondent’s favour. In that sense, Claimant will certainly be condemned to pay all 
the costs Respondent incurred in these proceedings as the cost shifting rule is the one applicable 
to the case at matter, under which the prevailing party is awarded the reasonable expenses 
incurred for presenting its case [Rubins, p.312].  
58. Cost allocation is an element of procedure governed by the Parties’ agreement and the selected 
institutional rules [Wetter & Priem, p.249; Triumph v. Kerr; ICC Case No. 6962; ICC Case No. 6248]. 
That being said, the cost shifting rule – also known as the costs follow the event principle – is not only a 
almost universally recognized to the extent it may be viewed as a general principle of international law [Gotanda, 
p.34, section III, B2, ¶a)] and international commercial arbitration practice [Bondar, pp.45-58; 
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Rubins, p.363], but also the rule under which Danubian, Equatorianian and Mediterranean 
arbitration and procedural laws are based upon [PO2, p.58, ¶26]. Thus, the Tribunal shall at this 
stage of the proceedings order security for Respondent’s costs as it will ultimately render a costs 
award in its favour [Req. SfC, p.46, ¶2], entitling it – as the prevailing party – to recover its 
incurred costs  [Lew/Mistelis/Kröll, pp.23-52].  
59. Although the Tribunal has discretion to allocate costs [PO2, p.58, ¶26], its decision is likely to 
depend either on the legal environment arbitrators were educated and formed [Redfern & O’Leary, 
p.403] or on the law and practices as to costs at the locus arbitri [Bühler, p.256]. In the current 
proceedings, all three appointed arbitrators have their professional domiciles in the 
abovementioned countries, thus being more familiar with cost shifting [Req. Arb., p.6, ¶18; 
Answer Req. Arb. p.24, ¶4; ToR, p.41, ¶4.1]. For that reason, they will certainly tend to apply 
such rule when rendering the final award on costs pursuant to article 10.4.1 CAM CCBC-Rules. 
60. This approach is also corroborated by each party’s submission on the reimbursement of 
arbitration costs, namely the relief sought in these proceedings [Req. Arb. p.7; Answer Req. Arb., 
p.26]. Consensus on this matter shall be deemed by the Tribunal as a decisive factor [Giusti & 
Catarucci, p.179]. Had the Parties intended to deviate from the cost shifting rule, they would not 
have formulated requests for the losing party to bear those costs.  
61. Finally, [t[he Arbitral Tribunal shall also fix the amount or the proportion of refund of one party to the 
other [ToR, p.43, ¶12.3]. This wording indicates it will ground its decision on cost allocation 
upon the final award on the merits. Thus, the costs will follow the outcome of the dispute and 
vary in proportion of the success of the winning party. 
b) Claimant’s past behaviour evidences a non-compliance intent  
62. The parties’ conduct must also be addressed when analyzing an application for security for costs, 
namely of the one against which the measure is sought. Claimant’s behaviour is of extreme 
importance in order to determine the rectitude of the request [Rubins, p.375], particularly in 
previous arbitral or court proceedings [Darwazeh & Leleu, p.144]. 
63. Claimant argues all the awards in previous proceedings were complied with, thereby concluding 
Respondent has failed to prove its non-compliance with adverse awards [MfC, p.6, ¶8]. However, 
not only Claimant is alleging unsustained facts but is now presenting a different – and 
contradictory – version of the ones initially reported.  
64. Claimant assumed it has not complied with the award rendered against it in January 2016 in the 
arbitration against its supplier – allegedly due to an imminent set-off against the latter [Answer 
Req. SfC, p.49; MfC, p.6, ¶10]. Thus, Claimant cannot argue there is no valid proof it has failed to 
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comply with any award [MfC, p.6 ¶8] when such fact was uncontested, specifically when Claimant 
admits the amount is owes to its supplier has not been due for more than three months [MfC, p.6, ¶10].  
65. Additionally, and despite the aforementioned arguments, the Tribunal shall consider the fact that 
the supplier commenced enforcement proceedings in a court under the New York Convention 
and therefore objected to the set-off declared by Claimant, which is currently still being litigated 
in the courts of Ruritania [PO2, p.59, ¶30]. Although Claimant imprecisely argues any sum awarded 
will be set off [MfC, p.6, ¶10], the mentioned claim will most likely be disregarded. Indeed, an US 
Court held the right to assert counterclaims in [an application to enforce a foreign award] appears nowhere in the 
[New York] Convention. (...) [T]he relief sought is to be denied only if the party resisting enforcement shows that 
one of the specific grounds stated in the Convention for non-enforcement exists [Geotech v. Evergreen]. 
66. Besides, there is a tendency to reject such a[n] [unadjudicated] claim as a set-off defense in enforcement proceedings 
[Otto, p.201]. Accordingly, an English Court stated it was not aware of any case in which the courts 
have accepted it would be inappropriate to allow a Convention award (...) valid and enforceable to be enforced on 
the grounds the debtor has a cross-claim against the holder of the award [Tongyuan v. Uni-Clan].  
67. One should also note that the set-off invoked in the pending enforcement proceedings consists 
of an amount its supplier allegedly owes to Claimant’s parent company [Answer Req. SfC, p.49] 
and not to Claimant itself. Thus, there is no direct connection between the debt Claimant is now 
trying to take advantage of and the amount in debt.   
68. Therefore, Claimant does have a history of non-compliance which can actually be compared to 
the applicant’s background in RSM Production v. Saint Lucia. The mentioned award has similarities 
to the current proceedings as in both cases the claimants did not comply with past awards 
rendered against them nor gave valid explanations for their behaviour.  
69. In conclusion, the fact Claimant did not challenge nor complied with a previous unfavourable 
award unveils an evasive or dilatory behaviour which could equally convert into non-compliance 
with the future adverse award [Gu, p.196] rendered in these proceedings. In that event, and even 
though both Equatoriana and Mediterraneo are contracting states to the New York Convention 
[PO2, p.60, ¶35], it cannot be argued that the award will always be enforceable as the New York 
Convention foresees several grounds for refusal [vide art. V].  
c) Claimant’s financial situation is unstable 
70. Claimant’s non-compliance with the payment order of US$ 2,500,000.00 in the previous 
arbitration against its supplier raises serious doubts as to its actual financial situation. 
71. When deciding applications for security for costs, tribunals typically consider the financial state of 
the party from whom security is requested (...) and the likely difficulties in enforcing a final costs award [Born, 
p.2495; Martowski, p.7; Rubins, p.373]. Tribunals also assess whether such condition has 
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unforeseeably and significantly deteriorated since the conclusion of the contract [Sandrock, 
pp.17-30; Rubins, p.357] and therefore constitutes a serious risk to the enforcement of any costs 
award. Orders for security are the standard method of protecting a party against the other’s 
potential inability to pay costs [Rubins, p.310]. 
72. Claimant argues it is in a very healthy financial status and not currently facing any liquidity challenges 
[MfC, p.7, ¶13] although adopting a contrary position when setting forth that once Claimant’s 
liquidity is stable (...) this will all be sorted – referring to its non-compliance with the arbitral award 
rendered against it [MfC, p.6, ¶10]. In fact, Claimant recognizes its lack of funding when arguing 
Respondent is the one causing it [Answer Req. SfC, p.49]. Such acknowledgement can also be 
compared to the claimant’s admission of its financial limitations in RSM Production v. Saint Lucia. 
Moreover, Claimant relies on the witness statement of its CFO, Ms Jaschin, to prove it is now 
facing a strained liquidity due to the production of the new TRF-305 fan-blade [Cl. Ex. C9, p.50]. 
Therefore, such fact shall be deemed uncontested by the Tribunal.  
73. Furthermore, Claimant’s fragile situation is reflected in its published financial statements. 
According to the 2015 balance sheet, Claimant’s cash and cash equivalents – which amount to 
US$ 199,950.00 – are insufficient to pay the costs Respondent is estimating to incur in this 
arbitration [PO2, p.59, ¶28]. Furthermore, the vast majority of Claimant’s assets are non-current, 
which includes property, plant and equipment, and other intangible assets. These cannot be easily 
liquidated to suppress any urgent need since they are essential to maintain the business activity. 
As some authors note, the classical case where security may be granted is the claimant’s impecuniosity here 
reflected in its serious cash-flow problem and lack of working capital [Altaras, p.86]. 
74. Moreover, as Claimant’s set-off defense in the abovementioned enforcement proceedings is most 
likely to be disregarded, the liabilities position may increase in, at least, US$ 2,500,000.00. In that 
scenario, the debt will be larger than the amount of assets Claimant presently has, portraying 
uncertainty concerning the future development of the company [in accordance with the ruling in 
ICC Case number 6697 in which security was ordered since Claimant was near insolvency and had 
far more creditors than assets to satisfy them]. Therefore, although it is still in possession of (…) 
assets [MfC, p.7, ¶13], the Tribunal shall not ignore the fact that Claimant is facing serious financial 
difficulties, which can immediately convert into an insolvency situation. Such facts reveal urgency 
in an immediate relief in order to stop potential harm – though awarding security for costs does 
not typically require such showings [Born, p.2472; Redfern & Hunter, ¶5.35]. Thus, Claimant’s 
imminent bankruptcy will deprive Respondent from recovering its incurred arbitration costs due 
to Claimant’s substantial debts, essentially loans usually secured and therefore first satisfied. There 
is in fact serious risk that Claimant will not have the funds or its assets will not be readily available 
to pay the costs as the end of these proceedings.   
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d) Claimant’s financial status unexpectedly deteriorated 
75. In addition to considering Claimant’s current instability, the Tribunal shall also acknowledge that 
its financial situation has unexpectedly deteriorated since the conclusion of the Contract. Firstly, 
at that time, the 2010 balance sheet, which reflected a loss in the amount of US$ 760,000.00, had 
not yet been published [PO2, p.58, ¶28]. Thus, Respondent could not have been aware of 
Claimant’s difficult financial situation. Besides, Claimant’s 2009 balance sheet portrayed an 
unrealistic amount in the claims position which Claimant consents [MfC, p.7, ¶12], creating the 
impression it was supposed to be rendered US$ 15,000,000.00 when, in reality, it was actually 
awarded only US$12,000,00.00 [Res. Ex. R6, p.47] of the US$203,000,000.00 allegedly claimed – 
not being Respondent aware of Claimant’s largely unsuccessful arbitration at the time of 
contracting. Such US$ 3,000,000.00 difference is of major importance for Claimant’s financial 
situation given the fact it is now claiming an inferior amount in these proceedings which has – 
according to Claimant’s version – contributed to its current lack of funding [Answer Req. SfC, 
p.49; MfC, p.8, ¶14]. Moreover, the largely unfavourable award in the arbitration with one of 
Claimant’s supplier was only rendered the past year. 
e) Claimant has a history of searching for third party funding and has 
employed external funding for the purpose of initiating these proceedings 
76. Claimant previously resorted to third party funding in both arbitrations with Xanadu [PO2, p.61, 
¶39(d)] and has sought it for these proceedings. Although Respondent is well aware Claimant did 
not successfully obtain third party funding for the current proceedings [MfC, p.7, ¶11], its 
inquiries shall be considered when thoroughly evaluating Claimant’s situation as its financial 
difficulties are more likely to justify security for costs if (...) coupled with some other unforeseen factor that amplifies 
concerns about ability or willingness to pay [Henderson, p.73]. 
77. Indeed, due to the unsuccessful search for third party funding [Res. Ex., p.47; PO2, p.59, ¶29], 
Claimant had to make use of a US$ 3,000,000.00 loan provided by Wright Holding PLC – aimed 
for the final stages of the TRF-305 production – to be able to finance this arbitration [idem]. 
Therefore, albeit Claimant did not obtain third party funding, for all purposes availed itself of the 
financial aid of a third person [Sandrock, p.34] since it lacked funding capacity to independently 
commence this proceedings [Brekoulakis, ¶1], contributing to a strong prima facie for security for 
costs in the same terms as resorting to third party funding [cf. Born, p.2496] since it is doubtful 
whether the parent company will assume responsibility for honouring an eventual adverse costs award 
[RSM Production v. Saint Lucia].  
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f) Respondent is not responsible for any lack of liquidity 
78. Simultaneously, it cannot be argued that Respondent contributed to Claimant’s strained liquidity 
or lack of funding [Answer Req. Arb., p.49; MfC, p.8, ¶14] since, as mentioned before and further 
demonstrated, Respondent has fully performed its payment obligations under the Contract. Thus, 
Claimant’s claims are unlawful and unproven.  
79. Claimant also failed to prove Respondent was the sole or primary cause of its financial difficulties 
as, according to the former, it is undergoing self-inflicted strained liquidity due to the 
development of the TRF-305 [Cl. Ex. C6, p.15; Hart v. Larchpark]. In fact, Claimant’s admissions 
regarding the strained liquidity associated with the new fan-blade and lack of funding allegedly 
caused by the Respondent’s refusal of additional payment only add to the very own 
acknowledgement of its doubtful financial condition. 
80. In conclusion, the requested measure is not only adequate but necessary to efficiently protect 
Respondent against Claimant’s frivolous claims [Req. SfC, p.46, ¶5; Miles & Speller, p.32; Ho, 
p.334], having been genuinely demonstrated that granting security will ensure the preservation of 
Respondent's reimbursement right [Gu, p.168] and consequently the effectiveness of the 
arbitration [Pessey, p.18].  
81. Moreover, Claimant’s compliance with its administration fees obligations [PO2, p.60, ¶32] does 
not guarantee its ability to pay any costs award at the end of the proceedings, might rendering 
these meaningless [Skoufalos, p.5] – if the matter relates to the integrity of the proceedings (...) it is always 
urgent [Quiborax v. Bolivia]. In addition, Claimant failed to demonstrate that ordering security would 
either be onerous, unnecessary, unfair or deprive it from pursuing its claim [Skoufalos, p.5; ICC 
Case No. 10032]. Respondent's request was presented in good faith, meeting its obligations under 
article 12 CAM-CCBC Rules [PO2, p.60, ¶32; vide ICC Case No. 10032, considering Respondent’s 
conduct as a relevant factor in order to justify granting security]. Additionally, the fact that 
Claimant offered to settle for a fraction of the amount claimed [Req. Arb., p.5, ¶17] may lead the 
arbitrators to conclude that the claim is being used oppressively and it would be fair to require the party to provide 
security for the applicant’s costs [commentary on art. 4 CIArb Guideline]. 
g) Claimant’s concealment of its financial situation prevented Respondent 
from an earlier request for security for costs 
82. Claimant also sustains the Tribunal should not order security because the request was made after the 
Parties and the tribunal had already agreed on the terms of reference [MfC, p.3, ¶1], providing no reasoning 
for such conclusion. 
83. Although the terms of reference are usually interpreted to fix the subject matter of the dispute 
and specify the parties’ claims [Terashima & Gagliardi, p.111; vide also 
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Fouchard/Gaillard/Goldman, p.666, ¶1228 controverting such nature], they do not prevent future 
applications for security for costs – as interim measures can be sought at any time before or 
during arbitral proceedings – let alone when parties only acknowledge relevant facts after their 
signature, in this case essentially through the pieces of information reported by Carioca Business 
News. Indeed, Respondent’s request is no new counterclaim for the purposes of article 4.21 
CAM-CCBC Rules but instead a provisional measure to ensure further compliance with the claim 
for costs Respondent filed upon its defense [Answer Req. Arb., p.26], therefore already included 
in the scope of the dispute [Rubino-Sammartano, p.588, ¶23.8; RSM Production v. Saint Lucia]. 
84. Costs are foreseen in the Terms of Reference and have to be allocated when rendering the final 
award [art.10.4.1 CAM-CCBC Rules; XY International v. Société Z]. However, it cannot be argued 
that requesting security conflicts with the wording of the Terms of Reference under which [d]uring 
the course of the arbitration proceedings, each party shall bear the fees of its respective attorneys and possibly of 
technical assistants, (...) [ToR, p.43, ¶12.4]. The granting of the measure does not exclude the 
payment by each party of the incurred costs but instead adds a guarantee to that payment – in a 
variety of forms, such as an escrow account, bond or bank guarantee – that the winning party will 
finally be reimbursed of those expenses by the opposing party. Thus, once security is ordered, it 
is deposited to the Tribunal’s order for release [Berger, p.13], being either used to cover the costs of 
the respondent or paid back to the claimant [Živković, ¶4], and not compromising the regular 
continuance of the proceedings nor the outcome of the arbitration. Thus, the likely non-
recoverability of Respondent’s costs largely outweighs any harm associated with Claimant’s 
deposit of the requested sum. 
85. Regardless, Claimant’s concealment of its financial situation through the omission of the outcome 
of previous arbitrations restrained Respondent from requesting the measure when previously 
approaching CAM-CCBC or the Tribunal. The non-compliance with the award rendered in the 
arbitration with Claimant’s supplier was only disclosed – under article 11.2 of the Rules – to the 
Chambers of Commerce in Equatoriana and Mediterraneo on 1 September 2016 and then press-
released the following day [Res. Ex. R6, p.47], after Respondent had already answered to the 
Request for Arbitration on 24 June 2016 and agreed to the Terms of Reference on 22 August 
2016. Additionally, Respondent only became aware of Claimant’s need for funding for these 
proceedings due to the paper dated 5 September 2016 [idem], being this the ultimate triggering 
event for the request for security for costs [art. 4 CIArb Guideline]. 
86. Considering that when drafting the terms of reference Respondent was unaware of any financial 
details regarding the TRF-305 other than it was to be completed in 2016 [PO2, p.58, ¶27], it could 
not be certain whether requesting security for costs was justifiable at that date. 
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87. Meanwhile, Respondent relied on Claimant’s misleading information about its assets and could 
never had been aware of the latter’s real financial status. At the time of contracting, Claimant 
presented itself as a financially sound company (presenting its financial status too positively) 
creating and maintaining the impression that an award of at least US$ 100 million was imminent 
in its arbitration with the government of Xanadu [PO2, p.60, ¶34]. Notwithstanding the fact that 
the final award was rendered three weeks before the signature of Contract, Claimant never 
informed Respondent that it was well below its expectations, not meeting the previsions for the 
2009 balance sheet [PO2, p.59, ¶28]. Claimant refused to comment on the information, opting 
not to clarify any misconceptions that might have been created due to the inaccurate information 
initially conveyed [Res. Ex. R6, p.47].  
88. Even though confidentiality has always constituted a main feature of arbitration [Redfern & 
Hunter, ¶1.105], such duty cannot be an absolute one [Hwang & Chung, p.612]. Exceptions have thus 
been found portraying a gradually growing transparency in international arbitration [Redfern & 
Hunter, ¶2.170; Lew II, p.22; Carbonneau, p.579; Lo, p.235; Villagi, p.3; Ruscalla, p.9; Buys, 
p.121] evidenced, for instance, by UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency – though not directly 
applicable to the disputes. Such tendency may be motivated by award enforcement aspects, public 
interest and inevitably international trade protection [Hwang & Chung, p.613-618; Gruner, p.923; 
Rogers, p.2]. Hence, confidentiality is not to be considered lege lata [Paulsson & Rawding, p.48] 
and depends on the specific circumstances of the case [Poudret & Besson, p.316]. 
89. Not only the outcome of the arbitration with the government of Xanadu was of major financial 
importance – weighing on Respondent’s decision to engage in a long term relationship with 
Claimant – but the arbitration itself directly encompassed general public interests. It emerged 
from an alleged non-compliance with local regulations and governmental officials conspiracy with local competitors 
to take possession of the very profitable subsidiary and its production facilities [Res. Ex. R6, p.47], which 
should immediately ground its public availability – though there is clearly a public interest in any 
arbitration by an investor against a government, especially if the claim is for a large sum of damages [Hwang & 
Chung, p.618].  
90. Furthermore, the transparency trend may also comprise disclosure obligations in international 
arbitration proceedings such as those pertaining to financial disclosure of legal proceedings, 
including private proceedings that may affect the company’s stock price [Vaughn, pp.37&38]. 
This is the case of both previous arbitrations Claimant was involved in. Had Respondent known 
about Claimant’s actual finances, it might not have engaged in a substantial contractual 
relationship possibly risking other business associations as the one established with Earhart.  
91. Besides, Claimant apparently holds that Respondent is demanding disclosure of the facts 
reported, when those were already solely revealed by the article in the Carioca Business News 
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[MfC, p.10, ¶22]. Respondent’s request was therefore submitted in a timely manner [Needham, 
pp.122-125; Regia v. Gulf] upon discovery of these facts on 6 September 2016.  
iii) The Tribunal will not be prejudging the case by ordering security  
92. Arbitrators have long abandoned the perspective according to which considering an application 
for security for costs would inevitably imply addressing the merits of the dispute, underlined by 
the fact that Claimant supports such allegation on outdated bibliography [MfC, p.10, ¶23]. 
However, there is no need for the tribunal to prejudge the outcome of the dispute and no reason why it should be 
thought to be doing so in making an order for security for costs [Redfern & O’Leary, pp.400&401; art. 2 
CIArb Guideline], limiting their examination to preliminarily establishing the claims’ good faith 
[Lew I, p.27; Rubins p.370; RSM Production v. Saint Lucia; Keary v. Tarmac]. In fact, such measure is 
usually issued by means of interim order or partial final award [Born, p.2505], in any case not 
disposing [Skoufalos, p.2] neither determining on the merits [Martowski, p.7] as it consists of a 
procedural decision [XY International v. Société Z]. 
93. Claimant affirms ordering security may stifle its claim or even deter it from continuing this 
arbitration [MfC, p.10, ¶23]. Yet, such ruling will generally not stifle the claim when funds can be 
provided from elsewhere, for example resorting to credit as Claimant previously has [vide Keary v. 
Tarmac; Hart v. Larchpark] nor prevent it from equally presenting its case. Nonetheless, Claimant’s 
concerns regarding the matter and its consequences – which contradict its prior statements 
asserting its financial stability [MfC, p.7, ¶13] – shall be interpreted as additional evidence of 
Claimant’s current fragile financial status and the admission of the demerit of its claims.  
94. By contrast, the non-granting of the measure may jeopardize the equal treatment of the parties – 
another core mandatory principle in arbitration [Holtzmann & Neuhaus, p.550] – established 
both in articles 7.8 CAM-CCBC Rules and 18 DAL. This principle is not intended to protect a 
party – Claimant in this case – from its own failures or strategic choices [Transnacional v. STET 
International], for instance the TRF-305 development, in a way that surpasses a reasoned request.  
95. Claimant would certainly not have cast the burden of a claim on Respondent if it were not thought 
that the latter had sufficient funds to pay an award. Respondent, in turn, does not have such 
assurance and therefore was placed in an uneven playing field [Redfern & O’Leary, p.412] and in 
a less favourable position when dragged to this arbitration [idem, p.398; Gu, p.168]. Thus, to 
guarantee equal treatment, Respondent is entitled to an order of security for costs.  
 
CONCLUSION: THE TRIBUNAL SHALL ORDER 
CLAIMANT TO PROVIDE SECURITY IN THE MINIMUM 
AMOUNT OF US$ 200,000.00  
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96. Although uncontested, the amount Respondent is requesting given that nowadays arbitration 
costs can reach amounts in the millions or tens of millions of dollars [Redfern & Hunter, ¶1.124; 
Hanotiau, p.213] in exchange of its clear benefits [Timm, p.202] and also include parties’ legal 
costs [ToR, p.43, ¶12.3;e.g. annotation 5(a)(iv) UNCITRAL Notes]; CIArb Guideline; Swiss entity 
v. Dutch entity]. The amount is merely estimated at this point since part of those final costs, namely 
evidentiary expenses and attorney’s fees, cannot yet be determined.  
97. Both CAM-CCBC Rules [art. 10.4.1] and the Terms of Reference [¶12.3] are silent on the 
reasonableness of the costs awarded to the winning party, as any definition for the concept is 
non-existent. Thus, the Tribunal is free to fix the amount secured pursuant to the particular 
circumstances of the case. 
98. Considering that regularly awarded legal costs can also amount to millions of dollars [Newman & 
Zaslowsky, p.2; e.g. Ulysseas v. Ecuador (US$2 million awarded for legal costs); Saur v. Argentina (US$1.5 
million awarded for legal costs)], Respondent’s request for a minimum of US$ 200,000.00 is not only 
justifiable – since it includes all accountable defense costs and evidence production expenses – 
but also will probably be far below its final costs. The amount is more than plausible for legal 
costs covering inhouse counsel from Mr Langweiler’s who already prepared two submissions 
[Answer Req. Arb & Req. SfC, the latter under considerable time pressure], and the expenses for the oral 
hearing of experts (subject to proposed fees, travel, accommodation and services) and witnesses 
(namely travel, accommodation and translation, since the Parties are from different domiciles) – 
this may amount up to 80% of the average overall costs of arbitral proceedings [ICC Report on 
Decisions as to Costs]. Thereby the Tribunal shall considerer the amount requested to be 
reasonable [vide RSM Production v. Saint Lucia where the claimant was ordered to post security for 
costs for US$ 750,000.00]. 
 
III. CLAIMANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN ADDITIONAL PAYMENT OF US$ 2,387,432.80  
99. Claimant is not entitled to additional payment since the Parties intended and agreed on a fixed 
exchange rate for the whole Contract (A) and Respondent is not under the obligation to bear 
the levy as it is an extraordinary bank charge (B). Therefore, no further payment of any kind is 
due as Respondent duly concluded the Contract and performed its payment obligations under 
the CISG (C). Furthermore, Respondent reasonably relied on Claimant throughout the 
negotiation and performance of the Contract; thus, it cannot be held liable for the latter’s 
inconsistent conduct (D).  
A. The Parties intended and agreed on a fixed exchange rate for the whole Contract 
100. Claimant argues that its ability to request payment of outstanding amounts arises from the proper reading of 
the wording of the addendum [MfC, p.16, ¶35]. However, Claimant cannot claim that the purchase 
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price was not the one provisioned in the 14 January 2015 invoice since both Parties clearly 
foresaw the application of a fixed exchange rate to the purchase of the fan-blades in their 
negotiations, statements and meetings, and by ultimately adding an express clause in the 
addendum to the Contract in this sense [Answer Req. Arb., p.25, ¶17]. 
101. Article 8 CISG provides for the interpretation of unilateral acts of each party, such as their 
statements and conduct, in order to shed light on the purpose of the contract [CISG Digest, 
p.34, ¶1; Secretariat Commentary, ¶2; Zeller, p.630; Cowhides case; Marble v. Ceramica]. It applies not 
only to the interpretation of concluded contracts but also to its formation [Ziegel, ¶3].  
102. Pursuant to this provision, it can only be inferred that the Parties intended to work on a fixed 
exchange rate basis for the whole Contract. An analysis of the subjective intent of the wording 
of the Contract points in that direction (i) as well as through the understanding of a reasonable 
person under the same circumstances (ii) and considering the particularities of the case (iii). 
Moreover, the addendum clarified such intention (iv). 
 
i) According to article 8(1) CISG the subjective intent of the parties was to apply 
a fixed exchange rate to the whole Contract  
103. Claimant argues the Contract should be interpreted in line with articles 8(1) and 8(2) CISG; 
however, it holds a misleading understanding of their scope and application [MfC, p.16, ¶35].  
104. Article 8(1) CISG provides that contracts are to be interpreted according to the actual intent of 
the parties [Schlechtriem, p.39], where the other party (…) could not have been unaware of what that intent 
was [CISG Digest, p.34, ¶4; Vorobey, p.143; Building materials case]. Similarly, UNIDROIT 
Principles establish that [a] contract shall be interpreted according to the common intention of the parties 
[art. 4.1(1); vide Bonell, p.137] and that statements and other conduct of a party shall be interpreted according 
to that party’s intention if the other party knew or could not have been unaware of that intention [art. 4.2(1)]. 
In fact, not only was Claimant not unaware of Respondent’s intention to establish an exchange 
rate, but it even expected to work on a US$ 1 = EQD 2 exchange rate basis regardless of this 
dispute, which is evidenced by various facts.  
105. First, while the Parties were still subsidiaries of Engineering International, Claimant knew of 
Respondent’s need to be de-risked to make it more attractive to buyers, which expressly included 
taking steps such as agreeing on fixed exchange rates in order to reduce the business risk of its 
commercial agreements [Res. Ex. R1, p.27].  
106. Second, considering the final remark in Claimant’s notes on the meeting of 1 May 2010, Claimant 
acknowledged the expected and intended exchange rate: our expenses in EQD will have to be converted 
but no major risk involved. Exchange rate should be around 2-1 and has been very stable over the last years [Cl. 
Ex. C1, p.8].  
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107. Third, the signing of the Contract had to be postponed due to Claimant’s sale to Wright Holding 
PLC, at that time Skymover, on 27 July 2010; Respondent did not know about such sale up until 
that date [PO2, p. 54, ¶1]. At that point, however, the Contract had already been negotiated and 
written down. It was only three days after its signature that Respondent realized that the Parties 
forgot to add an express provision as to the exchange rate to the model used [Answer Req. Arb. p.25, ¶10]. 
Hence, in view of convenience and following a notice that Respondent could need clamps in the 
future [PO2, p.57, ¶16; Req. Arb. pp.4&5, ¶8], the Parties regulated the order and all remaining 
terms (i.e. the exchange rate) in the addendum. Thus, Claimant accepted Respondent’s offer to 
explicitly include the exchange rate governing the whole Contract in the addendum [Cl. Ex. C2, 
p.11; Res. Ex. R2, p.28; Res. Ex. R4, p.30].  
108. Indeed, Claimant knew or ought to have known [Zeller, p.630] Respondent’s intention to fix an 
exchange rate; it had sufficient reason to; the exchange rate was well within its own predictions; 
and, more than all, it willingly and knowingly accepted such provision. 
ii) According to article 8(2) CISG any reasonable person under the same 
circumstances would understand that the fixed exchange rate applied to the 
whole Contract  
a) Fixing a price range in Section 4 of the Contract cannot be interpreted as the 
Parties’ intention not to establish an exchange rate 
109. Claimant holds that the inclusion of the price range at Art. 4 of the Development and Sales Agreement, may 
be seen as prima facie evidence of the lack of a fixed exchange rate and a realization of the parties shared intention 
to make a profit from this agreement to jointly develop and for the sale of fan-blades and clamps [MfC, p.16, 
¶36]. In other words, Claimant deems that the establishment of a provision to fix an exchange 
rate for the fan-blades was unnecessary altogether since the Parties fixed maximum and minimum 
sale price for the blades to ensure both Parties obtained a profit [MfC, pp.16&17, ¶¶37&38]. This could 
not be further from the truth. 
110. Furthermore, Claimant raises another false issue: from its understanding, a reasonable person 
reading the addendum would find the fixed exchange rate only applicable to the clamps, as the sum of 9.744 
US$ falls short of the minimum pricing range seen at Art. 4 of the DSA [MfC, p.16, ¶37]. Indeed, the 
exchange rate is applicable only to production costs, but as the Contract price is calculated on an 
actual cost plus profit basis [Cl. Ex. C5, p.14], the formula to calculate the final purchase price is 
based on the production costs added to a contractually agreed upon percentage, namely 
Claimant’s profit, depending on which bracket the final production cost falls into [Cl. Ex. C2, 
p.10, Section 4]. Thus, unlike what Claimant argues, the need to fix an exchange rate is vital.  
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111. It is interesting to note that considering the price mechanism in Section 4 of the Contract, 
Claimant would obtain a greater profit by using the fixed exchange rate rather than through the 
use of a floating one (respectively, US$ 950,000.00 v. 840,000.00) [vide Chemical products case 
concerning interpretation suggested by the parties’ interests in the contract].  
112. Nevertheless, Respondent will demonstrate how the application of a fixed exchange rate results 
in a final purchase price entirely within the pricing range of Section 4 of the Contract, thus not 
failing its obligations by refusing to pay the additional payment [MfC, p.16, ¶37]. 
113. It is undisputed that the production costs per fan-blade is EQD 19,586 [PO1, p.52, ¶3(ii)]. 
Applying the agreed exchange rate of US$ 1 = EQD 2.01, each fan-blade costs US$ 9,744.28, in 
addition to the respective profit of US$ 475. Thus, Respondent paid US$ 10,219.28 per fan-
blade. This is well above the minimum price per fan-blade provisioned in Section 4 of the 
Contract. Asymmetrically, applying a floating exchange rate of US$ 1 = EQD 1.79, each fan-
blade would cost US$ 10,941.9, in addition to US$ 420. This amounts to a total of US$ 11,361.9 
per fan-blade, representing a non-contractual 11% increase in the agreed price. 
b) Rather, an objective analysis under article 8(2) CISG determines that both 
Parties intended to apply a fixed exchange rate to the whole Contract  
114. If the examination of the subjective intent proves insufficient, which Respondent holds 
otherwise, statements made by and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the understanding 
that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have had in the same circumstances [art. 
8(2) CISG; CISG Digest, pp.34&35, ¶8; Zeller, p.635; Magnesium case].  
115. In order to determine the intent of a reasonable person of the same kind in the same 
circumstances, it is necessary, among other things, to analyze the wording actually adopted or 
the conduct engaged in. Hence, article 8(2) provides the interpretation process to determine the 
true content of the communication [Secretariat Commentary, ¶5].  
116. In cases where a seller mistakenly offers to sell goods for ‘68,000 francs’ when he intended to offer to sell them 
for 86,000 francs, a reasonable person of the same kind and in the same circumstances of the buyer might not 
realize that the seller has made a mistake in expression [Farnsworth, p. 102]. The invoice, however, had 
no mistake, as the exchange rate provision was clear and unequivocal.  
117. To begin with, Claimant was specifically asked if the terms contained in the addendum were 
acceptable [Res. Ex. R2, p.28]. If there were any ambiguous terms, Claimant had the chance to 
dispute, challenge or correct them. However, Claimant agreed to link the agreement concerning 
the purchase of the clamps to the one concerning the purchase of the fan-blades [Res. Ex. R4, 
p.30], also agreeing to the fixed exchange rate [idem]. It is clear from the wording of the e-mail sent 
by Claimant that the first sentence concerned exclusively the purchase of the clamps whereas the 
second one aimed the whole Contract. Indeed, when also agreeing to the fixed exchange rate, 
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Claimant is applying a single formula to both purchases. Thus, a reasonable – business – person 
would have understood such wording and phrasing as intent to address the issues together, all 
the more since the Contract and the addendum embody a single document.  
118. Besides, adding such provision was an entirely new practice in the Parties’ relationship, so any 
lack of clarity had to be dealt with in a crucial manner. Therefore, if Claimant did not understand 
the full extent of the clause, they should have said so and not let us believe that the exchange rate applied to 
the complete contract [Res. Ex. R5, p.31]. 
119. However, and very suitably, there are two reasonable person[s] of the same kind as the parties (...) in the 
same circumstances [arts. 4.1(2) & 4.2(2) UNIDROIT Principles]: Mario Lee – Claimant’s  
accountant, and Paul Romario – Respondent’s CEO, persons with, for example, the same linguistic 
knowledge, technical skill, or business experience [Bonell, p.138]. 
120. Mario Lee himself stated that he was given excel files with the costs incurred per fan blade and per clamp 
as well as Ms Kwang’s [another accountant for Claimant] binder concerning the blade project containing all 
correspondence and the Development and Sales Agreement [Cl. Ex. C4, p. 13], thus having more than 
enough information regarding the whole transaction. Hence, when Mario Lee applies the fixed 
exchange rate of US$ 1 = EQD 2.01 as stated in the addendum [idem] to both invoices, it demonstrates 
that the Parties’ intention to apply the fixed exchange rate and the wording of the Contract is so 
clear that even under considerable time pressure it can be read and understood according to 
Respondent’s real intention. 
121. As experienced business persons, Paul Romario’s and Amelia Beinhorn’s (Claimant’s COO) e-
mail exchange is the paradigm of the understanding of both Parties. Paul Romario sent Amelia 
Beinhorn an e-mail detailing the explicit wording of the addendum which she agreed to. The 
wording of the addendum could not be clearer [Res. Ex. R5, p.31]. Indeed, it is safe to objectively 
conclude that both parties found it clear that the exchange rate would apply also to the fan-blades [idem]. 
iii) According to article 8(3) CISG, all the relevant circumstances of the case 
indicate that the Parties intended to fix an exchange rate to the Contract  
122. In the present case, it is also particularly important to consider all relevant circumstances of the case, 
including, but not limited to [UN Official Records, p.18, qualifying article 8(3) as enumerative rather 
than exhaustive], the negotiations, any course of conduct or performance between the parties, any relevant usages, 
and subsequent conduct of the parties [art. 8(3) CISG; CISG Digest, pp. 35&36, ¶17; vide also art. 4(3) 
UNIDROIT Principles]. Thus, all extrinsic evidence may be weighed to establish and interpret 
the terms of a contract [Zeller, p.630], which means that provisions in writing are but one of the 
many circumstances to consider [CISG AC Opinion No. 3, ¶2.1]. 
123. Claimant cannot invoke the Parol Evidence Rule in the case [MfC, p.17, ¶38] as the Contract is 
governed by the CISG which rejects such approach [Marble v. Ceramica]. Commentators have 
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agreed that the CISG lacks a parol evidence rule and allows a court interpreting a written contract to consider 
not just trade usage, course of dealing, and course of performance, but even the parties' prior negotiations. [Dodge, 
p.87]. In fact, conversely to the Parol Evidence Rule, the Convention specifically allows for the 
consideration of prior negotiations [Andreason, ¶III(A)(1)]. 
124. While the Parties contracted under the same group of companies, there had been no need for the 
parties to explicitly regulate the exchange rate [Answer Req. Arb. p.24, ¶8]. However, presently, their 
business model is independent from one another and current practices do not have to meet their 
previous ones. Claimant cannot rely on their previous dealings [MfC, p.16, ¶37] as the circumstances 
in which they took place have significantly changed [Req. Arb. p.7, ¶21]. This is also one more 
reason to justify why the Parties intended to fix the exchange rate. 
125. Nevertheless, if the Tribunal were to consider the Parties’ usages under article 9 CISG [Fiberglass 
composite materials case; Eörsi, ¶¶2.05&2.06], it shall take into consideration the fact that there is no 
fixed usage as the agreements depend on the bargaining power of each party, resting on who has 
a better opportunity to hedge the risk or is willing to take the risk [PO2, p.56, ¶13]. Besides, an 
usage requires standardization and reiteration. Thus, two contractual relationships were anyway not 
sufficient to establish a practice between the parties under article 9(1) CISG [White urea case]. In order for 
a practice between the parties to be established, long lasting contractual relationships involving 
more sales contracts between the parties are required [idem], contrary to what Claimant puts forth 
when sustaining that the Parties did not intend to fix an exchange rate similarly to previous 
cooperations [MfC, pp.16&17, ¶37&38].  
126. Therefore, not only did such previous cooperations occur in particularly different instances 
[Answer Req. Arb., p.24, ¶8], but the non-fixation of an exchange rate is contrary to the aircraft 
industry’s normal business practice according to which parties normally either explicitly agree on 
the exchange rate or the relevant date for it [PO2, p.56, ¶13]. 
127. Even if the Tribunal deems the referred previous contracts as an actual established practice, then 
it shall conclude that the Parties never intended to apply the exchange rate at the time of contract 
performance [Answer Req. Arb. p.24, ¶8]. Furthermore, if this route is taken, then the Tribunal 
must also take into account the established practice of the Parties to adopt the exchange rate which was 
profitable for RESPONDENT [PO2, p.54, ¶5].  
128. Therefore, considering all relevant circumstances in which the Contract was negotiated and 
concluded, it comes out clear that the Parties intended to fix an exchange rate for both orders. 
Accordingly, when signing the addendum, Claimant could not have been unaware of its scope.  
iv) Moreover, the addendum validly and effectively clarified that intention 
129. Irrespective of the Parties’ demonstrated intention to fix an exchange rate to the Contract, 
Claimant alleges the fan-blades were not under a fixed exchange rate as the clamps [MfC, p.18, ¶41]. 
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130. Both articles 29 CISG and 2.18 UNIDROIT Principles reinforce the principle that any agreed 
modification (...) will be valid in whatever form it is made or contained [Eiselen, ¶d)]. The first entrenches 
the principles of party autonomy, freedom of contract and from formalities contained in article 
11 CISG [idem], envisioning contractual modification – which may include variations, alterations 
and a fortiori ratione clarifications – [Viscasillas, p.170] by mere agreement between the parties. 
This is underlined by the fact that the Contract does not contain a provision requiring any 
modification to be in writing or an entire agreement clause [PO2, p.54, ¶4]. 
131. Firstly, in light of the circumstances, the language contained in the addendum was clear and 
unambiguous [cf. Summer cloth collection case] so both Parties could not have been unaware of its 
extent. Secondly, Claimant expressly confirmed its content [cf. Rare hard wood case], which is of 
extreme importance since mere silence or inaction does not by itself amount to an acceptance 
[Viscasillas, p.172]. Therefore, the addendum contained specific clarifications concerning the 
whole Contract, agreed to and signed by both Parties [Res. Ex. R 4, p.30].  
132. Claimant argues that the stipulation providing for [o]ther terms as per main Agreement [Cl. Ex. C2, 
p.11] objectively excludes the application of the fixed exchange rate to the fan-blades [MfC, p.16, 
¶35]. Although Claimant recognizes the importance of the interpretation of the addendum, the 
conclusion that the Tribunal must draw is rather different from Claimant’s. 
133. The actual order in which the clauses contained in the addendum are drafted is not aimless: the 
one establishing the fixed rate is the last precisely due to the fact that it is the only addition to 
the main Contract and therefore needed to be singled-out.  
134. The addendum defines the terms applicable to the purchase of the clamps and contains 
specifications as to the quantity and the price calculation method. The terms not expressly 
foreseen in the addendum are the same terms provided for the purchase of the fan-blades, 
according to the clause [o]ther terms as per main Agreement [Cl. Ex. C2, p.11]. Those other terms could 
have never included a provision concerning the applicable exchange rate since the main Contract 
was originally silent on that matter. Thus, the clause providing for the fixed exchange rate cannot 
be seen as an exception to a non-existent clause. Instead, the logical conclusion to be drawn from 
the interpretation of the clause fixing the exchange rate [idem] is that it aimed the whole Contract 
and not only the addendum as Claimant claims [MfC, p.16, ¶35], since terms and expressions used by 
one or both parties are clearly not intended to operate in isolation but have to be seen as an integral part of their 
general context [Bonell, p.142 on article 4.4 UNIDROIT Principles]. As the Parties did not initially add 
the provision concerning the exchange rate, the inclusion of the same in the addendum can only 
be seen as comprising the purchase of both the fan-blades and the clamps, according to the exact 
wording of the parties and well as the systematic context of the contract [Fruit and vegetables case]. 
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135. In virtue of good faith, Claimant could have requested further clarifications as early as 22 October 
2010, when Respondent first suggested the wording of the addendum via e-mail [Res.  Ex. R2, 
p.28; Res. Ex. R4, p.30], all the more since it was the first time a provision dealing with exchange 
rates was added to a Contract between the Parties. 
136. Considering that the addendum stands as a contractual modification clarifying the Parties’ 
intentions and payment terms, Claimant cannot allege that the exchange rate was a floating one 
[Req. Arb. p.5, ¶12]. Consequently, Respondent did not fail to complete its obligations [MfC, 
p.16, ¶37] since it effected payment as per the main agreement. 
137. Although, and alternatively, even if the Tribunal finds the Parties had not actually fixed an 
exchange rate for the Contract – which Respondent contests – the latter could not be the one to 
bear the risk of Claimant’s national currency fluctuations over the course of the Contract since 
it can be sustained that this must be borne by the creditor as it is its domestic affair [e.g. ICAC Case 
No. 61/1993], despite being a logically foreseeable aspect of international trade [Nicita, p.1]. 
Claimant could ultimately claim compensation from losses arising from such devaluation had 
Respondent delayed in the payment of the price [cf. CISG Digest, p.347, ¶37] which it did not. 
CONCLUSION: THE FIXED EXCHANGE RATE APPLIES 
TO THE WHOLE CONTRACT 
B. Respondent is not under the obligation to bear the levy  
138. Claimant alleges that Respondent did not take the necessary steps to enable the full payment of 
the purchase price it was obliged to under both the Contract and article 54 CISG [MfC, p.19&20, 
¶¶42-45]. However, Claimant seems to ignore that Respondent was not under any obligation – 
contractual or legal – to pay the levy. This is because Respondent was only to bear the costs for 
the transfer of the amount (i) and cannot be held liable for Claimant’s own lack of foreseeability 
(ii). Alternatively, Respondent is exempt under article 80 CISG (iii). 
i) Respondent shall only bear the costs for the transfer of the amount 
139. Section 4 of the Contract states that [t]he bank charges for the transfer of the amount are to be borne by 
the BUYER [Cl. Ex. C2, p.10, Section 4: Purchase Price]. 
140. At the time the bank charges provision was introduced, Respondent had no knowledge nor 
justifiable reasons to be aware of the existence of Regulation ML/2010C, since Wright Ltd was 
its only Equatorianian supplier and no comparable rule exists in Mediterraneo or any other 
country known to Respondent [Answer Req. Arb., p.26, ¶18].  
141. Claimant, on the contrary, was aware of the press reports from December 2009 that greatly 
criticized the fact that Equatoriana was one of six countries worldwide where private parties had 
to pay a fee for such type of investigations and clearances [PO2, p.55, ¶7]; its Contract negotiators 
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did not know about the specific provisions of the Regulation, but were aware of its existence; and 
finally, Claimant’s financial department was fully aware of the scope of the Regulation nearly two 
months before the Contract was signed, remaining unknown why this fact only came to surface 
after the Contract was performed and paid for [idem, ¶¶7&8]. Nevertheless, this cannot be 
imputed to Respondent and must instead be borne by Claimant as the latter failed to inform the 
former about such Regulation [Answer Req. Arb., p. 26, ¶19] or to clarify the bank charges 
provision since it was Claimant who suggested its inclusion in the Contract [PO2, p.55, ¶6]. 
142. Thus, following the rules of interpretation of contracts provided in article 8(1) CISG, the bank 
charges provision included in the Contract has to be interpreted as not including the levy applied 
to the paid amount since neither negotiating party was aware of its application nor was that the 
intended purpose of the provision when written for the agreement concerning the TRF 155‐II 
of March 2003. 
143. Had Claimant wanted to include the payment of the levy on the bank charges provision, it would 
or could have, upon inclusion, suggested alterations to its drafting [idem]. Thereby Respondent is 
not under any contractual obligation to bear such non-ordinary charge.  
144. Furthermore, contrarily to Claimant’s arguments [MfC, pp.19&20, ¶42], Respondent is not 
obliged under article 54 CISG to pay the levy as it cannot be considered to enable the payment.  
145. Article 54 CISG deals with actions preparatory to payment of the price [CISG Digest p.264, ¶1], 
encompassing several steps prior to the date of payment [Report of the Committee, p.341, ¶319; Osuna-
González, p.299]. Preparatory actions required by public law regulations may include, for 
instance, governmental permissions or even – as Claimant indeed notices – the procurement of 
securities for payment [CISG Digest p.264, ¶1; Maskow, p.399, ¶2.9; MfC, pp.19&20, ¶42]. 
Nonetheless, these aim to ensure that the payment is actually made [Arbitration proceeding 123/1992]. 
146. Regulation ML/2010C is rather different from preparatory actions because the 0.5% subtraction 
by the Central Bank can only occur after payment is indeed made, non-constituting a measure 
necessary to enable the buyer to pay the price [vide Gabriel, p.274, exemplifying a governmental 
tariff on the export of money, prior to buyer’s transfer, as such a measure]. In that sense, it is only 
after an amount larger than US$ 2 million is transferred to an Equatorianian bank account that 
the Financial Intelligence Unit comes into the picture in order to determine if the transferred 
amount should be cleared and credited back to the relevant bank account – as it has been doing 
since 2010 [PO2, p.56, ¶10]. Hence, as such process first required Respondent’s transfer to 
Claimant’s chosen bank account – which it duly performed, and only then was the 0.5% 
deducted, Claimant is wrong to affirm Respondent is burdened to pay the levy when, according 
to article 54 CISG, it is not under any legal obligation to bear it. 
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ii) Respondent did not have to be aware of the application of the levy 
147. Besides the abovementioned interpretation, Respondent shall still not be deemed liable for the 
levy as it was not under the duty to know its content or applicability. 
148. As previously mentioned, Respondent had no knowledge about the content of ML/2010C since 
no comparable rule exists in Mediterraneo [PO2, p.55, ¶¶7&8]. In addition, the foreign press, 
including newspapers in Mediterraneo, merely reported that the Equatorianian government had 
taken actions to fight money laundering [idem], but did not specify the nature of such actions.  
149. Furthermore, not only does the Contract not specifically mention the specialized public law 
provision contained in Regulation ML/2010C, but despite having superior information about 
the specific regulatory requirements within its own jurisdiction, Claimant failed to disclose such 
relevant piece of information.   
150. Strikingly, Claimant argues that Respondent must bear the financial loss it incurred due to the 
regulation, despite having foreseen, but neither accounted for nor informed Respondent about 
its scope. This does not mean, however, that Respondent ought to have known about the levy. 
Indeed, the mere fact that a party has entered into a contract with a party from a different country should not in 
itself be sufficient to impute knowledge into the former of the intricacies of that country's trading policy and 
legislation [Saidov, p.202].  
151. This analysis is consistent with the famous approach of the German Supreme Court who decided 
that the seller was not expected to comply with specialized public law provisions of the buyer’s country or 
the country of use due to it being impossible to determine where, exactly, would its goods be used 
[New Zealand Mussels Case]. Furthermore, the Court stated that regulations of the buyer’s country 
would apply only where the same standard exists in both the seller’s country and the buyer’s country or where 
the buyer had specified the applicable standards and relied on the seller’s expertise to satisfy them [idem; Gillette 
& Walt, p.226].  
152. Taking such court decision into account, the same conclusion can also be applied to the present 
case. Indeed, commentators advocate that in order for Claimant to be correct in assuming that 
Respondent ought to know of and pay for the levy, there must be some additional evidence showing (...), 
at the time the contract was made, the buyer was informed about the relevant rules in the seller's country; or laws 
in the buyer's country were the same as those in the seller's country and there was a good reason why the buyer 
should have been aware of that fact [Saidov, p.203]. 
153. Hence, Respondent cannot be burdened with the payment of a charge it was not in position to 
be aware of due to its peculiarity. Indeed, it should not be assumed that buyers will necessarily be aware of 
the laws and regulations of the seller's country [idem, p.202]. Conversely, in such situations the seller should 
be deemed obliged to indicate such peculiarities to the buyer [Maskow, p.398, ¶2.7]. Therefore, the lack of 
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information given to Respondent concerning the levy shall be understood as excluding its liability 
for the payment of the claimed amount.  
iii) Even if the Tribunal understands Respondent must bear the levy, it shall 
find it exempt under article 80 CISG 
154. Nevertheless, if the Tribunal finds Respondent liable for the levy, it shall still not be awarded to 
pay the amount as Respondent would be exempt under article 80 CISG which deals with impaired 
performance and prohibits a party from relying on a failure of the other party to perform, to the extent that 
such failure was caused by the first party’s act or omission [Schlechtriem, p.105]. This omission will only be 
sufficient if the promisee has a duty to act, for instance because the act was necessary in order to enable the promisor 
to perform [Huber & Mullis, p.266].  
155. Claimant argues Respondent is not allowed to invoke any exemption to the obligation to pay the 
levy under article 79 CISG [MfC, pp.19&20, ¶42]. However, Claimant did not act appropriately 
when it failed to inform Respondent of the levy, going against the general duty to cooperate 
arising from the principle of good faith upon which article 80 CISG is based [Neumann, pp.68&69; 
Butler, Section 1]. Indeed, good faith implies a duty of cooperation and a duty to communicate all relevant 
information between the contracting parties [Audit, Section B; Highet, p.133, 135]. Accordingly, the 
general duty to cooperate includes the general duty to disclose material information to the other 
party [Magnus, ¶5.11; Ferrari, p.226; Machinery Case] which might threaten the performance of the contract 
[Sim, Section B, 2b)]. In this sense, Claimant had the duty to inform Respondent about the 
content of ML/2010C as the lack of information indeed threatened the performance of the 
Contract, namely the payment of the levy.  
156. Claimant did not comply with its duty to cooperate with Respondent by not disclosing such 
relevant information about the levy even though it was aware of its existence at the time of 
performance [PO2, p.55, ¶8]. As previously explained, Respondent did not have any goods 
reasons to know about such particular and extraordinary levy other than by relying on Claimant’s 
knowledge. Thus, the Tribunal shall deem Claimant responsible for Respondent’s default and 
exempt the latter from specific performance of this part of the Contract. 
CONCLUSION: CLAIMANT SHALL BEAR THE LEVY AS 
IT IS AN EXTRAORDINARY BANK CHARGE 
C. Respondent duly performed all contractual and legal obligations  
157. In accordance with the invoice sent with the fan-blades on 14 January 2015, Respondent 
transferred US$ 20,438,560 to Claimant’s bank account [Answer Req. Arb. p.25, ¶16&17]. Since 
the Parties intended to and agreed on using a fixed exchange rate for the whole Contract [idem], 
and Respondent is not under the obligation to bear the levy [idem, p.26, ¶¶18&19], no further 
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payment is due since the latter duly concluded the Contract and performed its obligations as per 
the main agreement and the CISG, complying with articles 53, 54 and 60.  
158. A contract is, first and foremost, the manifestation of an offer and an acceptance, and therefore 
the product of two unilateral acts [Secretariat Commentary, ¶2]. 
159. Article 14(1) CISG provides that an offer is sufficiently definite if it indicates the goods and fixes 
or makes provision for determinability of the price. Considering Sections 3 and 4 of the Contract, 
in addition with the addendum, the Parties agreed on the production of fan-blades and clamps, 
making sufficient provisions for determining their quantity and price.  
160. Accordingly, Respondent’s purchase order of fan-blades and clamps was accepted at the moment 
Claimant performed acts assenting to that offer [art. 18 CISG] by producing [Zara v. Company], 
shipping [Brassiere cups case] and submitting written invoices [ZPrinting and Dyeing v. Microflock 
Textile] to Respondent. 
161. In fact, Respondent is in agreement with Claimant’s understanding of the 1998 Appellate Court 
of Paris Laborall v. Matis judgement in the sense that once the duty to deliver goods has been adhered to, 
the completion of the duty will be seen (...) when goods and necessary documentation have effectively transferred 
property to buyer [MfC, ¶40, pp.17&18], not contesting Claimant completed its obligations. 
162. Respondent also successfully performed its obligations under the CISG by receiving [Doors case; 
Carpet case], examining [Cl. Ex. C3, p.12; art. 38 CISG], and paying for the goods as per Claimant’s 
instructions [Interland v. Tessenderlo; Crucible press case; Cathode ray tube case] in a timely manner, thus 
paying the price (...) and taking delivery as required by the contract and this Convention [arts. 53&60 CISG]. 
163. The Contract bound Respondent to pay not once the new-fan blade had been developed as 
Claimant claims [MfC, p.1], but upon delivery of the fan-blades – which occurred on 14th January 
2015. This should be confirmed by the BUYER as soon as possible, and in accordance, Respondent 
examined and effected full payment the following morning [Cl. Ex. C2, p.10]. In conclusion, 
Respondent complied with all obligations: price, time, and place for payment [Sevón, p.208].  
CONCLUSION: RESPONDENT FULLY PERFORMED ITS 
CONTRACTUAL AND LEGAL OBLIGATIONS   
D. Respondent cannot be liable for Claimant’s inconsistent behaviour  
164. As demonstrated above, Respondent reasonably relied on Claimant throughout the negotiation 
and performance of the Contract [cf. Lemire v. Ukraine]. Thus, since Claimant failed to avoid 
detriment occasioned in consequence of such reliance, Respondent cannot be held liable for 
Claimant’s inconsistent behaviour and claims. 
165. According to widely accepted standards, [e]ach party must act in (...) good faith and fair dealing in 
international trade [art. 1.7 UNIDROIT Principles]. Such duty may not be excluded nor limited 
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[idem]. Moreover, [a] party cannot act inconsistently with an understanding it has caused the other party to 
have and upon which that party reasonably has acted in reliance to its detriment [idem art. 1.8]. This 
understanding may result, for instance, from conduct, or from silence when a party would reasonably expect 
the other to speak to correct a known error or misunderstanding that was being relied upon [Bonell, p.23].  
166. Claimant did not act in bona fide since it did not reasonably pursue everything in its reach in order 
to enlighten Respondent of its alleged own subjective intent regarding the contractual provisions, 
having rather adopted an ambiguous conduct [e.g. ICC Case No. 14108]. For instance, it could have 
demanded clarifications about the applicable exchange rate, voiced its disagreement over the use 
of a fixed one when the addendum was added, estimated the final production costs or even 
prepared provisional documents containing the price for the goods at an earlier date. In addition, 
Claimant did not provide any clarifications concerning the levy, nor seemingly take the effort to 
inform the negotiating parties about its existence and eventual applicability. Furthermore, 
Claimant is now demonstrating a contradictory behaviour in disregard of Respondent’s legitimate 
expectations in relation to the Contract, opportunistically attempting to take advantage of the 
exchange rate fluctuation between the conclusion of the Contract and its performance [PO2, 
p.56, ¶12] – which happened to sway in Claimant’s way. 
167. Needless to say, Claimant had enough opportunities and expertise to account for these faults. 
Instead, it was only after the Contract was performed that Claimant demanded additional 
payment. Consequently, since it is now unjustifiably seeking to act inconsistently, Claimant shall be 
the one liable for any costs or losses incurred by reason of reliance [Finn, p.24; cf. ICC Case No. 14108], 
and not Respondent.   
CONCLUSION: CLAIMANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY 
ADDITIONAL PAYMENT UNDER THE CONTRACT 
 
REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
 
Counsel for Respondent respectively requests the Tribunal to find that: 
 
 Claimant’s claims are inadmissible as not having been timely submitted and therefore shall be 
rejected; 
 It is empowered to order Claimant to post security for the costs Respondent is likely to incur in 
this arbitration, and should exercise it by granting the justified measure; 
 Claimant’s claims for payment are to be dismissed as Respondent fully and dully performed its 
obligations under the Contract and the CISG; and 
 Claimant shall bear all the costs Respondent incurred in this arbitration, including costs due to 
the Tribunal, attorney’s fees, and expenses related to production of evidence. 
